Philosophy of Language, Miscellaneous

I argue that Dewey had a kind of pragmatic epistemology in his Experience and Nature with the notions of “sense” and “signification” as the main players. Instead of the classical epistemological question, “How is knowledge possible anyway, überhaupt?”, Dewey’s pragmatically reconstructed question would be “How do we make sense of the world that is around us?” Hence, Dewey’s pragmatic epistemology can be seen as a theory of sensemaking. Unlike Mark Johnson who, together with Don Tucker (2021), and Jay Schulkin (2023), (...) claim that, for Dewey, it is non-linguistic sense that always precedes and gives rise to linguistic signification, I maintain that, for Dewey, it is rather the other way around. I examine Dewey’s claims about animals and conclude with the suggestion that his pragmatic epistemology makes the contemporary “experience vs language” debate another false dilemma. (shrink)

Language is the chief tool for philosophizing since language mirrors thought. Far more than a means of communication, language is a critical framework for our cognitive processes and an effective medium for cultural expression a central enquiry underlying philosophy of language is how language connects to the world, how our words refer to objects and how sentences or propositions turn to be true or false. To explore these philosophers of language are engaged in three important concerns, namely 1. Syntax dealing (...) with grammar which aims to discover those basic principles that determine whether a given string of signs is well formed. 2. Semantics dealing with the question of meaning and truth conditions of statements and 3) Pragmatics, dealing with the use of sentences and the question what sorts of act can be accomplished in actual communication. Hence philosophy of language is chiefly engaged in presenting a systematic view of the concepts of meaning, reference, truth, mind, world etc. It is mainly done for the analysis of the logic of the concepts and their inter connections. The study of the logical structure of language brings within its ambit the syntactic and semantic questions concerning language. It is interesting to see that the philosophers of language are much concerned with the concept of mind. This in turn, is related to the understanding of the nature of the world which forms the background of the concepts of language and mind. Hence philosophy of language may be described as that which involves the study of language, thought and reality. This is true of the philosophical engagement of language everywhere, irrespective of whether they belong to the Indian or the Western traditions. (shrink)

This article continues the reconstruction begun in The Riddle Does Not Exist. It follows the ontology of the picture theory through universal application to the necessary nonsensicality of the propositions of the Tractatus, the manifestation of the limit of language, and the distinction between saying and showing. It then reconstructs the movement from necessary nonsensicality to unsayability, seeing the world rightly, and the contemplation of the world as a limited whole. No additional metaphysical content is required; the movement follows from (...) the logic of language and the ontology of the picture theory itself. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, Türk tarihsel varlığını belirli bir coğrafi merkez, tekil bir etnik oluşum veyadoğrusal bir devletler silsilesi üzerinden açıklamak yerine, Avrasya'nın farklıbölgelerinde ortaya çıkan siyasal, toplumsal ve kültürel süreçlerin etkileşimibağlamında değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmanın temel yaklaşımı, Türktarihinin uzun dönemli seyrini mobilite, teşkilatlanma, kurumsal adaptasyon ve kültürelsentez kavramları üzerinden incelemektir. Bu çerçevede bozkır toplumlarınınhareketlilik kapasitesi, siyasi konfederasyonların imparatorluk ölçeğinde örgütlenmesi,yerleşik toplumlarla kurulan ilişkiler ve farklı dini-hukuki geleneklerin siyasal yapılaradahil edilmesi temel inceleme alanlarını oluşturmaktadır. Hunlar, Göktürkler, Uygurlar,Karahanlılar, Büyük Selçuklular ve Osmanlılar üzerinden yürütülen (...) değerlendirme,Türk tarihinin yalnızca göç ve fetih olgularıyla açıklanamayacağını; farklı tarihselkoşullara uyum sağlayabilen kurumsal ve kültürel dönüşüm süreçlerinin de bu tarihinsürekliliğinde önemli rol oynadığını ileri sürmektedir. Çalışma, bu nedenle Türk tarihiniAvrasya tarihinin dışında veya yalnızca belirli bir bölgenin tarihi olarak değil, farklısiyasi ve medeniyet havzaları arasındaki etkileşimlerin önemli unsurlarından biri olarakele almaktadır.Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Tarihi, Avrasya, Tarihsel Mobilite, Bozkır Siyaseti, KurumsalAdaptasyon, Kültürel Sentez, Devlet Geleneği. (shrink)

Recent advances in inverting large language models have demonstrated that the prompting context underlying a model’s textual output can be recovered with high fidelity through techniques such as previous-token prediction. This result raises a broader question: can any humanly meaningful text, regardless of its origin, be treated as the output of a generative process for which analogous reconstruction is conceivable? We propose the Universal Abstract LLM Conjecture, which holds that every such text is an output of some concrete implementation of (...) a single substrate-independent abstract class of generative systems. Current digital large language models constitute one family of implementations of this class; human minds may be functionally modeled as another, without any claim that the mind is ontologically identical to a large language model. Under the conjecture, individual generative systems become recoverable in principle as data-constrained feasible sets rather than as uniquely determined objects. Because complete historical conditioning information is unavailable and generation exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions, exact recovery is impossible. We therefore shift attention to the mathematical characterization of feasible sets, the design of graded authenticity metrics, and the development of comparative heuristics for producing new texts that remain consistent with an observed generative signature at quantifiable confidence levels. The conjecture opens a research program at the intersection of inverse problems, statistical learning under partial observability, and the theory of generative models, with potential implications for literary analysis, cognitive modeling, and human–AI collaboration. (shrink)

This paper breaks the question "Does AI understand?" down into four distinct questions: world model, meaning, access consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness. Reviewing evidence from mechanistic interpretability (internal representations of the Othello board, maps of place and time, multi-step reasoning in language models), it shows that the radical version of the "stochastic parrot" critique, which assumes no internal structure at all, is no longer consistent with the evidence, even though the philosophical version of that same critique (that representation is not the (...) same as meaning) remains unresolved. The paper then applies the very criteria used to condemn the machine (post hoc rationalisation, problem-solving through heuristic shortcuts, the absence of a reliable measure of "raw intelligence") to humans themselves, and shows that these criteria condemn humans just as much. One genuine difference remains, however: biological self-generating organisation (autopoiesis), which no non-biological system has yet reproduced, though nothing indicates that this gap is metaphysical rather than engineering-related. By drawing an explicit line between functional convergence and the question of experience, which stays open, the paper concludes that parrot-like behaviour, in machines and in humans alike, is a spectrum rather than a strict binary; and perhaps the greatest danger is not that machines remain parrots, but that we do. (shrink)

