Free Will, Misc

Many Compatibilists seem to suppose that discover that we lived in a deterministic world would not unseat our confidence that many of our actions are nevertheless free. Here's a short story about such confidence becoming unseated.

The problem of free will has persistently resisted a solution throughout centuries. There is reason to believe that new elements need to be introduced into the analysis in order to make progress. In the present physicalist approach, these elements are emergence and information theory in relation to universal limits set by quantum physics. Furthermore the common, but vague, characterization of free will as "being able to act differently" is, in the spirit of Carnap, rephrased into an explicatum more suitable for (...) formal analysis. It is argued that the mind is an ontologically open system; a causal high-level system, the future of which cannot be reduced to the states of its associated low-level neural systems, not even if it is rendered physically closed. A positive answer to the question of free will is subsequently outlined. (shrink)

This article develops Hedonic Compatibilism, a model explaining how free will arises within a fully deterministic universe. Contemporary science leaves little room to deny causal necessity: behavior is produced by predictive mechanisms operating under limited information. Yet the phenomenon of freedom persists at the subjective level. I argue that this duality originates in an evolutionary functional shift — Hedonic Inversion — the moment when pleasurable experience becomes the aim of behavior and self-preservation becomes its instrument. Before inversion, behavior is governed (...) by structural regulation; after inversion, it is generated through internal hedonic evaluation, which marks the first emergence of an internal causal source. This creates a two-level structure: at the level of the world, there is only one necessary causal flow; at the level of the agent, there arises a multiplicity of represented alternatives. Freedom is the divergence between objective necessity and subjective multiplicity, not a breach of determinism. In this framework, free will is the agent’s internal causal necessity, aligned with the universe’s external necessity — a form of double determinism. Death marks the collapse of this subjective space and the end of agency. Hedonic Compatibilism thus connects Spinoza’s external necessity with Dennett’s reasons-responsive agency by identifying the evolutionary link between them. (shrink)

This paper offers a Deterministic Hedonist account of the meaning of life. The question “What is the meaning of life?” is often intensified by finitude, which can shift a practical concern with how to live into a demand for an external justification. The paper argues that this shift deforms the question. Within Deterministic Hedonism, meaning is defined operationally as what works in behavior: a stable, internally organized configuration of priorities that shapes choice over time. Since behavior is governed by the (...) hedonic law, the meaning of life cannot be a transcendent aim or a non-realizable declaration; it must be realizable within an agent’s field of alternatives. Meaning is therefore always already present wherever behavior occurs, while “searching for meaning” is the comparison and reordering of one’s living toward a better available configuration, sharpened by the time factor (opportunity cost). (shrink)

Deterministic Hedonism is presented as a complete, descriptive philosophical doctrine in a new revised edition. The text systematically integrates a causal analysis of behavior within the framework of the Hedonic Law (H=S−U) and shows how this mechanism operates across all forms of behavior—action, restraint, and even inactivity. It describes hedonic inversion as a functional turning point after which life changes its teleological structure and pleasure becomes the final criterion of behavior. On this basis, the doctrine develops hedonic compatibilism and a (...) scheme of “double determinism,” in which free will is interpreted as an agent’s internal causal necessity, compatible with external causality. Finally, it examines the meaning of life as an operationally defined, stable configuration of priorities (eudaimonia)—a form of subjective evaluation of life as a whole. (shrink)

In recent years, several Christian philosophers have proposed accounts of the relationship between divine grace and human freedom designed to allow for the resistibility of grace while also avoiding (semi) Pelagianism. However, it’s controversial whether any of these accounts succeed. Critics have argued that the proposed accounts either end up smuggling in some form of Pelagianism after all, or they don’t afford fallen humans enough control over whether they come to faith for grace to be truly resistible. Here I defend (...) an account of the relationship between grace and freedom that avoids this dilemma. It maintains that every action a person performs that is involved in, or that (non-trivially) contributes to, the person’s salvation is, and indeed must be, caused by grace. This feature enables the view to avoid even semi-Pelagianism. However, as long as God’s grace doesn’t determine the person’s salutary actions, she may remain free, on a moderate libertarian account of free will, to resist the work of grace in her life. (shrink)

