Stem Cell Research

In cases of fission a thing or person splits into two things or persons. It is often thought that in cases of fission the thing or person which fissions could not be numerically identical with one result of fission rather than the other, on the grounds that it would be objectionably arbitrary for the thing or person to end up as one result of fission rather than the other. I show that this sort of argument fails. Two fission cases which (...) receive special attention are split-brain transplants (where each brain hemisphere is transplanted into a different body) and monozygotic twinning. (shrink)

Neural organoids derived from pluripotent stem cells have sparked ethical debate because, it is claimed, they could be sentient, or could develop sentience. We critically assess three routes for defending such a possibility: analogy with known sentient organisms, inference from neural function using leading theories of consciousness, and foundational philosophical commitments. Current cortical organoids lack nociceptors, sensory integration, and behavioral repertoires necessary for analogical arguments; they also fall short of the structural differentiation presupposed by most empirically grounded consciousness theories, rendering (...) existing neural metrics unreliable. Even if constitutive panpsychism were accepted, the moral relevance of any putative micro experiences would remain undetermined. Precautionary appeals, therefore, hinge on how the term “possible” is interpreted. We argue that regulatory or experimental restrictions are warranted only once there is a non-trivial empirical likelihood that a given organoid type can generate valenced experience. Given present technological limits on size, complexity, and vascularization, that threshold has not been reached, nor is it likely to be met in the near to medium term. This claim is contingent on the current state of research, but we believe it to be justified. Our analysis clarifies conceptual ambiguities surrounding organoid sentience and offers a principled framework for proportionate precaution. (shrink)

Human brain organoids (HBOs) are three-dimensional structures derived from human stem cells that model aspects of brain development and function, offering potentially unprecedented opportunities for studying neurological disorders and for developing treatments. This consensus paper presents recommendations from the Asia Pacific Neuroethics Working Group, developed through interdisciplinary collaboration among scientists, bioethicists, philosophers, and legal scholars who convened in Singapore in November 2024. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the ethical, legal, and sociocultural dimensions of HBO research, addressing both current realities (...) and future possibilities. The paper examines key ethical considerations, including the potential moral status of HBOs, particularly regarding sentience and consciousness, while identifying and dispelling common misconceptions and “ethical red herrings” arising from sensationalized portrayals. We analyze consent frameworks for cell donation, privacy concerns, dual-use risks, and questions of distributive justice. Legal challenges are explored, including the categorical ambiguity of HBOs within existing regulatory frameworks, intellectual property issues, and cross-border inconsistencies in standards. Sociocultural perspectives emphasize the importance of public understanding, cross-cultural engagement, and empirical research on diverse community attitudes toward HBO research. In our recommendations, we advocate for evidence-based ethical discussions, anticipatory frameworks addressing potential future developments, contextualized analysis comparing HBOs to related experimental models, robust informed consent processes, proportionate responses to consciousness concerns, development of adaptive regulatory frameworks, responsible science communication to manage public expectations, and sustained interdisciplinary collaboration. We emphasize a balanced approach that promotes scientific innovation while maintaining rigorous ethical oversight, recognizing HBOs’ significant potential for advancing neuroscience and medicine. This represents the first comprehensive ethical framework for HBO research from the Asia Pacific region, helping to establish foundational principles for responsible development of this rapidly advancing field. (shrink)

Stem cell-based human embryo models (SCBEMs), generated in vitro from stem cells, currently exist outside the scope of regulatory frameworks that govern in vitro embryo research in most jurisdictions. A widely discussed proposal suggests using a ‘Turing test’ framework, whereby regulatory oversight is triggered if an SCBEM is found to be ‘equivalent’ to a human embryo. In this paper, we argue that such a proposal faces two major complications. First, sophisticated laboratory techniques such as trophoblast replacement allow researchers to manipulate (...) normal embryogenesis, obscuring whether a given SCBEM meets embryo-like regulatory thresholds. Second, attempts to assess SCBEMs’ developmental potential—especially through non-human analogues—rest on tenuous epistemic assumptions that may not align with human-specific developmental trajectories. Given SCBEMs’ potential manipulability and uncertain biological and potentiality benchmarks, we argue that reliance on equivalence-based frameworks alone is highly problematic. We conclude by urging a cautious, flexible approach that recognises both the scientific promise of SCBEMs and the normative need to prevent the circumvention of regulatory safeguards. (shrink)