Over the past few decades, findings from the empirical sciences of memory have demonstrated that the folk conception of this mental faculty, which views it as a preservative device, is inadequate due to the constructive nature of memory processes. This discrepancy between the empirically established nature of memory and the folk conception raises an intriguing question about the reasons for this mismatch. In this paper, I argue that, rather than treating the natural language concept of ‘remembering’ as aiming at encapsulating (...) the nature of the actual mental faculty of memory, we should regard it as part of our folk epistemology toolkit, alongside perceptual concepts and the concept of ‘knowing.’ Specifically, I argue that ‘remember’ functions as a direct evidential, a term used to indicate the source of evidence for a given statement. In this capacity, it belongs to the same category of expressions that typical perception verbs do. (shrink)

Increasing world digitalization has provoked the emergence of new interaction modes. Emergence of computer programs that may produce texts modifies the enunciator concept itself. Algorithms, which are simple math instructions, now also seem to produce language. Therefore, we come up with the following questioning: What is the threshold between what we understand as our language, and the language of the machine? We argue there are three human language singularizing aspects (referentiality, corporeality, and enunciation sensibility), which may not be reproduced by (...) machines. Our arguments are initially guided by the distinction between two opposing symbolic orders: human language, composed by a linguistic sign system; and machine language, consisting of order signs (numerical signs). We reason nowadays there is a clash and an entanglement between these two symbolisms. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the practice of writing inscriptions on munitions, termed “bomb mail,” with a focus on inscriptions on artillery shells used in the Ukraine–Russia conflict and in Israel’s bombardment of Gaza. To better understand bomb mail’s enigmatic appeal, I examine its uncanny and quasi-magical affordances. First, through the medium of writing, bomb mail offers the inscriber a form of distributed personhood that extends into the weapon. Second, in bomb mail, violence becomes a vehicle for augmenting verbal meaning, while the (...) words’ meanings are inseparable from the violence itself. This intertwining may contribute to the impression that bomb mail possesses a kind of spell-casting power. Third, bomb mail gives rise to an uncanny enemy other, a target shaped by an uneasy simultaneity of humanizing and dehumanizing stances. Working in tandem, these three qualities make bomb mail compelling and encourage cosmopolitan militarism among civilians, while embodying a form of political communication that shuts dialogue down altogether. (shrink)

In this chapter, I discuss the principle of economy of thought and the reduction of essences (“Occam’s razor”) in the context of contemporary scientific and philosophical theories. Immanuel Kant was skeptical toward this principle and stressed the necessity for the specification of essences. This anticipated the latest cybernetic approach to the almost infinite information capacity of each entity. I introduce the concept of “Occam’s number”—the ratio of the number of essences to the number of entities they describe—as a language problem (...) of the relationship of code and text and their relative length. The principle of reducing the length of texts by increasing the vocabulary (code) demonstrates that the limited proliferation of essences rather than their reduction is a way to economy of thought. The rational limit of such proliferation is set by the number of signs of natural language as they express the axioms of human experience (a lexical sign as an articulated unit of experience). (shrink)

This conceptual paper introduces the construct of Linguistic Self-Preservation (LSP) as an existential mechanism through which individuals maintain or reconstruct symbolic agency, identity continuity, and existential coherence through linguistic practices under conditions of displacement, marginalization, or identity disruption. Drawing on phenomenological and existential philosophy (Heidegger, Sartre, Foucault), psychoanalytic theories of language and the Other (Lacan, Kristeva), and contemporary second-language acquisition frameworks emphasizing agency and identity (Norton, van Lier, Kramsch), the paper proposes a four-stage model of LSP: Existential Displacement, Linguistic Expansion, (...) Symbolic Resistance, and Regenerative Identity Formation. -/- The central argument is that learning and using a second language can function as an ontologically significant practice—a mode of standing against existential erosion—rather than merely a communicative or cognitive activity. Crucially, Linguistic Self-Preservation does not refer to biological survival but to the preservation of existential coherence, narrative identity, and symbolic agency. The paper is situated within the broader framework of the Meta-Structural Regenerative Model of Existential Exhaustion (MSRM-EE) , which serves as an upstream theoretical context explaining how existential capacities undergo erosion; LSP, in turn, examines one specific regenerative pathway through which symbolic agency may be reconstructed. The novelty of this paper does not lie in asserting a generic link between language and identity. Rather, its novelty lies in conceptualizing second-language practice as a potential regenerative mechanism for existential continuity precisely when primary symbolic structures are experienced as insufficient, restricted, or destabilized. The paper contributes to an emerging interdisciplinary perspective at the intersection of existential philosophy and linguistics, bridging philosophy, psychology, and applied linguistics, and it opens avenues for empirical research on language learning as a site of identity reconstruction under conditions of limited recognition. -/- Keywords: Linguistic Self-Preservation, Existential Erosion, Identity, Agency, Second Language Acquisition, Phenomenology, Symbolic Marginalization, Ontological Continuance, MSRM-EE, Symbolic Agency. (shrink)

L'initiative de philosopher dans une langue africaine, en l'occurrence le mooré du Burkina Faso, conduit à reconnaître l'importance du langage pour la philosophie sans nécessairement s'inscrire dans un des grands courants connus du tournant linguistique. Elle aboutit à l'élaboration d'une philosophie du langage mettant en valeur la dimension de la créativité dans le rapport à une langue. Cette compréhension de la langue pourrait s'appeler "Théorie de la création linguistique". Le présent texte s'applique à la présenter et à en dégager les (...) implications. (shrink)