Many philosophers nowadays take for granted a causalist view of action explanation, according to which intentional action is a movement caused by mental antecedents. For them, “the possibility of human agency evidently requires that our mental states – our beliefs, desires, and intentions – have causal effects in the physical world: in voluntary actions our beliefs and desires, or intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways” (Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge (MA), (...) MIT Press, 2000 (1998), p. 31). The main question then is not to know whether there is mental causation at all, but how we should account for it. How can the mind move our body? In her 1983 paper, “The Causation of Action”, Elizabeth Anscombe shows how confused this way of putting things is. For her, if intentions or beliefs can indeed be taken to be causes of action, it is not in any metaphysically problematic sense. Seeing this requires us to distinguish clearly two theses: (1) “to be done in execution of a certain intention” is not a causal relation between intention and action; (2) an intention may be said to cause something: but this pertains to a specific kind of causal history, different from that which is uncovered by physical enquiry. First we will show how the metaphysical problem of mental causation arises from a given conception of action. Then we will turn to Anscombe’s arguments in favour of the two aforementioned theses. (shrink)

This paper presents a mathematical model for Russian roulette, integrating a philosophical concept of fate with probabilistic reasoning. Using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM), we model the probability of death as dependent on a hidden state of "fate," which dictates whether death is inevitable or impossible. The model employs a Markov chain to represent transitions between fate states and a Dirac delta function to characterize the binary outcome of death. Simulations demonstrate that death occurs only when the hidden state activates (...) it, supporting the philosophical notion that "you die when you are meant to die." Implications for understanding randomness and determinism in decision-making scenarios are discussed. -/- **Keywords**: Hidden Markov Model, Russian roulette, probability, fate, Dirac delta function. (shrink)

Compatibilism is the view that determinism is true, but agents nevertheless possess free will as long as they act from a compatibilist friendly agential structure (i.e., agents want to perform their actions, agents identify with the actions they perform, agents would be responsive to reasons against performing those actions, etc.). The most powerful contemporary objection to compatibilism is the manipulation argument, according to which agents determined to act as they do by the prodding of manipulative neuroscientists are not considered free, (...) so agents determined to act by physical processes operating from the remote past should not be considered free either. One compatibilist response to the manipulation argument is the so-called hard-line reply, according to which compatibilists argue that agents determined by physical processes operating from the remote past are free, so agents determined by manipulative neuroscientists are free as well. In this paper I demonstrate that leading hard-line replies fail, while also introducing a novel argument against the hard-line reply. (shrink)

Recently, a number of philosophers have put forward wager arguments to the conclusion that, as moral agents, we should act as if we have free will. These arguments have a similar structure: they argue that if we act as though free will does not exist and it actually does, we incur significant moral costs. Conversely, if we act as if free will exists when it does not, we face no comparable moral costs. Such arguments face two significant objections: The Objection (...) from Rank-Ordering and The Objection from Probability. None of the existing wagers adequately address these objections without incurring serious theoretical costs. In this paper, I propose a new wager argument, the Deontic Wager, which is better positioned to meet them. Briefly, the argument is as follows: if we lack free will, acting as if it exists doesn’t violate any of our obligations towards others. However, if we do have free will and fail to acknowledge it, we will violate some of our obligations towards others. Therefore, it is rational to act as if free will exists. I demonstrate how The Deontic Wager is less vulnerable to The Objection from Rank-Ordering and The Objection from Probability than the other wagers, and explain its potential applications in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Galen Strawson has contrasting attitudes to consciousness and free will. In the case of the former, he says it is a fundamental element of nature whose denial is the “greatest woo-woo of the human mind.” In the case of the latter, by contrast, he says it is not merely non-existent but “provably impossible.” Why the difference? This paper suggests this distinctive pattern of positions is generated by underestimating the world (to adapt a phrase Strawson uses himself in another context). If (...) you underestimate the world, and correlatively overestimate your level of understanding of the world, it is natural to think both that consciousness is fundamental, and that free will is non-existent. If you don’t underestimate the world, on the other hand, a more uniform and attractive treatment of these topics becomes available. (shrink)

What's in a word? Free Will is not some special quality of 'the will.' Neither does it allude to freedom from (obstacles). 'Free Will' is an English idiom for personal freedom or autonomy. Philosophers also use 'Volition.' The famous German song sings, "The Thoughts are free," believing that thinking is more fundamental than acting. Classical Jewish Thought uses 'Free Choice,' which, however, is a special sort of choice. It's a commanded choosing to pursue moral improvement—a revolutionary concept, as we will (...) see. Ethics, not as an option, but as our Mission. Jewish freedom is a chance to act rather than a state of being. 'Free Will is a verb.' Is that why there are so many Jewish activists? Obstructions of your choice generally may take away some of your power to do as you must or want but never your capacity to improve morally (slightly) at every moment among the options that you still have right then. (shrink)