This paper seeks to address the challenges with applying a right to withdraw to pluripotent stem cell (PSC) research. PSC lines are unique in that they can be expanded indefinitely, disseminated globally, transformed into multiple derivatives, and employed as therapeutic products, rendering withdrawal not only logistically unfeasible, but also a substantive risk to research stability. Following an analysis of whether the classical right to withdraw can be suitably modified to address the tensions between donor freedoms and transformative biomedical research, we (...) argue for a recalibration of donor control. Specifically, we present a hybrid model that combines up-front broad consent (including an expression of initial preferences for currently known ethically contentious areas of stem cell research), ongoing dynamic consent, and robust governance. While the paper reviews existing consent and withdrawal models, its primary contribution is to show why these models fail to adequately address the PSC-specific tension between respect for donor autonomy and provision of research certainty and to propose a hybrid, autonomy-preserving alternative that is designed to deliver greater research stability than a modified right to withdraw. (shrink)

With the 2025 revisions to the ISSCR Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Clinical Translation, human stem cell-based embryo models (SCBEMs) sit within a clearer governance framework. We argue, however, that four practical challenges require further clarification. First, specialized oversight of human SCBEM research could be delayed where integration-building work is distributed across several protocols. Second, ambiguity persists at the boundary between SCBEMs and stage- or structure-specific 3D constructs. Third, the new oversight standards for human SCBEM research are not explicitly (...) linked to the ethical principles set out in the Guidelines. Finally, animal implantation or gestation findings could be accorded too much weight when committees consider the limits and scope of human SCBEM safeguards. In light of these four challenges, we propose four targeted clarifications: (1) a narrowly framed consultation trigger for defined protocol-level integration-building manipulations, without moving ordinary organoid, endometrial, placental, or trophoblast research into Category 2; (2) a Category 3B clarification distinguishing permissible, time-limited implantation modelling from impermissible attempts to enable sustained gestational or ectogenetic progression; (3) guidance limiting the decisive inferential use of animal SCBEM gestation evidence in human SCBEM oversight; and (4) a short note linking SCBEM classification and the ISSCR’s ethically motivated limits on preclinical human SCBEM research to explicit criteria and ethical justification. (shrink)

Stem cell-based human embryo models (SCBEMs), generated in vitro from stem cells, currently exist outside the scope of regulatory frameworks that govern in vitro embryo research in most jurisdictions. A widely discussed proposal suggests using a "Turing test" framework, whereby regulatory oversight is triggered if a SCBEM is found to be “equivalent” to a human embryo. In this paper, we argue that such a proposal faces two major complications. First, sophisticated laboratory techniques such as trophoblast replacement allow researchers to manipulate (...) normal embryogenesis, obscuring whether a given SCBEM meets embryo-like regulatory thresholds. Second, attempts to assess SCBEMs’ developmental potential—especially through non-human analogues—rest on tenuous epistemic assumptions that may not align with human-specific developmental trajectories. Given SCBEMs’ potential manipulability and uncertain biological and potentiality benchmarks, we argue that reliance on equivalence-based frameworks alone is highly problematic. We conclude by urging a cautious, flexible approach that recognizes both the scientific promise of SCBEMs and the normative need to prevent the circumvention of regulatory safeguards. (shrink)

In the debates regarding the ethics of human organoid biobanking, the locus of donor autonomy has been identified in processes of consent. The problem is that, by focusing on consent, biobanking processes preclude adequate engagement with donor autonomy because they are unable to adequately recognise or respond to factors that determine authentic choice. This is particularly problematic in biobanking contexts associated with organoid research or the clinical application of organoids because, given the probability of unforeseen and varying purposes for which (...) a donor’s organoids could be employed and given the different ways in which a donor can relate to her biospecimens, a donor can value her organoids differently in different contexts and her reasons for autonomously permitting use of her cells and tissues in one case may not support an autonomous decision in another. In response, this paper has three aims: firstly, to make the case for why organoid biobanks ought to respect donor autonomy conceived as authentic choice; secondly, to explore the autonomy-respecting limits of established and widely prevalent models of biobank consent; and thirdly, to propose certain conditions that organoid biobanks ought to support or facilitate in order to respect donor autonomy. (shrink)