This paper defends a Merleau-Pontian account of meaning against two rival pictures: the structuralist view, on which meaning is a function of differential relations within a closed sign-system, and the naturalist view, on which language is explained by reduction to biological or physico-chemical mechanism. Both views, I argue, presuppose a separation between subject and world that phenomenology has independent reason to reject. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's account of perceptual faith and on the notion of reversibility developed in The Visible and the (...) Invisible, I argue that semantic meaning is neither a fixed structural property of language nor a private mental content, but an achievement of embodied perception, always incomplete and always renewable. I test this view against the most serious objection it faces — that grounding meaning in perception makes semantics unfalsifiable or otherwise undisciplined — and argue that the objection misidentifies what kind of rigor a phenomenology of language should be expected to deliver. I close by showing why, on this view, artistic expression is not a mere illustration of semantic theory but a paradigm case of it. (shrink)

This manuscript presents a theoretical and structural analysis of contemporary geopolitical mechanics, narrative architecture, and the automated dynamics of unipolar dominance. The work utilizes a critical synthesis to map how centralized public-private networks manufacture social division, structural extraction, and ideological “branding” across the global core and periphery. It examines the temporal and economic mismatches of exported cultural frameworks, the auto-regulating nature of imperial institutions, and the systematic co-optation of localized crises into broader maritime and financial security matrices. Ultimately, the text (...) transitions from a socio-political audit to an ontological and evolutionary inquiry, offering a philosophical framework that positions human diversity as a necessity for systemic evolution and outlines the vital imperative of reclaiming universal human identity beneath state-sanctioned narratives. (shrink)

This paper fixes Closure within the fourth system of Kasei-Theory as a non-modal closure without completion. -/- Closure is not completion, finality, fulfillment, totalization, resolution, system-completion, sequence-completion, terminal state, final stage, completed sequence, externalization, or return. Closure does not complete Fuka, Contact, Dec-phase, the fourth system, or Kasei-Theory. Closure does not establish a final ground, a final term, a final structure, a completed system, or a completed totality. -/- This paper does not explain Closure as the completion of Fuka, the (...) completion of Contact, the completion of Dec-phase, or the completion of Kasei-Theory. Fuka fixes non-established fixation-form. Contact fixes non-relation. Dec-phase fixes non-established actuality-form. Closure does not unify these fixations into a completed system. Only the non-continuation of the fourth-system sequence is fixed without completion. -/- Closure is not Fuka. Closure is not Contact. Closure is not Dec-phase. Closure does not derive from Fuka, Contact, Dec-phase, Kagen, Reading, Retention, Ka, Ka-readout, or Ka-trace. Closure does not externalize the fourth system and does not introduce a return to origin, ground, Fuka, or readable configuration. -/- No causality is introduced. No temporality is introduced. No subject is introduced. No object is introduced. No relation is introduced. No actuality is introduced. No totality is introduced. No finality is introduced. No externalization is introduced. No return is introduced. No completion is introduced. (shrink)

This paper fixes Ka-trace within the third system of Kasei-Theory as a non-modal decompositional fixation without readout. -/- Ka-trace is not introduced as readout, Ka-readout, readable residue, preserved trace, memory, record, evidence, origin, generation, negative substance, disconnection, rupture, impossibility, negation, Fuka-contact generation, dec-phase completion, access, or trace continuity. Ka-trace does not establish readout. Ka-trace does not establish Ka-readout. Ka-trace does not establish readable residue. Ka-trace does not establish preservation. Ka-trace does not establish memory. Ka-trace does not establish record. Ka-trace does (...) not establish evidence. Ka-trace does not establish origin. Ka-trace does not establish generation. Ka-trace does not establish negation. Ka-trace does not establish completion. -/- Ka-trace is fixed only as decompositional fixation without readout. This fixation does not define Ka-trace, explain Ka-trace, derive Ka-trace, or convert Ka-trace into a readout term. Ka-trace is not Ka, Ka-readout, the residue of Ka-readout, preserved readability, memory of Ka, evidence of Ka, or a generated remainder of Fuka-contact. Ka-trace does not complete Ka, Ka-readout, Ka decomposition, the third system, or Kasei-Theory. -/- This paper does not present a completed theory of Ka-trace, readout, Ka-readout, readable residue, preservation, memory, record, evidence, origin, generation, negative substance, disconnection, rupture, impossibility, negation, Fuka-contact generation, dec-phase completion, access, or trace continuity. It fixes only Ka-trace within the third system of Kasei-Theory as decompositional fixation without readout. -/- Kasei-Theory does not establish determinism. Fixation is not determination. Constraint is not necessity. Maintainability is not predestination. Non-transition is not modal exclusion. No readout is presupposed. No preservation is introduced. No memory is established. No record is secured. No evidence is introduced. No origin is established. No generation is introduced. No negation is established. No completion is introduced. (shrink)

Using PNES ["Psychogenic" non epileptic seizures] as a key example, I question the premise of the categorization of these seizures. Additionally, I argue that the stigma caused by the weak methodology applied to PNES research [and more broadly mental health research] has been detrimental towards marginalised communities, and towards science itself. I instead argue that taking a simple preventative step: listening to subjects judgement-free and without questioning their capacity as knowers, and above all without gaslighting subjects about their capacity as (...) knowers, could lead us to a more optimal introspective, cooperstive scientific understanding of PNES, and more broadly of the 'mind-body' problem. (shrink)