At the heart of P. F. Strawson’s naturalistic approach to responsibility sits the Inescapability Claim. The main argument of this article is that the established interpretation of this claim is mistaken. According to, what I will call, the Standard Reading, it is the empirical claim that it is psychologically impossible for us to abandon our responsibility practices. Although widespread, this reading lacks interpretative basis, is in conflict with other features of Strawson’s approach, and is—most strikingly—explicitly rejected by Strawson himself. In (...) its place, I propose that we understand Strawson’s Inescapability Claim as the metaphysical claim that the concept of responsibility is among those ineliminable concepts that form the fundamental core of any conceivable conceptual scheme. The responsibility skeptic’s doubt is “idle, unreal, a pretense”, not because their doubt is psychologically inefficacious, but because it treads beyond the bounds of sense; their doubt is, in a particular sense, inconceivable or unintelligible. (shrink)

This paper contrasts our mortal lives with the kind of immortality depicted in Jorge Luis Borges’s story ‘The Immortal’. Borges’s story illustrates how chance plays a different role in mortal and immortal lives. I will show that this difference in the role of chance gives choices in our mortal lives an importance that the choices of Borges’s immortals lack. We can imagine immortal lives other than the ones in Borges’s story. But even for such immortals the importance of their choices (...) diminishes as time goes toward infinity. I conclude that being mortal comes with benefits that immortal lives lack. (shrink)

SEE PISTIL traces a single dictionary entry's refusal. Flower, saint, and social outcast share the same condition of involuntary reception, though only one of the three is granted shame. Formally spare and citation-anchored, the piece enacts its own thesis in its final line, breaking off mid-sentence before the wor.

The disappearing agent problem is traditionally cast as a tension between events and event-causation, on the one hand, and agents and agent-causation on the other. How- ever, as we show, the tension between events and agents can be recast as a tension between causation by agents and causation by parts of agents. If this is right, agent- causalists have their own disappearing agent problem to deal with. After setting out a version of this problem in the form of an overdetermination (...) argument, we present available responses to it. By examining these responses, our aim is to motivate the elaboration of an idea of derivative causation within agent-causal theories of action, whereby complex agents with parts cause whatever they must cause in order to act by way of their parts causing it. (shrink)

The maxim “what gets measured, gets done” has become a guiding principle across business, public policy, and technology. This chapter critically examines the expanding role of metrics and indicators in shaping collective action and decision-making. Rather than primarily serving objectivity, measurements function as coordination devices that make agreement and action easier by translating complex realities into numerical targets. Drawing on examples from climate policy, software development, healthcare, and organisational management, the chapter shows how poorly chosen or overused metrics can distort (...) behaviour. While rejecting the idea that societies should abandon measurement altogether, the chapter argues for a more reflective and democratic approach to metrics—one that treats them as evolving supports for shared vision rather than as definitive representations of reality. (shrink)

What if humanity's future lay not in progress, but in digression? Digressive Society is a philosophical essay that invites us to rethink how we live together and proposes an alternative to totalising narratives and dogmas of all kinds. An engineer by training and a digital artist, Christophe Bruchansky applies postmodern philosophies to the major transformations of our time: technological acceleration, hyper-consumerism, and virtual echo chambers. He develops an original project — a “digressive” society founded on the ambiguity of human existence (...) — a theoretical framework that he unfolds across the cultural, economic, and political spheres. Augmented with illustrations and QR codes giving access to videos and virtual reality works, this book, rich in practical applications, opens a fertile space for reflection for readers of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This paper is a copy of Digressive Society’s conclusions. In the book Digressive Society, I describe a society that would be based on the principle that no one is allowed to impose a principle on others. This paradoxical principle is, as I demonstrate, equivalent to the global maximisation of individual choices as well as the combating of all forms of alienation. A digression should be understood in the positive sense, it is distancing ourselves from an initial intention, deviate from a (...) pre-established or expected discourse. This book is, I hope, a productive attempt to develop a system at the crossroads of critical theory, existentialism, libertarianism, and anarchism: a system founded not on any preconceived notion of justice or human rights, but rooted in the ambiguous nature of human existence. (shrink)