Labor, producción y acción son las tres actividades que forman la vita activa para Hannah Arendt. En torno a acción construyó su pensamiento político y, por eso, es la más atendida por la literatura. Labor y producción han quedado relegadas a un segundo plano, obviando todo aquello que ambas retienen e iluminan. El artículo muestra las dificultades de una distinción que resulta un tanto resbaladiza, sobre todo cuando labor y producción se entienden como conceptos, cristalizaciones de los fenómenos que Arendt (...) pretendía capturar. Propone, en cambio, que labor y producción cobran su más hondo significado cuando se comprenden como experiencias, es decir, como las mentalidades y modos de vida del animal laborans y el homo faber¸ siempre dentro del esfuerzo arendtiano de comprensión de la Modernidad y el totalitarismo. (shrink)

A crucial question in reproductive ethics is whether a human being’s life begins at conception – if it does not, it is more difficult to argue that early embryos possess substantial moral status. I...

To determine when the life of a human organism begins, Mark T. Brown has developed the somatic integration definition of life. Derived from diagnostic criteria for human death, Brown’s account requires the presence of a life‐regulation internal control system for an entity to be considered a living organism. According to Brown, the earliest point at which a developing human could satisfy this requirement is at the beginning of the fetal stage, and so the embryo is not regarded as a living (...) human organism. This, Brown claims, has significant bioethical implications for both abortion and embryo experimentation. Here, we dispute the cogency of Brown’s derivation. Diagnostic criteria for death are used to determine when an organism irreversibly ceases functioning as an integrated whole, and may vary significantly depending on how developed the organism is. Brown’s definition is derived from a specific definition of death applicable to postnatal human beings, which is insufficient for generating a general definition for human organismal life. We have also examined the bioethical implications of Brown’s view, and have concluded that they are not as significant as he believes. Whether the embryo is classified as a human organism is of peripheral interest—a far more morally relevant question is whether the embryo is a biological individual with an identity that is capable of persisting during development. (shrink)

Stem cell research has been a problematic endeavour. For the past twenty years it has attracted moral controversies in both the public and the professional sphere. The research involves not only laboratories, clinics and people, but ethics, industries, jurisprudence, and markets. Today it contributes to the development of new therapies and affects increasingly many social arenas. The matrix approach introduced in this book offers a new understanding of this science in its relation to society. The contributions are multidisciplinary and intersectional, (...) illustrating how agency and influence between science and society go both ways. Conceptually, this volume presents a situated and reflexive approach for philosophy and sociology of the life sciences. The practices that are part of stem cell research are dispersed, and the concepts that tie them together are tenuous; there are persistent problems with the validation of findings, and the ontology of the stem cell is elusive. The array of applications shapes a growing bioeconomy that is dependent on patient donations of tissues and embryos, consumers, and industrial support. In this volume it is argued that this research now denotes not a specific field but a flexible web of intersecting practices, discourses, and agencies. To capture significant parts of this complex reality, this book presents recent findings from researchers, who have studied in-depth aspects of this matrix of stem cell research. This volume presents state-of-the-art examinations from senior and junior scholars in disciplines from humanities and laboratory research to various social sciences, highlighting particular normative and epistemological intersections. The book will appeal to scholars as well as wider audiences interested in developments in life science and society interactions. The novel matrix approach and the accessible case studies make this an excellent resource for science and society courses. (shrink)