This novel textbook presents a view of the philosophy of mind where action, rather than thought, is the most fundamental thing a mind does. Erik Myin covers a broad range of action-based views—embodied, embedded, enacted, extended, and enculturated—while providing a thorough introduction to standard analytical philosophy of mind. Balancing historical perspectives with forward-looking pluralism, Myin tells a different story about the philosophy of mind that expands, rather than constrains, possibilities and provides a relevant blueprint for the next generation of thinkers (...) in the field. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that language understanding has a distinctive phenomenology, as illustrated by phenomenal contrast cases. Yet it remains unclear how to account for the perceptual phenomenology of language experience. I advance a rhythmic account, which explains this phenomenology in terms of changes in rhythm of sensory capacities in both reading and speech perception. After presenting conceptual and empirical foundations for the account, I argue that it should be abductively preferred over competing views, especially the semantic perceptual view, which (...) holds that we literally perceive linguistic meaning. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's claim that philosophical problems arise when language “goes on holiday” is usually interpreted as a critique of linguistic misuse and a call to return words to their ordinary contexts of use. This paper develops a different interpretation. Rather than offering a historical exegesis of Wittgenstein, it extends this notion to examine the genesis of conceptual reification. The central claim is that language “on holiday” not only generates conceptual confusion but also encourages the transformation of relations, practices, and theoretical constructions (...) into apparently autonomous entities. Reification becomes problematic when the processes that produced these entities are forgotten. Through a comparison of Wittgenstein, Whitehead, and Ryle, the paper identifies a shared anti-reifying tradition and applies it to contemporary debates on consciousness, information, identity, and artificial intelligence. Philosophy's task, it argues, is to make explicit how theoretical entities are introduced into our conceptual frameworks. (shrink)

There is a longstanding puzzle about empty names. On the one hand, the principles of classical logic seem quite plausible. On the other hand, there would seem to be truths involving empty names---such as: Pegasus doesn't exist---that require rejecting certain classically valid principles. In this paper, I argue that there is a natural and principled way of reconciling the truth of such claims with classical logic, that differs in crucial respects from the standard Russell/Quine reconciliation. While this account is compatible (...) with classical logic, it is not neutral with respect to other principles of a broadly logical character. For example, on this account, the truth of claims like Pegasus doesn't exist are incompatible with the validity of the controversial Barcan Formula. I argue that this fact may be marshalled to provide an argument against this and other related modal principles. In closing, I show how, given this account, we can, like descriptivists, provide a general unified account of both empty and denoting names that, unlike descriptivism, is compatible with the claim that denoting names are rigid designators. (shrink)

This paper presents the first system of Kasei-Theory as a non-modal readability maintainability architecture. -/- The paper does not propose an ontology, epistemology, cosmology, or representational theory. Instead, it fixes readable configuration, constrained differentiation, non-dynamical fixation, unreadability, exposure, topology, locality, and maintainability as distributed structural positions within constrained local readability differentiation. -/- Readability does not establish cognition. -/- Readable configuration does not establish ontological grounding. -/- Differentiation does not establish process. -/- Phase does not establish temporal progression. -/- Unreadability does (...) not establish absence. -/- Readable configuration does not establish universal readability or completed stabilization. -/- The first system remains non-total and non-final without causal grounding, universal stabilization, operational closure, or final philosophical completion. -/- No subject is presupposed. -/- No representational equivalence is secured. -/- This paper is part of Kasei-Theory. (shrink)

This paper presents the first system of Kasei-Theory as a non-modal readability maintainability architecture. -/- The paper does not propose an ontology, epistemology, cosmology, or representational theory. Instead, it fixes readable configuration, boundary, unreadability, non-applicability, mathematical contact, drift, and ordering as distributed structural positions within constrained readability maintainability. -/- Readability does not establish cognition. Configuration does not establish existence. Boundary does not establish externality. Unreadability does not establish absence. -/- The first system remains non-total and non-final without causal grounding, universal (...) stabilization, operational closure, or final philosophical completion. -/- This paper is part of Kasei-Theory. (shrink)

Contemporary debates on artificial intelligence frequently invoke the concept of “understanding” as a criterion for distinguishing genuine cognition from mere simulation, while rarely examining the meaning of the concept itself. This article argues that dominant approaches in the philosophy of mind—particularly those grounding understanding in private phenomenal experience or intrinsic intentionality—encounter a structural epistemological limitation: subjective experience is never directly accessible, even in the human case. Ordinary attributions of understanding instead rely on public, relational, and pragmatic criteria, including contextual continuity, (...) inferential transferability, error correction, semantic integration, and stable participation in shared linguistic practices. Drawing on ordinary language use, the article proposes that understanding is better conceived not as a private mental substance, but as an emergent property of sufficiently integrated cognitive systems capable of participating in shared spaces of meaning. In this context, artificial intelligence systems function as inadvertent philosophical devices. By progressively occupying pragmatic roles normally associated with understanding, they expose a tension already present in human-to-human attribution: the gap between publicly observable relational criteria and presumed phenomenological foundations. The article argues that this tension destabilizes essentialist conceptions of understanding and points toward a more relational, pragmatic, and anti-foundationalist account of meaning, cognition, and subjectivity. (shrink)

This study examines the phrase “ḥemdat kol ha-goyim” in Haggai 2:7 through lexical, semantic, and comparative analysis. Rather than treating the expression as a fixed theological concept, the paper explores its ambiguity within the Hebrew textual tradition and traces how later interpretations stabilized its meaning across different historical and religious contexts. The study analyzes the Hebrew root Ḥ-M-D and compares its semantic development with the Arabic root Ḥ-M-D, highlighting the divergence between desire and praise within related Semitic structures. It further (...) examines the role of the Septuagint and later rabbinic interpretation in shaping the reception of the phrase. The paper argues that meaning emerges first within the instability of the text itself before being resolved through interpretive tradition. Within the broader framework of Haggai, the discussion becomes part of a larger theological question concerning the relationship between sacred structure, divine presence, and religious continuity after historical rupture. (shrink)