In this paper—the last of the series—I discuss the second of the two main types of soft-line responses to manipulation cases, which I refer to as bypassing views. These views hold that a large part of the reason that Victim lacks responsibility is because the action issues from attitudes acquired in a way that bypassed Victim's capacities for control over their mental life. After offering a quick gloss, I explain how such views are able to avoid various challenges faced by (...) manipulator-focused views—the subject of part 2—including natural force cases and parallel cases. I then introduce the particular views in more detail. This is followed by discussion of various objections raised against these views, as well as responses given by proponents of bypassing views, and responses they might give. The paper concludes with a general discussion of how the two types of views compare overall, and some of the difficulties in making the overall comparison. (shrink)

Four centuries ago, Descartes introduced "I think, therefore I am," in the Cogito which secured a foundation for the certainty of knowing, but left the structure of agency without an equivalent point of origin. This book argues that such a foundation exists, and that it is revealed in the most elemental feature of lived experience, which is the ability to direct one’s own focus. Before intention or choice, before deliberation or desire, there is the self-evident act of orienting awareness, and (...) from this act emerges a new first principle articulated in the axiom Focō, ergo volō, "I focus therefore I will". This axiom is not a metaphysical posit and it is not an empirical conjecture. It stands in the transcendental register where its truth is demonstrated in the very effort to examine or deny it, for any attempt to assess the claim already performs the act it identifies. The capacity to locate, shift or withhold attention is the primordial gesture through which an agent discloses itself as the source of its own activity. A Defense of Focō, ergo volō establishes the philosophical legitimacy of this axiom and justifies its place as the irreducible ground upon which all accounts of agency must rest. Descartes’ Cogito secured the certainty of the thinking self. This work explicates the originary activity through which that self becomes capable of authorship. In doing so, it brings to completion a structural insight that remained implicit since the first articulation of modern thought. (shrink)

One of the most contentious issues in the contemporary philosophy of luck is the account of the so-called significance condition. Consideration of the significance condition pulls in two opposite directions: either into subjectivism and relativism about luck, which may result in the admission that luck cannot have the philosophical use attributed to it, or into eliminativism about the significance condition, which may result in an account of luck that does not do justice to the common usage of the term. In (...) this paper, I discuss whether contemporary philosophers of luck can benefit from considering Aristotle’s view of luck (tyche) and offer a cautiously affirmative answer. Aristotle develops an objective account of luck that avoids problems plaguing contemporary theories, especially those concerning the significance condition. However, the use of Aristotle’s analysis in the context of current debates is limited due to at least three reasons: (1) Aristotle’s analysis depends on his peculiar understanding of teleology, which in turn presupposes a specific conception of the good that is difficult for many to accept today; (2) Aristotle’s analysis requires unexpected and sometimes strained explanations of our everyday attributions of luck; and (3) it seems that Aristotle does not treat cases of good luck and bad luck symmetrically. (shrink)

This paper responds to Chen Yajun’s critique in “Frankfurt’s Concept of Identification.” Frankfurt is well-known for defining free will as second-order volitions that an agent fully endorses wholeheartedly. Chen, however, argues that Frankfurt’s concept of wholeheartedness is problematic for two reasons. First, it fails to offer a clear endpoint in the appeal to higher-order desires to resolve conflicts among second-order desires. Second, wholeheartedness sets an unreasonably high bar for acting freely, as one can still act freely even in a state (...) of halfheartedness or ambivalence. In response, Chen proposes his theory of weak identification, which he claims has certain advantages over Frankfurt’s view. I argue that Frankfurt can address the issue of arbitrariness and that Chen misinterprets Frankfurt’s concept of wholeheartedness. Furthermore, I argue that Chen’s theory faces significant challenges. (shrink)

In the accounts we give of one another, claims about our abilities appear to be indispensable. Some abilities are so widespread that many who have them take them for granted, such as the ability to walk, or to write one's name, or to tell a hawk from a handsaw. Others are comparatively rare and notable, such as the ability to hit a Major League fastball, or to compose a symphony, or to tell an elm from a beech. In either case, (...) however, when we ascribe such abilities to one another we have the impression that we are making claims that, whether they are worth saying or not, are at least sometimes true. The impression of truth exerts a pressure towards giving a philosophical theory of ability. It is not an option, at least at the outset, to dismiss all our talk of ability as fiction or outright falsehood. A theory of ability can be reasonably expected to say what it is to have an ability in a way that vindicates the appearance of truth. Such a theory will deserve the name “philosophical” insofar as it gives an account, not of this or that range of abilities, but of abilities generally. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for free will expressivism, the view that the best interpretation of what people are doing when they utter free will sentences is not, as cognitivists maintain, asserting truth apt propositions, but rather, expressing attitudes towards the performance of certain actions. I argue that free will expressivism has several advantages over its cognitivist rivals in making sense of our free will discourse, and that this is good reason to interpret people thusly.

Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity appears to defend a distinctly existentialist, deontologically-constrained version of consequentialism. On that interpretation, her belief that freedom consists in the real possibilities provided by our concrete situation leads her to reject Kantian autonomy to allow for some consequentialist decisions, while her belief that our situation derives its meaning from freely-chosen projects leads her to limit such choices to their consequences for situated freedom rather than general happiness. However, I will argue that Beauvoir’s view is better understood (...) as a non-deontological, internal critique of consequentialism, rooted in Marx’s historical materialism rather than her existentialist commitments. Beauvoir challenges consequentialism’s tendency to evaluate decision-making over actions, and intended or predicted consequences over actual ones, considering consequences during a limited time-frame despite their variable, contingent future value. In other words, consequentialism is insufficiently consequentialist, a view rooted in historical materialism in two ways. First, her materialist understanding of freedom as situated possibility requires an ethics that prioritizes real rather than projected consequences. Materialist consequentialism acknowledges outcomes are never final and so refuses to assign unambiguous moral value. A decision’s ethical value is preserved only to the degree that the value of its real consequences for existing individuals’ projects is maintained into the indefinite future. Second, her view that value is historical, a human creation based in our actual situation’s contingent utility to our individually chosen projects, denies that any consequence has a fixed value independent of the historical development of humanity as realized through individual choices. Historical-materialist consequentialism demands moral agents retroactively reassess the moral status of every action in order to repair consequences that have, because of changing human purposes, become obstacles to freedom. Together, these historical materialist constraints ground Beauvoir’s demand for an ethics that is ambiguous in principle as well as practice: no decision, action, or consequence has a fixed moral value because consequences are always incomplete and, even when they do not change, the projects that give them value change. While compatible with existentialist conceptions of freedom, responsibility, and authenticity, her ethics does not require such commitments, making it more Marxist than existentialist in character. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the project of naturalising agency, where agency can be broadly understood as the ability to choose and control one's actions on the basis of one's own purposes, goals, or reasons. Such agency is central to the basic phenomenology of our everyday existence as human beings, to how we come to understand ourselves and the world around us, and to the social, moral and legal practices that structure our societies. It is also (...) fast becoming a critical concept for addressing emerging issues in the ethics of artificial intelligence and animal rights. -/- Yet, despite its profound existential, societal and ethical importance, we still lack a robust understanding of the concept of agency from the perspective of the natural sciences. Part of the reason for this is a widespread and long-standing belief that agency - and related concepts such as freedom, purpose, and meaning - carry with them certain metaphysical commitments that are fundamentally incompatible with the picture of the world as it is given to us by science (what is sometimes known as a naturalistic worldview or metaphysics). This belief has led many scientists and philosophers to conclude that our concept of agency is, in fact, an illusion - a non-natural, unscientific notion that exists in our phenomenology, but not in the 'real world'. -/- In this thesis, I push back on these conclusions by developing an empirically grounded account of biological agency. I show how several of the core features (or types) of agency that are commonly claimed to be mysterious and unscientific are in fact perfectly consistent with a modern scientific worldview. To do this, I consider a series of challenges for agency that have emerged out of the philosophy of action, behavioural neuroscience, and the philosophy of free will. Each challenge targets the scientific credibility of a particular feature of agency: specifically, (i) macroscopic, agent-level control, (ii) purposive or mental causation, and (iii) the ability to 'do otherwise' and make genuine choices. I draw on recent empirical work from across the natural sciences to argue that these features are in fact supported by modern science. I do this by developing an empirically grounded framework for thinking about living systems and their behaviour (within each of the specified contexts) which, I argue, provides an entirely naturalistic and non-mysterious account of the relevant feature of agency. That is, I argue for a novel view of naturalistic metaphysics that appears to resolve many of the existing scientific concerns about the concept of agency. I then end by considering some recent attempts to extend a similar concept of agency into the domains of developmental and evolutionary biology. I argue that, in their current form, these attempts are not successful. (shrink)