The debate on the question of the moral status of human beings and the boundaries of the moral community has long been dominated by the antagonism between personism and speciesism: either certain mental properties or membership of the human species is considered morally crucial. In this article, I argue that both schools of thought are equally implausible in major respects, and that these shortcomings arise from the same reason in both cases: a biological notion of being human. By contrast, I (...) show to what extent being human is morally relevant in a non‐biological sense. I establish the living human form as the essential criterion for belonging to the moral community, and defend it against a number of possible objections. This new morphological approach is capable of capturing essential elements of personism and speciesism without sharing their faults, and of reconstructing widespread moral intuitions. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to the many arguments and controversies concerning abortion. While it argues for ethical and legal positions on the issues, it focuses on how to think about the issues, not just what to think about them. It is an ideal resource to improve your understanding of what people think, why they think that and whether their (and your) arguments are good or bad, and why. It's ideal for classroom use, discussion groups, organizational learning, and personal reading. -/- (...) From the Preface -/- To many people, abortion is an issue for which discussions and debates are frustrating and fruitless: it seems like no progress will ever be made towards any understanding, much less resolution or even compromise. -/- Judgments like these, however, are premature because some basic techniques from critical thinking, such as carefully defining words and testing definitions, stating the full structure of arguments so each step of the reasoning can be examined, and comparing the strengths and weaknesses of different explanations can help us make progress towards these goals. -/- When emotions run high, we sometimes need to step back and use a passion for calm, cool, critical thinking. This helps us better understand the positions and arguments of people who see things differently from us, as well as our own positions and arguments. And we can use critical thinking skills help to try to figure out which positions are best, in terms of being supported by good arguments: after all, we might have much to learn from other people, sometimes that our own views should change, for the better. -/- Here we use basic critical thinking skills to argue that abortion is typically not morally wrong. We begin with less morally-controversial claims: adults, children and babies are wrong to kill and wrong to kill, fundamentally, because they, we, are conscious, aware and have feelings. We argue that since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy, before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus. -/- Furthermore, since the right to life is not the right to someone else’s body, fetuses might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body—which she has the right to—and so she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body. This further justifies abortion, at least, until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal: it is an injustice to criminalizing actions that are not wrong. -/- In the course of arguing for these claims, we: 1. discuss how to best define abortion; 2. dismiss many common “question-begging” arguments that merely assume their conclusions, instead of giving genuine reasons for them; 3. refute some often-heard “everyday arguments” about abortion, on all sides; explain why the most influential philosophical arguments against abortion are unsuccessful; 4. provide some positive arguments that at least early abortions are not wrong; 5. briefly discuss the ethics and legality of later abortions, and more. -/- This essay is not a “how to win an argument” piece or a tract or any kind of apologetics. It is not designed to help anyone “win” debates: everybody “wins” on this issue when we calmly and respectfully engage arguments with care, charity, honesty and humility. This book is merely a reasoned, systematic introduction to the issues that we hope models these skills and virtues. Its discussion should not be taken as absolute “proof” of anything: much more needs to be understood and carefully discussed—always. (shrink)

Research ethics committees must sometimes deliberate about objects that do not fit nicely into any existing category. This is currently the case with the “gastruloid,” which is a self-assembling blob of cells that resembles a human embryo. The resemblance makes it tempting to group it with other members of that kind, and thus to ask whether gastruloids really are embryos. But fitting an ambiguous object into an existing category with well-worn pathways in research ethics, like the embryo, is only a (...) temporary fix. The bigger problem is that we no longer know what an embryo is. We haven’t had a non-absurd definition of ‘embryo’ for several decades and without a well-defined comparison class, asking whether gastruloids belong to the morally relevant class of things we call embryos is to ask a question without an answer. What’s the alternative? A better approach needs to avoid what I’ll refer to as “the potentiality trap” and, instead, rely on the emergence of morally salient facts about gastruloids and other synthetic embryos. (shrink)

Many “rising powers” such as India, China, Argentina, Singapore, and Brazil are investing in stem cell technology, joining the traditional leaders in the field, such as the UK, Germany, USA, and Japan. Malaysia is also entering this sector because of the potential medical and economic benefits that the use of stem cell technologies could provide. Like other countries, Malaysia faces the challenge of how to encourage scientific progress and innovation in an ethical manner while at the same time ensuring a (...) safe and accessible market for regenerative therapies. This paper reports on the research findings of semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders to investigate how they perceived and evaluated the current regulatory framework for human stem cell research in Malaysia, and what might be at stake if the state continues with its current regulatory approach. (shrink)

The clonal evolution model and the cancer stem cell model are two independent models of cancers, yet recent data shows intersections between the two models. This article explores the impacts of the CSC model on the CE model. I show that CSC restriction, which depends on CSC frequency in cancer cell populations and on the probability of dedifferentiation of cancer non-stem cells into CSCs, can favor or impede some patterns of evolution and some processes of evolution. Taking CSC restriction into (...) account for the CE model thus has implications for the way in which we understand the patterns and processes of evolution, and can also provide new leads for therapeutic interventions. (shrink)

Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen ist und bleibt umstritten. Zugleich gibt es immer neue und tiefergehende biotechnologische Möglichkeiten, Embryonen zu manipulieren. Das betrifft insbesondere ihr Entwicklungspotential und die klare Zuordnung zur menschlichen Spezies. Dieses Buch untersucht, welche Auswirkungen diese neuen Manipulationsmöglichkeiten auf die Tragfähigkeit der Argumente haben, mit denen ein herausgehobener moralischer Status des Embryos begründet werden soll: die Potentialitäts- und Speziesargumente. In den Beiträgen werden aktuelle Entwicklungen in der Forschung mit Embryonen zusammengetragen und insbesondere folgende Fragen diskutiert: Was bedeuten (...) diese Entwicklungen für die Potentialitäts- und Speziesargumente – und damit letztendlich auch für den moralischen Status der so manipulierten Embryonen? Können die zentralen embryoethischen Argumente angesichts der neuen biotechnologischen Eingriffsmöglichkeiten überhaupt aufrechterhalten werden? Sind alle Varianten der Argumente betroffen oder nur einige? Können und müssen sie möglicherweise reformuliert oder neu gedacht werden? (shrink)

This article discusses what is involved in having full moral status, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status and surveys different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.

Guidelines on embryo storage prioritise 'respect for the embryo' above the wishes of the women whose labour and tissue have gone into creating the embryo in the first place, effectively making women and the female body disappear. In this article I draw a parallel between this phenomenon relating to embryo storage and other instances of a similar phenomenon that I have called 'the lady vanishes', particularly in stem cell and 'mitochondrial transfer' research. I suggest that a modified property regime could (...) protect women's interests in embryo storage, making a parallel with the Yearworth case, in which it was recognised that men had limited but actionable interests in their stored sperm.. (shrink)

Ontologies of living things are increasingly grounded on the concepts and practices of current life science. Biological development is a process, undergone by living things, which begins with a single cell and (in an important class of cases) ends with formation of a multicellular organism. The process of development is thus prima facie central for ideas about biological individuality and organismality. However, recent accounts of these concepts do not engage developmental biology. This paper aims to fill the gap, proposing the (...) lineage view of stem cells as an ontological framework for conceptualizing organismal development. This account is grounded on experimental practices of stem cell research, with emphasis on new techniques for generating biological organization in vitro. On the lineage view, a stem cell is the starting point of a cell lineage with a specific organismal source, time-interval of existence, and ‘tree topology’ of branch-points linking the stem to developmental termini. The concept of ‘enkapsis’ accommodates the cell-organism relation within the lineage view; this hierarchical notion is further explicated by considering the methods and results of stem cell experiments. Results of this examination include a (partial) characterization of stem cells’ developmental versatility, and the context-dependence of developmental processes involving stem cells. (shrink)

I argue against the view that modern biology has undermined traditional moral rules, including the prohibition of abortion and restrictions on human embryonic stem cell research, by blurring the distinction between humans and other animals. I argue that this view depends on the false premise that an organism can be wronged only if the organism has conscious interests. I then defend a rule against harvesting stem cells in a way that kills an organism with a rational nature. Finally, I apply (...) this rule to proposals about altered nuclear transfer and animal-human chimeras. (shrink)

A new therapeutic strategy could break the stalemate in the war on cancer by targeting not all cancerous cells but the small fraction that lie at the root of cancers. Lucie Laplane offers a comprehensive analysis of cancer stem cell theory, based on an original interdisciplinary approach that combines biology, biomedical history, and philosophy.

It is common in bioethical discussion to present thought experiments or cases in order to construct an argument. Some thought experiments are quite illuminating, and ethical theorizing will often appeal at some point to one’s intuitions. But there are cases in which thought experiments are useless or do not contribute to the argument. This article considers cases presented in the context of stem cell research that are destructive of human embryos. I argue that certain popular cases that are meant to (...) motivate the view that such research is permissible either are dialectically useless or do not contribute to the argument. By dialectically useless, I mean that the cases analyzed here yield intuitions in people who are already committed to the permissibility of such research. I end with some reflections that challenge the reliability of our intuitions on applied ethics issues by suggesting that thought experiments in this field are dubious from the start. My argument should not be read to support moral skepticism but to urge that our inquiries on applied issues requires certain intellectual virtues. (shrink)

When does a developing human being acquire moral status? I outline three different positions based on substance ontology that attempt to solve the question by locating some morally salient event in the process of human development question. In the second section, I consider some specific empirical objections to one of these positions, refute them, and then show how similar objections and responses would generalize to the other substance-based positions on the question. The crucial finding is that all the attempts to (...) answer the question that involve substance ontology need to appeal to dispositions. (shrink)