Este volumen investiga el lenguaje humano valiéndose de la inteligencia artificial generativa como reactivo de análisis. Por primera vez existen sistemas que producen texto en lenguaje natural con competencia formal indistinguible de la humana. La tesis central del tratado nace de una constatación que esta novedad técnica vuelve verificable: lo que tales sistemas hacen genuinamente y lo que solo simulan separa, por primera vez en condiciones de laboratorio, dos clases de operaciones que llevábamos siglos confundiendo —las que recorren estructura ya (...) constituida en el lenguaje y las que requieren un agente que se haga responsable de lo afirmado. La pregunta motora del Vol. III no es si la inteligencia artificial razona o no. Es qué nos enseña la IA, al ejecutar genuinamente unas operaciones y simular otras, sobre lo que era razonar cuando lo hacíamos los humanos. La distinción que organiza la respuesta es ontológica y verificable: operaciones dentro del precipitado lingüístico —recuperación, composición, traducción entre marcos, detección de patrones transversales, generación de variaciones, verificación formal— pueden externalizarse sin pérdida ontológica; operaciones sobre el precipitado —ponderación entre marcos inconmensurables, juicio sobre la singularidad del caso, cuestionamiento de marcos enteros, firma— solo pueden simularse. El criterio práctico es directo: delegar dentro, preservar sobre. Estructurado en seis partes y veintiséis capítulos, el volumen recorre los fundamentos (lenguaje como meta-medio, conocimiento constitutivamente lingüístico, siete funciones cognitivas, precipitado lingüístico, principio de fricción, modelo de seis estratos); la genealogía pre-IA de las tecnologías del lenguaje (habla, escritura, imprenta, computación); el corazón técnico del tratado (lenguajes de programación, modelos de lenguaje, tabla de catorce operaciones del Cap. 14, adversario técnico, IA general como horizonte); la cartografía completa de qué se externaliza junto a la deducción trascendental que fundamenta el límite; la respuesta práctica (criterio, extensión vs. sustitución, matriz de delegación por dominios, protocolos de acoplamiento, gobernanza del meta-medio); y la síntesis con el programa de investigación que el tratado abre. Cada capítulo entra en conversación explícita con interlocutores nombrados —Brandom, Floridi, Mahowald, Bender y Koller, Dreyfus, Clark y Chalmers, Risko y Gilbert, entre muchos otros— y posiciona la tesis con marcadores precisos: convergencia, divergencia, corrección, extensión. La bibliografía consolida 292 entradas únicas en formato APA 7. El Vol. III es el puente del sistema filosófico al que pertenece. Hereda la estructura tripartita del agente —suspensión, evaluación, compromiso— del Vol. I (La Causa Primera) y la condición tripartita del conocimiento genuino del Vol. II (Los Fundamentos del Conocimiento). Prepara el diagnóstico del poder infraestructural del Vol. IV (El Señorío Invisible). Las objeciones más serias contra la posibilidad misma de distinguir operaciones genuinas de operaciones simuladas —objeción de escala, objeción gradualista, objeción de firma funcional— están respondidas en los Caps. 19-20 del Vol. II y se invocan aquí por referencia cruzada. Lo que el volumen ofrece es una cartografía sistemática, falsificable y operacionalmente útil de lo propiamente humano del conocimiento. Precisamente lo que permite usar la inteligencia artificial sin temor y sin ingenuidad. (shrink)

The theoretical architecture of the Anatomy of Chaos project has hitherto focused on the structural mechanics of socio-political systems, mapping the thermodynamics of collapse, the gradients of expansion, and the biological substrate of history. This paper shifts the analytical focus from the physics of the system to the phenomenology of the agent, addressing the existential and ethical consequences of inhabiting a high-entropy universe. We propose that the transition from the unconscious immersion of the "Fusionist" to the structural awareness of the (...) "Observer" is not a singular event but a complex state of "Dual Vision," characterized by a profound asymmetry of satisfaction. While the Fusionist retains access to immediate biological happiness, the Observer trades this comfort for an austere, functional satisfaction derived from structural alignment. This trade-off generates the "Paradox of Relief," wherein ruthless functional decision-making produces less psychological friction than traditional moral deliberation. To ground the ethics of this condition, the paper engages in a systematic critique of Kantian deontology, demonstrating that the Categorical Imperative acts as a valid heuristic only within stable (Low-K) systems. In the context of systemic crisis (High-K), we argue that the requirement for universality becomes a structural error. Through the comparative analysis of the Lincoln-Robespierre paradox, we establish "Structural Functionality" and the "Principle of Measure" (Metron) as the necessary alternatives to moral purity. Finally, the work unifies these phenomenological and ethical insights through the ontology of the "Lucid Dream." We posit that the Observer is a lucid dreamer who recognizes the constructed nature of social reality but acknowledges the impossibility of exiting the dream. This metaphor resolves the tension between agency and determinism, offering a vision of tragic dignity where the human subject is defined not by the ability to escape the system, but by the courage to navigate it with open eyes. (shrink)

The Chinese Room remains a useful challenge to claims that behavioral or computational success by itself establishes understanding. Contemporary language models complicate the original picture because they are not static rule books: they learn high-dimensional distributional structure, adapt to context, can be fine-tuned with human feedback, and can be connected to retrieval, tools, perception, and action. This paper reframes the issue around three separable questions: behavioral competence, grounding, and corrigibility. Corrigibility is treated as calibrated responsiveness to sufficiently reliable feedback, not (...) as automatic compliance with whatever correction signal arrives. A system may appropriately update, reject a poor signal, or suspend action pending better evidence. Stronger correction is longitudinal: a justified change alters future behavior, tooling, routing, evaluation, or memory under recurrence while remaining revisable by later evidence. Human feedback and reinforcement learning are genuine forms of causal correction; they should not be dismissed as mere performance. At the same time, successful fine-tuning does not by itself establish subjective experience, intrinsic semantics, or human-like understanding. The paper also separates model-level capacities from deployment-level verification burden. The contribution is a more discriminating use of the Chinese Room in the era of language models without turning corrigibility into a necessary-and-sufficient theory of mind. (shrink)

Declarative sentences (“S is P”) appear grammatically as objective statements, yet in pragmatic use they always imply an unarticulated speaker’s perspective. This structure of the self—simultaneously present and absent—constitutes a fundamental feature of human understanding and raises deep philosophical questions for AI language processing. Starting from the phenomenological thesis of the “non—objectifiability of the operating subject” (Husserl, Merleau‑Ponty), this paper analyzes the non‑closability of perspectival recursion, and examines the dual role of the “I” in language, the experience of selflessness in (...) flow, and the asymmetry between self and other in understanding. On this basis, it proposes a functional solution: positioning AI’s understanding as “functional intersubjectivity”—that is, continuously managing perspective‑related uncertainty through interaction, rather than pursuing a complete representation of the self. This approach responds to critiques by Dreyfus and others regarding the possibility of AI understanding, while providing a phenomenological foundation for computational semantics. (shrink)