Some free-will defenses appeal to the intuition that the love of creatures who God causally determined to love him is less valuable than the love of creatures who chose to love God freely, in the libertarian sense. I challenge that intuition directly. I attempt to discredit the intuition in question by demonstrating that no analogies regarding human-related cases can support it. In each case I treat, I argue either that the case is disanalogous to God’s case, or that granting the (...) lover libertarian free will wouldn’t make the love in question more valuable. (shrink)

An important philosophical question relates to whether or not our decision-making practices are constrained or free (or, at least, mostly constrained or free). The notion of rationality (reason or logical thinking) is exemplary of the former, while a kind of radical voluntarism propounded by some post-structuralists is exemplary of the latter. The post-structuralist conception of decision-making as a free (and largely unbridled) enterprise predicts that we should witness people struggling to successfully and reliably make decisions. I intend to demonstrate that (...) this is not the case. If so, then post-structuralists suffer a debilitating dilemma. They must either (a) retain their post-structuralist principles and accept that their view does not concord with how successful decision-making actually occurs or (b) accept that successful decision-making is constrained (by something like rationality) and thereby give up their view's post-structuralist foundation. I will suggest that Option b is more tenable. (shrink)

The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is traditionally formulated in terms of whether true counterfactuals of freedom about the future (true subjunctive conditionals concerning what someone would freely do in the future if they were in certain circumstances) even partly determine an agent's present moral obligations. But the very assumption that there are true counterfactuals of freedom about the future conflicts with the idea that freedom requires a metaphysically open future. We develop probabilism as a solution to the actualism/possibilism debate, a (...) solution that accommodates an open future requirement for freedom. We argue that probabilism resolves the conflicting intuitions that arise between actualists and possibilists and maintains certain distinct advantages over actualism and possibilism. (shrink)

Laplacean Determinism (his so-called demon argument) is the thesis that every event that transpires in a closed universe is a physical event caused (i.e., determined) in full by some earlier event in accord with laws that govern their behavior. On this view, it is possible, in principle, to make perfect predictions of the state of the universe at any time Tn on the basis of complete knowledge of the state of the universe at time T1. Thus, if identity theory, epiphenomenalism (...) or any other instantiation of Laplacean Determinism is correct, mental events such as free will, intention and other forms of mental agency are tricks of the mind, misleading us into believing our volitional concerns have traction in a world ruled entirely by physical circumstance. Not surprisingly, advocates of free will and related acts of human volition have engaged in spirited debate with adherents to Laplacean orthodoxy, the results of which have been far from conclusive. Rather than join these deliberations, I wholly embrace the demon argument and then ask “what are the consequences of this allegiance?” As I hope to show, acceptance of this argument commits one to a belief in the existence of human precognition. This, I suggest, is a consequence that does not fit comfortably within a contemporary scientific worldview. (shrink)

One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism—roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be skeptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized (...) so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle—specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication). (shrink)

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues (...) that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise _in some sense_. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise _in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will_. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work. (shrink)

One of the central problems within the free will debate lies in the apparent incompatibility of an agent's ability to do otherwise and determinism. Recently, compatibilist libertarianism was proposed as an actualist position intended to finally reconcile both. In this article, we argue that in order to maintain consistency, this position must be understood as a variant of classical compatibilism rather than a version of libertarianism. Though this seems to be an undesired consequence for proponents of compatibilist libertarianism, we think (...) that it is not that bad. We show that recent objections to this position can be avoided by embracing its compatibilist nature and argue that a modified version of compatibilist libertarianism might very well be as close to an actualist account of free will in a deterministic world as one can hope for. (shrink)