Chapter 1 introduces the Problem: either one supports embryonic stem cell research and accepts resulting embryo destruction, or one opposes embryonic stem cell research and accepts that its potential benefits will be foregone. It summarizes the main reasons for supporting as well as for rejecting embryonic stem cell research, assuming, for the sake of argument, that the embryo has a significant moral status. It also introduces the two main types of response to the Problem, namely the development of (i) a (...) middle-ground position, which accepts only those types or aspects of embryonic stem cell research that are deemed compatible with the view that the embryo has a significant moral status, or (ii) a technical solution that allows scientists to derive embryonic stem cells, or their functional equivalents, without harming embryos. The chapter ends with an outline of the remainder of the book. (shrink)

Chapter 3 investigates the use–derivation distinction. This middle-ground position holds that while _deriving_ embryonic stem cells is always wrong, it can be permissible to _use_ such cells in research or therapy. It is first argued that tetraploid complementation technology casts doubt on a necessary assumption underlying this distinction: the assumption that embryonic stem cells are not embryos or their moral equivalents. However, this argument only works if the embryo derives its moral status from its potential to develop into a person. (...) It is then argued that, in any case, by _using_ embryonic stem cells one always encourages embryo destruction in a way that is presumptively wrong. It is concluded that, in absence of any new arguments, we should reject the use–derivation distinction as a sound ethical position. Once one accepts the use of embryonic stem cells, consistency requires that one also accepts embryonic stem cell derivation. (shrink)

Chapter 4 discusses several proposals for obtaining embryonic stem cells, or their functional equivalents, without harming embryos: the use of organismically dead embryos, blastomere biopsy, the blastocyst transfer method, altered nuclear transfer, oocyte assisted reprogramming, and parthenogenesis. It is argued that these techniques involve harming embryos, or rely on practices that do so. It is shown that induced pluripotent stem cell research cannot offer a fully satisfactory solution either, as it indirectly encourages embryonic stem cell research, and, thus, embryo destruction. (...) In addition, it is shown that the potential of induced pluripotent stem cells to become a person is similar to that of embryos, rendering research with these cells problematic for those adhering to the potentiality argument. It is concluded that the position holding that it is permissible to apply one of the technical solutions but impermissible to conduct embryonic stem cell research is inconsistent. (shrink)

Chapter 5 provides a summary of the previous chapters and reveals a shocking implication of the conclusions arrived at: consistency seems to require that if one believes that induced pluripotent stem cell research is presumptively permissible, one should also find the use and derivation of stem cells from embryos created for research presumptively permissible. It is suggested that this implication could perhaps be avoided by an appeal to the moral distance argument, but that this strategy creates new challenges. The book (...) is drawn to an end with some thoughts on whether an inconsistent solution to the problem of embryo destruction in embryonic stem cell research, though failing as a sound ethical position, could nevertheless be defended as a compromise, for example, to serve as a basis for stem cell policy. It is concluded that this would almost always have a significant epistemic cost. (shrink)

Embryonic stem cell research holds great promise for biomedical research, but involves the destruction of human embryos. Katrien Devolder explores the tension between the view that embryos should never be deliberately harmed, and the view that such research must go forward. She provides an in-depth analysis of major attempts to resolve the problem.

Chapter 2 investigates the discarded–created distinction. This popular middle ground position holds that it can be permissible to derive stem cells from embryos discarded following _in vitro_ fertilization, but not from embryos created for research. After establishing that there is a presumption against this distinction, it investigates whether this presumption can be overridden by widely used arguments that appeal to the nothing-is-lost principle, the doctrine of double effect, or the notion of respect. It is concluded that none of these arguments (...) can override the presumption and that, in absence of any new arguments, we should reject the discarded–created distinction. Once one accepts the use and derivation of stem cells from discarded embryos, consistency requires that one also accept the use and derivation of stem cells from research embryos. (shrink)

Each of the 13 articles in this collection wrestles with intricate metaphysical and moral aspects of the widespread belief that a thing’s potential—what it could, would, might, or will be, but isn’t yet—matters for how we should treat that thing. As John Lizza explains in his lucid introduction, the articles are grouped into three parts according to their aims and theoretical constraints. In this review, I briefly summarize and offer some critical discussion of each part.