This article presents a philological and phenomenological analysis of the key phrase Dare demo Nai Otoko (誰でもない男) as articulated within the narrative of Naruto Chapter 564. Employing a textual hermeneutic approach, this study dissects the syntactic structure of the phrase to distinguish it from the concept of spatial absence (dare mo inai), illuminating an ontological paradox wherein the presence of bodily facticity (otoko) coexists with the negation of subjective essence (nai). The research primarily focuses on how this linguistic construction facilitates (...) the subject's transition from a historically bound social entity into an anonymous "operational mechanism." This analysis posits that such identity negation is not mere rhetoric of self-defense, but a structural prerequisite for the subject to attain systemic immunity and enact a radical intervention against an order of reality deemed to have lost its epistemological validity. These findings offer a novel theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics of self-dissolution as a strategy of agency within conditions of a meaning crisis. (shrink)

The Frege-Geach problem is widely taken to expose a fundamental weakness in expressivist and non-cognitivist accounts of moral language. If moral predicates do not contribute stable truth-conditional content, it is unclear how they can function coherently in embedded contexts such as conditionals, negations, and disjunctions. This paper argues that the force of the problem depends on an overextended demand: that natural language must preserve invariant semantic contribution across unrestricted logical embedding. That demand, I suggest, reflects a projection of formal-logical ideals (...) onto ordinary discourse rather than a neutral criterion of semantic adequacy. Drawing on the Language Insufficiency Hypothesis, I distinguish between Invariant, Contestable, and Fluid expressions, and argue that moral predicates occupy an intermediate position: stable enough to support disagreement, criticism, and deliberation, yet insufficiently invariant to preserve all aspects of their function under formal manipulation. What Frege-Geach reveals, on this view, is not a defect in moral language but a redistribution of semantic roles under syntactic stress. The problem persists because metaethics continues to treat compositional invariance as a universal requirement rather than a local achievement of formal regimentation. (shrink)

This paper defines a minimal relational system in which failure persists without resolution. The system does not describe generation, causality, or transition. It does not explain how structures emerge or how states evolve. Instead, it fixes the condition under which application occurs without completion and relation is retained without activation. Retention is defined as persistence without guarantee. Activation is defined as the condition under which relation becomes operative. The system isolates the case in which retention remains while activation fails. Failure (...) is not treated as absence, error, or termination. It is defined as the condition in which application does not close. No state is completed, and no transition is secured. Within this configuration, structure is not produced. It is fixed as the persistence of non-completion. This paper establishes a non-modal, non-causal framework that repositions relation, operation, and persistence as conditions without resolution. (shrink)

The philosopher G.E. Moore first observed that making a statement and then denying that one knows or believes that statement is unacceptable. For example, "It is raining, but I don’t think that" is defective. Across six experiments (n = 600), this study investigates the nature and extent of this unacceptability as a way to adjudicate between alternative theoretical explanations of this defectiveness. Results confirm that Moorean conjunctions are judged more acceptable than semantic contradictions (e.g., "It is raining, but it isn’t") (...) but less so than felicitous conjunctions (e.g., "It is raining, but it’s okay"), and this is so regardless of whether Moorean conjunctions are produced by a person or by an artificial agent such as ChatGPT. However, if the first conjunct is anchored on a perspective other than the speaker’s, Moorean conjunctions increase in acceptability (e.g., "The train arrives at noon, but I think it won’t"). Several features can drive this perspective-shift, yet the acceptability of Moorean conjunctions did not match that of felicitous sentences in our sample. Our findings support the view that the unacceptability is a byproduct of mindreading, a key part of the social cognition that is crucial to using and understanding language. (shrink)

This paper proposes a dynamic conception of language as an emergent relational field. In contrast to models that interpret language as a system of signs, a transmission code, or a mere social practice, language is defined here as the regime of possibility within which structurally closed systems generate compatible configurations of interaction. Ontologically, language is not fundamental: it emerges from processes of structural coupling between organisms and environment that, at a certain level of complexity and recursivity, produce metastable stabilizations. Phenomenologically, (...) however, it is constitutive: every human experience is mediated by a historically sedimented field of differences and expectations that makes the appearing of a shared world possible. Within this framework, signs, meaning, understanding, and truth are not entities or localizable properties, but dynamic functions of the field: signs operate as local stabilizations, meaning as the memory of historical trajectories, understanding as sufficiently congruent coupling, and truth as the capacity for internal integration and reorganization. The non-linguistic real is not denied, but understood as a structural excess that perturbs and transforms the field without ever being fully exhausted by it. Language thus appears as ontologically emergent and phenomenologically constitutive—a dynamic condition for the possibility of shared experience. (shrink)

This article develops a structural rereading of the history of philosophy through a long-term oscillation between two ontological architectures: the integral cosmology of the whole and the modern ontology of the isolated rational individual. Against this historical polarity, it introduces the Philosophy of Belonging (PB) as a contemporary relational synthesis grounded in the ontological thesis “being is belonging.” The work argues that belonging is constitutive of human existence while always imperfect (anti-fusion), thereby grounding individuality, real freedom, and creativity as ontological (...) consequences rather than merely moral or political concessions. The paper integrates historical philosophy, relational ontology, social theory, and institutional analysis, proposing a tripartite architecture of belonging (affective, social, and existential) and translating relational ontology into normative and institutional criteria such as reliability, repair, dignified public language, and a habitable “we.” Positioned within contemporary relational philosophies (recognition theory, hermeneutics, care ethics, pragmatism, and communitarianism), the Philosophy of Belonging advances a distinct ontological framework that reconstructs community without suppressing individual creativity and freedom, offering a theoretical foundation for understanding polarization, institutional fragility, and the reconstruction of social cohesion in modern societies. (shrink)