В данной работе рассматриваются важнейшие вопросы о коллективном воображаемом и его отношениях с реальностью и истиной. Сначала мы рассмотрим эту тему в концептуальных рамках, а затем проведем соответствующий фактологический анализ наглядных поведенческих реалий. Мы будем опираться не только на методологию, но и, главным образом, на постулаты и положения аналитической философии, которые, безусловно, будут проявляться на протяжении всего исследования и могут быть идентифицированы по признакам, описанным Пересом : Рабосси (1975) отстаивает идею, что аналитическая философия может быть идентифицирована путем рассмотрения некоторых семейных (...) сходств. Он предлагает следующие семейные черты: позитивное отношение к научному знанию; осторожное отношение к метафизике; представление о философии как о концептуальной задаче, в которой в качестве метода используется концептуальный анализ; тесная связь между языком и философией; стремление к аргументированным ответам на философские проблемы; поиск концептуальной ясности. Эти базовые понятия включают в себя культурное, социальное, религиозное, научное, философское, моральное и политическое содержание, принадлежащее каждому и коллективному существованию. В данной статье мы не будем дискутировать и доказывать. Наша цель — не систематическая методология, не критика и не доказательство. Настоящая работа основана на аналитической рефлексии. Мы будем рассуждать как можно более полно и глубоко и излагать результаты своих размышлений. Несмотря на междисциплинарный характер темы и методологическую открытость к принятию вклада из любой области науки, данная работа относится к психологии и онтологии, или, другими словами, к социальной и онтологической психологии. Свободная методология, направляющая такие размышления, охватывает и рассматривает все, что приближается к согласованности с философской и психологической эпистемологией. Эта методология не гонится за доказательствами, а ищет взаимосвязь между существующими доказательствами любой природы и величины, выводя когерентный смысл реальных вещей. (shrink)

We investigate two formal arguments familiar to free will scholars and central to the work of Peter van Inwagen: the consequence argument (CA) and the Mind argument (MA). While CA is an argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism, the version of the Mind argument we consider argues for a tension between free will and in determinism. Together the arguments support the view that no one has free will. Our study and comparison of the arguments show that CA (...) and MA have the same determinism-independent core. This is an odd result, and at the end of the paper we discuss interpretations of these findings. (shrink)

The terms ‘compatibilism’ and ‘incompatibilism’ were introduced in the mid-20th century to name conflicting views about the logical relationship between the thesis of determinism and the thesis that someone has free will. These technical terms were originally introduced within a specific research paradigm, the classical analytic paradigm. This paradigm is now in its final stages of degeneration and few free-will theorists still work within it (i.e. using its methods, granting its substantive background assumptions, etc.). This chapter discusses how the ambiguity (...) of the terms ‘incompatibilism’ and ‘compatibilism’ took root as the classical analytic paradigm declined and why this matters to the contemporary debate. Among other things, I explain why the ambiguity of these anachronistic terms, though relatively innocuous when they were first introduced, is now encouraging theorists to tolerate and perpetuate serious philosophical errors (e.g. to conflate relations as different in kind and importance as correlation and causation, to promote uncontentiously invalid arguments, and to equivocate in ways that keep the free-will debate mired in pseudo-stalemates). I also suggest a new framework for anyone looking for relief from the confusion and deadlock created by quixotic attempts to redefine classical narratives and jargon so that they adequately describe the dialectical contours of the contemporary free-will debate. In addition, this new framework allows philosophers to start cross-pollinating work on free will and other famous problems of luck and control, e.g. the paradox of moral luck. (To see the distinctions applied to the philosophical problems of causal luck, constitutive luck, and moral luck, please see my essay "Free Will, Self-Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck" (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2019) and the case for the internal inconsistency of hard incompatibilism in "Hard Times for Hard Incompatibilism" (manuscript)). -/- . (shrink)

The common thread of Pinocchio’s story is his desire to become a human being. Unlike some creators who approached the adventures of Pinocchio in the context of posthumanism the transhumanism embraces technological progress while strongly defending human rights and individual choice. Pinocchio is aware of his incompleteness: he seeks during the story to become „a real boy.” Human consciousness can refer to things that we do not perceive directly. Pinocchio is a „child” without a mother, created by his father to (...) fill his loneliness. He highlights the current problem of the relationship between man and his creation, out of control. (shrink)

There are many historical concerns about freedom that have come to be deemphasized in the free will literature itself—for instance, worries around the tyranny of government or the alienation of capitalism. It is hard to see how the current free will literature respects these, or indeed how they could even find expression. This paper seeks to show how these and other concerns can be reintegrated into the debate by appealing to a levels ontology. Recently, Christian List and others have considered (...) how the notion of levels could be relevant to the free will debate. Invariably, however, the focus is on the significance of facts at lower levels. The threats come from below, from fundamental physics or neuroscience. Here, I aim to show how we can frame many interesting concerns about free will in terms of threats from above. After arguing that determination from above is no less threatening, I catalogue such concerns that might constitute threats to our freedom. Doing this not only allows us to show how these concerns relate to those standardly discussed, but it pushes us to expand our conception of freedom. (shrink)