I have previously argued that stem cell experiments cannot demonstrate that a single cell is a stem cell. Laplane and others dispute this claim, citing experiments that identify stem cells at the single-cell level. This paper rebuts the counterexample, arguing that the alleged ‘crucial stem cell experiments’ do not measure self-renewal for a single cell, do not establish a single cell’s differentiation potential, and, if interpreted as providing results about single cells, fall into epistemic circularity. I then discuss the source (...) of the dispute, locating it in differences between philosophical and experimental perspectives. (shrink)

This chapter brings a philosophical perspective to the concept of stem cell. Three general questions both clarify the concept of stem cell and emphasize its ambiguities: (1) How should we define stem cells? (2) What makes them different from non-stem cells? (3) What is their ontology? (i.e. what kind of property is “stemness”?) Following this last question, the Chapter distinguishes four conceptions of stem cells and highlights their respective consequences for the cancer stem cell theory. Determining what kind of property (...) stemness is, in what context, is an urgent question, at least for therapeutic strategies against cancers. I hope that this chapter also illustrates how philosophy can be useful to biology. -/- The Chapter starts by clarifying the notions of self-renewal and differentiation. This leads to the question “can we (and if so, how) distinguish stem cells from non-stem cells through these two properties?”. From that will follow an interrogation on whether stem cells belong to a natural kind. On this issue, biologists and philosophers have framed the following alternative: either the concept of stem cell refers to entities (the cells that belong to the stem cell natural kind) or it refers to a transient and reversible cell state. I will argue that four conceptions of stemness should be distinguished rather than two. Finally, I will develop the case of the cancer stem cell (CSC) theory in order to show why it is crucial to answer the ontological question: some therapies might or might not be efficient depending on what stemness is. (shrink)

Reprogramming technologies show that cellular identity can be reprogrammed, challenging the classical conception of cell differentiation as an irreversible process. If non-stem cells can be reprogrammed into stem cells, then what is it to be a stem cell, and what kind of property is stemness? This article addresses this question both philosophically and biologically, states the different possibilities, and illustrates their potential consequences for science with the example of anti-cancer therapies.

Patient-funded trials are gaining traction as a means of accelerating clinical translation. However, such trials sidestep mechanisms that promote rigor, relevance, efficiency, and fairness. We recommend that funding bodies or research institutions establish mechanisms for merit review of patient-funded trials, and we offer some basic criteria for evaluating PFT protocols.

Sarah Franklin’s Biological relatives: IVF, stem cells, and the future of kinship and Charis Thompson’s Good science: the ethical choreography of stem cell research, examine recently normalized biotechnologies. Franklin’s monograph extends her previous work on in vitro fertilization , deconstructing the success of a technology that, she argues, has grown “curiouser and curiouser” while taking hold in scientific and social life. IVF in its diverse aspects becomes a lens for scrutinizing our ambivalence about new technology, which Franklin articulates by putting (...) disparate literatures into conversation: feminist science studies, political economy, fine art, and more. Thompson’s Good science focuses more concretely on the first decade of human pluripotent stem cell research, tracing the field from the innovation of cultured human embryonic stem cells through Bush-era policy debates, to current acceptance of stem cell research as a part of the scientific and policy landscape. Th .. (shrink)

Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to possess—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a (...) duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo. (shrink)

Recent breakthroughs in stem cell differentiation and reprogramming suggest that functional human gametes could soon be created in vitro. While the ethical debate on the uses of in vitro generated gametes (IVG) was originally constrained by the fact that they could be derived only from embryonic stem cell lines, the advent of somatic cell reprogramming, with the possibility to easily derive human induced pluripotent stem cells from any individual, affords now a major leap in the feasibility of IVG derivation and (...) in the scope of their potential applications. In this paper we develop an ethical framework, rooted in recent scientific evidence, to support a robust experimental pipeline that could enable the first-in-human use of IVG. We then apply this framework to the following objectives: (1) a clarification of the genetic parenting options afforded by IVG, along with their ethical underpinnings; (2) a defence of the use of IVG to remedy infertility, broadening their scope to same-sex couples; (3) an assessment of the most far-reaching implications of IVG for multiplex parenting. These include, first, the liberation of parenting roles from the constraints of biological generations in vivo, allowing multiple individuals to engage in genetic parenting together, thus blurring the distinction between biological and social generations. Second, we discuss the conflation of IVG with sequencing technology and its implications for the possibility that prospective parents may choose among a hitherto unprecedented number of potential children. In view of these perspectives, we argue that, contrary to the exhausted paradigm according to which society lags behind science, IVG may represent instead a salient and most visible instance where biotechnological ingenuity could be used in pursuit of social experimentation. (shrink)