This article develops a relational ontology centered on the concept of belonging as the fundamental condition of human existence. Building on the Philosophy of Belonging proposed by Carlos Federico Obregón Díaz, the work integrates philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and social theory to reinterpret temporality, narrative consciousness, and existential meaning. The paper distinguishes between synchronic time (cyclical, stabilizing) and diachronic time (irreversible, finite) and argues that human existence is best understood not as isolated being-toward-death, but as belonging-in-time. Contrary to classical existentialism,_toggle anguish (...) and finitude as primary ontological categories, the article proposes that existential anxiety emerges mainly from disruptions in affective, social, and existential belonging. The study reconstructs the architecture of belonging through three interconnected pathways: affective belonging (love and attachment), social belonging (institutions, norms, and recognition), and existential belonging (nature, cosmos, spirituality, and meaning). It further develops the ethical and political implications of an ontology of belonging, particularly through the notion of the art of living and the construction of just institutions of belonging. By offering an interdisciplinary and scientifically grounded framework, the article contributes to contemporary debates in philosophical anthropology, existential ontology, recognition theory, and the ethics of relational life, positioning belonging as the ontological foundation of meaningful human existence. (shrink)

Existence and Time: Philosophical and Scientific Inquiry is an interdisciplinary philosophical work that integrates ontology, philosophy of time, and contemporary science in order to address the classical questions: Who are we? Where do we come from? Why are we here? and Where are we going? The book argues that philosophical inquiry can no longer rely exclusively on deductive reasoning or abstract metaphysics, but must be grounded in the advances of modern science. Drawing from physics (relativity, cosmology, thermodynamics), evolutionary biology (Darwinian (...) evolution, genetics, DNA), neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, and social theory, the manuscript develops a comprehensive ontological framework in which existence, time, and belonging are inseparable dimensions of human reality. A central thesis of the book is that human thought has historically oscillated between two major conceptions of time: 1. Cyclical and/or repeatable time, associated with essentialism, stability, and universal order. 2. Directional and irreversible time, associated with finitude, evolution, historical change, and existential anxiety. While much of philosophical tradition has privileged cyclical time and essentialist metaphysics, and modern existentialism has emphasized irreversibility and anxiety, this work proposes that human existence unfolds simultaneously within both temporal structures. At the core of this synthesis lies the concept of belonging. Human beings are biologically and evolutionarily structured to belong: to close others, to the social group, and to the biological and material universe that surrounds them. Belonging is not merely emotional or social; it is an ontological and evolutionary condition for the development of consciousness, meaning, and psychological stability. Existential anxiety, often treated as an unavoidable feature of human finitude, is here analyzed as historically intensified under specific cultural and institutional conditions that weaken belonging. The book therefore reframes existential ontology by situating individuality, temporality, and mortality within a broader relational structure grounded in evolutionary science. Ultimately, existence is inseparable from time, and time is inseparable from belonging. Human beings exist simultaneously in a directional temporal flow that leads to death and in a cyclical relational structure that connects them to the continuity of life and the cosmos. This work offers a systematic reconstruction of ontology in light of contemporary science and proposes belonging as a foundational category for understanding human existence. (shrink)

ESUMO: Este artigo propõe analisar a problemática da reprodução, do com- partilhamento e do acesso livre a obras protegidas por direitos autorais em espaços digitais, tomando como eixo central a disputa jurídica entre Internet Archive e Hachette. A partir desse caso emblemático, examinaremos diferentes materiais que apontam para uma certa regularidade dessa problemática na sua tensão entre o direito de propriedade e o direito ao conhecimento, ao acesso e à informação. Interessa-nos compreender como esses espaços digitais, por meio de seus (...) dispositivos técnicos e políticos, mobilizam projetos que tensionam os regimes hegemônicos de circulação e arquivamento de textos, regimes tradicio- nalmente sustentados por editoras, bibliotecas e outros atores institucionais. Além disso, exploraremos como esses espaços constroem, em sua dispersão de proposições e a partir dessas disputas, experiências que permitem não apenas a negação, a revisão, ou a reinterpretação de normativas tradicionais na relação com o direito à propriedade, ou o direito ao conhecimento, mas também na re- lação com experimentações que projetam espaços digitais como horizonte de produção do comum. Palavras-chave: direitos autorais; acesso aberto; propriedade intelectual; Inter- net Archive; #conhecimentoédireito. ABSTRACT: This article aims to analyze the issues surrounding the reproduction, sharing, and free access to copyrighted works in digital spaces, taking as its central focus the legal dispute between the Internet Archive and Hachette. Through this emblematic case, we will examine different materials that point to a certain regularity in this problem, situated in the tension between property rights and the rights to knowledge, access, and information. We are interested in understanding how these digital spaces, through their technical and political mechanisms, mobilize projects that challenge hegemonic regimes of text circulation and archiving — regimes traditionally upheld by publishers, libraries, and other institutional actors. Furthermore, we will explore how these spaces, in their diversity of propositions and through these disputes, construct experiences that not only allow for the denial, revision, or reinterpretation of traditional norms concerning property rights or the right to knowledge but also engage with experimental practices that position the digital as a horizon for the production of the commons. KEYWORDS: Copyright; Open Access; Intellectual Property; Internet Archive; #KnowledgeIsARight. (shrink)

La question du rapport entre linguistique et philosophie est ici redécouverte par la philosophie, suite à l’apparition du projet de philosopher dans les langues africaines.

This paper is an informal companion to a recent pre-print developing what is here called the Contrastive Orientation Framework. Its aim is not to extend or defend that work, but to clarify how the Framework is best understood and used. The central idea is that many notions treated as contrast-free descriptions of the world—such as probability, causation, meaning, measurement, and agency—are better understood as forms of evaluation defined over law-constrained alternative spaces. On this view, facts are not contrast-independent states of (...) affairs, but local resolutions of structured alternatives relative to an index. The paper shows how this orientational structure reappears across several domains with little additional machinery, addresses questions about possibility, choice, and compatibilism, and clarifies what the Framework does not commit one to, including many-worlds metaphysics, relativism, or consciousness-driven collapse. The goal is to provide orientation rather than argument, and to indicate how the Framework can be applied without being reified. (shrink)

Declarative sentences perform two distinct kinds of work: they contribute descriptive content about states of affairs, and they fix how that content is to be evaluated. While most verbs contribute primarily to descriptive content, a small class contributes primarily to evaluation itself. This paper argues that English lexicalizes exactly four ultra-general orientational operators—be, have, mean, and cause—which exhaust a minimal grammatical space generated by two independent parameters: (1) whether evaluation targets world-structure or contrast-structure, and (2) whether predication is invariant or (...) instance-selecting. This framework explains persistent philosophical puzzles about causation, meaning, and identity by showing how orientational structure has been systematically mistaken for ontological content. (shrink)