The title of the paper is an allusion to Philip K. Dick’s book Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (which inspired the movie Blade Runner) and aims, at once, to highlight the (possible) relation between Criminal Law and Artificial Intelligence in its two dimensions of criminal protection (hence the reference to ‘electric crimes’) and criminal liability (hence the reference to the androids’ dreams), within the background problem of knowing whether Artificial Intelligence is truly mind. The purpose of this paper is, (...) precisely, to identify whether there is indeed such relation, in those two dimensions, and making use of a mediating concept, the concept of ‘mind (or ‘mentality’). I argue that Artificial Intelligence “specimens” do not have a mind and, therefore, its protection and regulation by Criminal Law is impaired. I conclude by presenting a choice between a total irrelevance model of Artificial Intelligence to Criminal Law and a model in which Artificial Intelligence emerges as object and subject of Criminal Law by analogy with persons. (shrink)

Précis of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice (2022).

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per (...) se face significant independent moral objections (Pereboom 2014: 153). Despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s (2001, 2013, 2014), taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—which I call the public health-quarantine model (Caruso 2016, 2017a)—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own since it prioritizes prevention and social justice. In Section 1, I begin by (very) briefly summarizing my arguments against free will and basic desert moral responsibility. In Section 2, I then introduce and defend my public health-quarantine model, which is a non-retributive alternative to criminal punishment that prioritizes prevention and social justice. In Sections 3 and 4, I take up and respond to two general objections to the public health-quarantine model. Since objections by Michael Corrado (2016), John Lemos (2016), Saul Smilanksy (2011, 2017), and Victor Tadros (2017) have been addressed in detail elsewhere (see Pereboom 2017a; Pereboom and Caruso 2018), I will here focus on objections that have not yet been addressed. In particular, I will respond to concerns about proportionality, human dignity, and victims’ rights. I will argue that each of these concerns can be met and that in the end the public health-quarantine model offers a superior alternative to retributive punishment and other non-retributive accounts. (shrink)

This chapter outlines six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, not the least of which is that it is unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify it. It then sketches a novel non-retributive alternative called the public health-quarantine model. The core idea of the model is that the right to harm in self-defense and defense of others justifies incapacitating the criminally dangerous with the minimum harm required for adequate protection. The model also draws (...) on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. It is argued that not only does the public health-quarantine model offer a stark contrast to retributivism, but it also provides a more humane, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior, one that is superior to both retributivism and other leading non-retributive alternatives. (shrink)

This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability-it distinguishes between basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility and considers a (...) number of skeptical arguments against each. It then outlines an alternative forward-looking account of moral responsibility grounded in non-desert-invoking desiderata such as protection, reconciliation, and moral formation. It concludes by addressing concerns about the practical implications of skepticism about desert-based moral responsibility and explains how optimistic skeptics can preserve most of what we care about when it comes to our interpersonal relationships, morality, and meaning in life. (shrink)

Like most episodes of Black Mirror, “Hang the DJ” raises a host of philosophical questions. While there is much from this episode to explore, this chapter will explore something that has not yet been addressed in other work, namely the connection between “Hang the DJ” and questions about free will and determinism (or indeterminism, as the case may be). This chapter will proceed as follows: first, I will sketch some reasons for thinking that, if determinism is true, then no one (...) has or exercises free will. One type of response to determinism’s threat to free will is to accept the incompatibility of free will and determinism and to maintain that we nevertheless have free will. Theorists who endorse indeterministic accounts of free will are called libertarians in the free will debate (but please do not confuse them with political libertarians). Second, I will explain a bit more of the mechanics of libertarianism. Third, I will discuss an influential challenge to libertarianism that has come to be known as the “rollback argument.” The mechanics of this challenge will resemble the plot twist of “Hang the DJ.” Fourth, and finally, I will explore the episode’s portrayal of the value of undetermined choice. (shrink)

P. van Inwagen famously offered three precise versions of the so-called Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. The third of these essentially employs the notion of an agent’s having a choice with respect to a proposition. In this paper, I offer two intuitively attractive accounts of this notion in terms of the explanatory connective ‘because’ and explore the prospects of the third argument once they are in play. Under either account, the argument fails.