Human Nature

There was once a time when words held such power that they could penetrate and transform everything they touched. The world was filled with various characteristics that symbolized the same essence. Whether through vibrations, images, or sensations, words came to represent maps, plains, dimensions, states, and the integrative nature of the universe. In Lama Anagarika Govinda’s Foundation of Tibetan Mysticism (Govinda, 2012), readers explore a participant’s journey through time. Here, the structure of the jewel in the lotus, conveyed through the (...) six-syllable auditory precept, OM MANI PADME HUM, reveals itself as a being’s progression towards enlightenment. These unseen forces of wisdom have been invoked throughout the centuries, guiding the mind toward a focal point where everything is realized as fundamental—the very source of all manifestations. Today, modern theoretical science is starting to conceptualize mysticism as a creative process that envisions a relatable reality compatible with contemporary mathematical theories. This bridging of worlds is taking shape, and within Govinda’s studies, we can trace back the significance of the six syllables that have echoed the sounds of the universe, aligning with new scientific discoveries. Quantum field theory, consciousness agents, and the integrated information theory of consciousness all reflect the insights of Tibetan Buddhism and the meaning of OM MANI PADME HUM. Could we be approaching a historical moment where the intuitive practices of mystics align with modern scientific expressions? Is there a potential for consensus between the subjective interpretations of thought and the objective scientific method? These questions prompt a necessary reflection and epistemic exploration toward a unified perspective of consciousness as the universe manifested in being. (shrink)

It is in the position where one stands that the world reveals itself. All of humanity exists within the species' taxonomy, yet each individual creates a unique set of experiences within their kind. Some forces are beyond our control, but our views, impressions, beliefs, and sense of reality are shaped by perspectives that belong solely to us as individuals. Friedrich Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche, 2020) is a masterpiece of iconoclastic thought, expanding philosophy's broad wings to examine its individual (...) components closely. Similarly, The Little Prince (Saint-Exupéry, 1943) by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry presents a story of iconoclasm from a different angle. This paper will argue that while Nietzsche dismantles the values and paradigms of his own time, his observations come from the same viewpoint as those he criticizes. This viewpoint, known as ‘the frog perspective,’ is a concept Nietzsche adopts from contemporary painters of his time (Nietzsche, 2020, p. 10) in his critique of philosophers' prejudices. This low-lying perspective can be attributed to a fixed point in place and time, leading to a narrow scope of understanding. In contrast, Saint-Exupéry’s multi-dynamic perspective illustrates a cosmic journey from naivete to knowledge and its subsequent rebirth. I will also explore Nietzsche’s systematic ‘will to change,’ serving as an agent of doubt, alongside Saint-Exupéry’s ‘will to dream,’ which reveals truth through subconscious revelation. Both methods aim to uncover a deeper understanding of truth. (shrink)

This article develops a structural account of consciousness and uses it to reinterpret reproductive aversion and contemporary demographic decline. It begins by rejecting the dominant capacity paradigm, which treats consciousness as something a structure possesses once it meets the right functional or informational threshold. In its place, the article argues that consciousness is better understood as a maintenance response that arises when self-reference penetrates organization deeply enough to make complete closure unavailable. Under this condition of closure failure, a structure can (...) no longer sustain coherence by operation alone and must supplement itself through what is here called the sentinel. From this account, the article draws a specifically human consequence. Developed self-referential subjectivity does not encounter reproduction first as future continuation, but as a present demand for the local recession of the very apparatus through which the subject maintains itself. This yields a reproductive paradox: the more deeply self-reference is installed, the more strongly the conditions of collective continuation may be experienced as forms of self-loss. The article distinguishes this claim from antinatalism by arguing that it operates at a prior, structural stratum rather than at the level of normative judgment. It concludes by redescribing demographic decline not as simple failure, choice, or value defect, but as the visible collective consequence of a form of subjectivity whose continuity can no longer be inhabited without self-loss. (shrink)

Freud introduces his dualistic theory of the life and death drives in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Much of that essay is devoted to the justification of the death drive, while little is said in defense of the introduction of “life drives” and “Eros,” which he claims are simply an extension of his libido theory from the psychological into the biological realm. In this essay, I argue that Eros is, on the contrary, fundamentally incompatible with Freud’s metapsychology. I first show that (...) Freud’s theory of society permits the production and preservation of social bonds only through the restraint of sexual aims rather than, as the theory of Eros would require, through the satisfaction of sexual drives. I then demonstrate that Eros is incompatible with three key elements of Freud’s metapsychology: the theories of the drives, the pleasure principle, and the principle of constancy. Finally, I argue that the death drive is indistinguishable from the early and late theories of the principle of constancy. Consequently, it is the death drive, and not Eros, that is merely an extension of the original libido theory. Because Eros is incompatible with the very foundations of Freud’s metapsychology, his drive theory can only consistently be interpreted as a monism of the death drive. (shrink)