Human–nonhuman chimeras have been the focus of ethical controversies for more than a decade, yet some related issues remain unaddressed. For example, little has been said about the relationship between the origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities to which they may give rise. Consider, for example, a developing mouse fetus that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a human and another that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a dolphin. If both chimeras acquire morally relevant (...) capacities as a result of transplantation, and if those capacities are indistinguishable, should the difference in cell origin matter to how we classify these creatures? I argue that if morally relevant capacities are easy to detect, cell origin is irrelevant to how the chimera ought to be treated. However, if such capacities are hard to detect, cell origin should play a role in considerations about how to treat the chimera. (shrink)

I am grateful to the authors who commented on my article (Piotrowska 2014) for their careful examination of my argument. They have presented a variety of stimulating ideas and suggestions, with which I largely agree and which I would like to discuss further, but in the interest of brevity, I shall try to concentrate only on points of contention.

In his discussion of in vitrogametogenesis, Rob Sparrow claims that an ethical barrier to development of this technology is that many jurisdictions currently prohibit the practice of creating embryos solely for the purpose of research. However, he suggests that this ethical barrier will soon be eroded, in view of the fact that in vitro gametogenesis could serve as a powerful new technology to overcome infertility. In this commentary, I argue that Sparrow is being overly optimistic in his analysis here. I (...) claim that the debate over so-called compromise positions in the human embryonic stem cell debate suggests that the purpose of the research for which a research embryo is created is unlikely to be considered as having any significant bearing on the moral permissibility of the practice for those who oppose it. Even though in vitro gametogenesis could serve as a powerful new technology to overcome infertility, I argue that opponents of the practice of creating embryos solely for research purposes would still view the creation of research embryos that the development of in vitro gametogenesis would require, as being incompatible with affording the embryo proper moral respect. I conclude by suggesting that Sparrow's analysis of the potential benefits of in vitro gametogenesis provides us with further reasons to scrutinise the unconvincing arguments that are often cited in favour of prohibiting the practice of creating embryos solely for research purposes. (shrink)

A series of recent scientific results suggest that, in the not-too-distant future, it will be possible to create viable human gametes from human stem cells. This paper discusses the potential of this technology to make possible what I call ‘in vitro eugenics’: the deliberate breeding of human beings in vitro by fusing sperm and egg derived from different stem-cell lines to create an embryo and then deriving new gametes from stem cells derived from that embryo. Repeated iterations of this process (...) would allow scientists to proceed through multiple human generations in the laboratory. In vitro eugenics might be used to study the heredity of genetic disorders and to produce cell lines of a desired character for medical applications. More controversially, it might also function as a powerful technology of ‘human enhancement’ by allowing researchers to use all the techniques of selective breeding to produce individuals with a desired genotype. (shrink)

Con la Modernidad, la reflexión filosófica sobre la política ha incidido progresivamente en la relevancia del espacio público como lugar de aparición y, por tanto, de acción. Estos son los ejes de la obra arendtiana que intenta delimi-tar el espacio político y el papel de la ciudadanía a la hora de constituir y mantener este espacio por medio de una acción que requiere la presencia. En cambio, en el pensamiento de Arendt no se abordan las nuevas posibilidades de acción y (...) espacio político ausente que abren las tecnologías de la comunicación. En el segundo apartado se analizarán las posturas de Derrida y Virilio, autores que emprenden una crítica a la política de la presencia, incidiendo en dos aspectos diferentes. Continuando la crítica de Virilio se llegará a la apología de las multitudes rizomáticas “Open Source” defendidas por Negri como nuevo sujeto político, lo que supone incidir en las pérdidas irremediables que el empleo de las TIC implican para una política de la presencia. (shrink)

In this article, I present a new interpretation of the pro-life view on the status of early human embryos. In my understanding, this position is based not on presumptions about the ontological status of embryos and their developmental capabilities but on the specific criteria of rational decisions under uncertainty and on a cautious response to the ambiguous status of embryos. This view, which uses the decision theory model of moral reasoning, promises to reconcile the uncertainty about the ontological status of (...) embryos with the certainty about normative obligations. I will demonstrate that my interpretation of the pro-life view, although seeming to be stronger than the standard one, has limited scope and cannot be used to limit destructive research on human embryos. (shrink)