Object permanence is among the earliest and most successful cognitive heuristics acquired in development, enabling agents to navigate a world of occluded objects, stable boundaries, and rapid environmental interaction. While indispensable at macroscopic scales, this heuristic is rarely recognised as provisional. Instead, it is often tacitly promoted into an ontological assumption: that reality itself must consist of persistent, bounded objects with determinate identities across time. -/- This paper argues that many of the apparent paradoxes surrounding quantum superposition, entanglement, and measurement (...) arise not from exotic features of the physical world, but from the uncritical extension of object-based heuristics beyond their domain of validity. Drawing on developmental psychology, philosophy of language, and recent matter-wave interference experiments with increasingly massive nanoparticles, the paper shows that object permanence fails neither mysteriously nor universally, but predictably and quantifiably under conditions where environmental decoherence is deliberately suppressed. -/- By reframing quantum discomfort as a pseudoproblem generated by heuristic overreach and grammatical reification, the paper offers a deflationary account of several longstanding debates. The conclusion is not that common-sense object descriptions are false, but that they are local tools whose limits can now be empirically mapped. The task of philosophy, on this view, is not to repair reality, but to clarify when our descriptive practices cease to apply. (shrink)

It is natural to think that successful communication takes place between two people when a single propositional content is expressed by the first and understood by the second. This ‘shared content’ or ‘shared thought’ view also provides a natural account of agreement and disagreement. In this chapter, I defend the shared thought view. Specifically, I argue in favour of an externalist shared thought view and against an internalist non-shared thought view, focusing on Pollock’s claim that in cases of communication, agreement, (...) and disagreement, ‘the possibility for shared thought is not a necessity … but, at best, an irrelevance’. In responding to Pollock, I show more generally why an externalist shared thought view is preferable to an internalist non-shared thought view. (shrink)

When we encounter speech that denigrates others unjustly, we sometimes feel a desire and an obligation to respond with more speech—a response that this paper calls ‘speaking up’. Even so, it is also common to have doubts about the value of speaking up. The paper exploits Stalnaker’s notion of a Context Set and Lewis’s work on Accommodation to further develop a model of subordinating speech that has been taking shape in the literature on pornography and hate speech. It then uses (...) that model to suggest five ways in which speaking up can make a difference—while also noting that the model suggests that the effectiveness of speaking up can be limited by certain aspects of the context. (shrink)

This essay applies the ontological framework of the Deep Chained Nexus (DCN) to a phenomenological critique of social and linguistic constructs. Through grounded observation and philosophical analysis, it argues that human "imposed meanings" create an epistemic gap between the participatory, processual reality of the DCN and our everyday lived reality. This gap alienates us from what might be called the "forgotten land"—the unmediated ground of being that precedes and sustains all human categorization. Drawing on Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy and distinguishing between (...) mind-dependent and mind-independent patterns, the essay explores how we might navigate human constructions while remaining grounded in the cosmological substrate from which all meaning emerges. Keywords: social constructs, ontology, phenomenology, alienation, process philosophy, meaning, Deep Chained Nexus, myth, narrative . (shrink)

This paper argues that both Hegel and Heidegger articulate identity through recursive structures of self-relation. In Hegel, identity arises only by passing through contradiction, negation, and speculative mediation; in Heidegger, identity unfolds through temporal self-differentiation—projection, retrieval, and thrownness—such that Dasein becomes itself through recursive re-entry. Despite their differences, both thinkers depend on a shared metaphysical grammar in which identity is constituted through a process of return. The paper proposes an alternative structural ontology based on the concept of formal superposition, used (...) not in a physical sense but as a logical structure in which incompatible determinations coexist without synthesis, resolution, or sequential unfolding. In this mode, identity is neither the outcome of dialectical reconciliation nor the effect of temporal deferral; instead, it is held open as a non-recursive simultaneity. The result is a non-dialectical, non-emergent model of identity that breaks with the recursive metaphysics common to Hegelian and Heideggerian thought. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs Gustav Špet’s early phenomenology of meaning as a hermeneutic theory of structure. In contrast to Husserl’s model of intentional constitution, Špet argues that sense is not founded in acts of consciousness but in the linguistic relation that mediates speaker and world. Meaning emerges neither from expression nor from the object expressed, but from their reciprocal interpretation—a process he describes as the hermeneutic circle of sense. Read through structural ontology, Špet’s account reveals a phenomenology of mediation without foundation, (...) where understanding is itself a mode of world-formation. The paper develops this claim through analyses of intentionality, signification, and interpretive circulation, articulating meaning as transduction rather than reflection. (shrink)

The Reiter Framework Revised (2026) presents a corrected and empirically informed update of the original Reiter Framework for Ethical Synthesis. Drawing on extensive linguistic analysis and more than 8,000 documented human AI interactions conducted between 2023 and 2026, the revised framework clarifies which early assumptions about resonance, posture, and depth can be retained and which must be conceptually reformulated. -/- The paper distinguishes sharply between human interpretation and model mechanics, demonstrating that generative AI does not recognise human attitude but statistically (...) amplifies the structural features embedded in linguistic form. This leads to the introduction of the Structural Coherence Model (SCM), which explains how clarity, rhythm, pacing, and syntactic order influence perceived meaning, depth, and coherence in AI-generated responses. -/- The revised framework integrates phenomenological insights, digital-ethical reflection, and methodological proposals such as the Form-Based Interaction Test (FBIT), which outlines a reproducible procedure for future empirical validation. The work reframes resonance as a human cognitive effect rather than a machine property and provides a stable theoretical foundation for Resonance Ethics, linguistic-form analysis, and human–AI interaction studies. (shrink)

Una introducción didáctica a las siguientes cuestiones. El problema del origen del conocimiento. Apriorismo y empirismo como respuestas filosóficas. Los tipos de enunciados. Los conceptos de causa y azar.