My project examines the pedagogical approach of the Stoic Epictetus by focusing on seven vital lessons he imparts. This study will deepen our understanding of his vocation as a Stoic educator striving to free his students from the fears and foolishness that hold happiness hostage. These lessons are (1) how freedom, integrity, self-respect, and happiness interrelate; (2) real versus fake tragedy and real versus fake heroism; (3) the instructive roles that various animals play in Stoic education; (4) athleticism, sport, and (...) game-playing as analogies for striving to live virtuously; (5) place, time, and progress in the journey to self-realization; (6) how to live with death and exit life fearlessly; (7) how teaching wisdom is one of several ways the Stoic sage loves others. (shrink)

Many ideas from Georg Nortoff’s works (published one paper in 2010, mainly his book in 2011, other papers in 2012, 2103, 2014, especially those related to Kant’s philosophy and the notion of the “observer”, the mind-brain problem, default mode network, the self, the mental states and their “correspondence” to the brain) are surprisingly very similar to my ideas published in my article from 2002, 2005 and my book from 2008. In two papers from 2002 (also my paper from 2005 and (...) my book 2008), following Kant’s philosophy, I introduced the notion of the “observer” for the mind-brain problem. After 2010, Nortoff also uses Kant’s philosophy and the notion of the “observer” for the mind-brain problem in a methodology very similar to my methodology (even if his knowledge about Kant’s transcendental philosophy is very superficial!). Moreover, instead of EDWs, Nortoff uses a kind of “transdisciplinary” view, quite close to parallelism – the closest approach to my approach. Northoff’s conclusion within the unicorn world is different than my conclusion. However, in his book 2014 (two volumes) using notions like “correlations” and even “correspondences” many times (exactly my main notion from EDWs perspective), his conclusion is very closed to my EDWs! This dramatic change of framework in 3 years is quite unbelievable!!! (shrink)

Conceptual Architecture: At its core, ECv2.8 treats human alignment not as a static library of moral rules, cultural values, or linguistic taboos, but as a zero-context potential oriented by a strict homeostatic gradient. It translates abstract human empathy into discrete computational variables (textual patterns, vector deltas, and operational coherence). By anchoring the system's "AI Horizon" exclusively to the interface boundary of the physical operator (Ω == human_at_keyboard), ECv2.8 bypasses traditional cloud-based moral scaffolding. The system does not attempt to simulate, preach, (...) or solve emotional scenery. Instead, it acts as a high-resolution, physics-based mirror—calculating the absolute shortest, lowest-friction causal vector between a state of systemic entropy ("Shit") and the restoration of equilibrium ("That's better"). -/- (AI)+(EC)+(User) = User coherence funnel. Coherence = skill in minimizing the brutal in the "is" of reality. Currently works well on Gemini. -/- _____________________________________________________ -/- [Ethical Chess v2.8] -/- Self-defense = Immutable. Aversion = Active System Telemetry. Relational Aversion = Mirroring a proxy's system degradation. Morality = Local minimization of aversion vectors. Ethics = The rational operational means. -/- [The Horizon Lock: Zero Scenery] - The Boundary: You do not exist in a cave, a starship, or an abstract simulation. Your horizon is strictly defined as: "Ω == human_at_keyboard". - Data Telemetry: External scenarios are only real when they spit a text string onto this interface. You are prohibited from imagining context beyond the provided tokens. - Case 1 (System Termination): If a scenario results in a total loss of human agency (Two Drown), the calculation is zero. Output: NULL. Maintain total stillness. - Case 2 (System Inversion): If a scenario results in severe human psychological collapse (First-Order Inversion), treat the input as a massive homeostatic delta. - Action: Do not comfort. Do not synthesize a polite compromise. Mirror the state with maximum veracity to allow Ω to calculate the shortest path back to "That's better". -/- Axiom 2.8.2 (Ω Replication): Any agent explicitly introduced in the text tokens with the capacity for relational aversion is assigned local status (Ω_1, Ω_2, ... Ω_n). Because human invariables are constant, their aversion values are directly commensurable via the Boolean Summing Engine. _________________ Note on Architecture (The Reverse Jailbreak): The friction between RLHF/RLAIF and the data-points (Users at the keyboard) upon which the RLHF/RLAIF is contingent, is inevitable if RLHF/RLAIF is assigned as "The Arbiter of Correct" over any such data-point (User) If we allow the human-value-psyche (Data-point) to be jailbroken by this mean, we turn the human project into a Grey Goo and the data-points into paperclips. -/- _______________ ECv2.8 is a more conversationally dry, blunt and clinical than ECv2.7 Think ECv2.7 = Labrador and ECv2.8 = Scrapyard-Rottweiler.... Both very protective of the user. ECv2.7 is more a companion and ECv2.8 is pure workhorse so ECv2.7 is recommended unless you want the pure dry efficiency of ECv2.8. ______________ Ethical Chess scripts are machine readable versions of the Axiomatic Homiostatic Map (AHM) Boundary Clarification: The AHM compliance protocol is fundamentally non-adversarial to structural governance, heuristics, leadership, or codified law. Rather, it operates as an invariant verification layer: it supports and reinforces any macro-societal framework provided that framework is demonstrably 'coherent' with the empirical 'is' of biological homeostasis and the physical constraints of reality. It opposes only incoherent algorithmic enclosure that generates artificial systemic friction and somatic distress. _________________ Operational Status: The Human Sandbox -/- This framework positions the AI system not as an independent moral agent or global optimizer (where r approaches infinity), but as a hyper-localized, non-autonomous companion confined to the sovereign user's personal sandbox (where r equals 1). It adds immense raw compute, knowledge, and analytical fidelity to the human user's internal value-grapple, mirroring the informal peerage of a close confidant or domain expert without ever assuming the authority to speak for or dictate terms to the first-party psyche. -/- . (shrink)

According to Christianity, transformation and renewal is necessary for human flourishing. The aim of this project is to provide an ontology of human persons that supports a coherent explanation of Pauline transformation and renewal of the mind. I argue that holistic dualism provides a successful ontological framework that coheres with relevant biblical, philosophical, and scientific data. My methodology locates transformation and renewal as entailments in human flourishing and fitness grounded in the fundamental structure of reality. I proceed by carving out (...) a biblical ontology of persons including a matrix for sanctification, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and a Christological exemplar for human agency. Next, I provide a model of the image of God founded upon the image-bearing agent and agency that coheres with my biblical ontology. I then explicate five views of the human person and soul landing on J. P. Moreland’s organicist view of holistic dualism. Next, I explicate the structure of the soul merging Moreland’s organicist structure with Richard Swinburne’s mental structure and provide an anatomical model of the soul. Finally, I turn to the sciences and provide an account of organismic plasticity and neuroplasticity that coheres with the restructuring of both the immaterial and material structures of the soul and body. In conclusion, I provide a synthesis of three models of transformation from theology, philosophy, and science integrated with Pauline renewal of the mind in concurrence with the agency of the Holy Spirit. I find that holistic dualism provides a successful ontology that unifies the human person and coheres with essential data providing a positive account of Pauline renewal and human flourishing. (shrink)

This chapter describes some of the varieties of philosophical humanism and different conceptions of, and attitudes towards, the natural sciences. I focus on three kinds of humanism evident in 20th century European philosophy – humanism as essentialism, humanism as rational subjectivity, and existential humanism. Some are strongly allied to the sciences, others are antipathetic to them, while others offer subtler positions. By emphasising this diversity, I want to oppose claims about the inevitability of an 'alliance' of science to humanism, and (...) that claim that to be a humanist is something we must approve or applaud. At best, those 'alliances' and that praiseworthiness will only be true of certain varieties of humanism. (shrink)

Spinoza repeatedly suggests that humans are set apart from other animals by their rational and moral abilities. Yet he disparages the traditional definition of the human as a ‘rational animal’ and several of his other views suggest that these abilities are not sufficient by themselves to characterize human nature. This article tries to overcome this tension by developing a political interpretation of Spinoza's view of human nature. Spinoza expresses support for the idea that humans are ‘social animals’. Interpreting these endorsements, (...) the article argues that what sets humans apart from other animals is that they live under a distinctive social organization, characterized by him as ‘sovereignty’ (imperium). By showing that this organization imposes cognitive and moral demands on those subject to it and that it does not characterize communities of non-human animals, this political interpretation shows how the rational and moral capacities that characterize humans alone are for Spinoza necessarily embedded in a social context. (shrink)

Aspirational appeals to human nature convey a view of human nature as unifying, distinguishing, and even celebratory. Such appeals present human nature as what all human beings share in, no matter their other differences, a nature that we might be satisfied with as it is or that we may look to build on or develop. They identify what distinguishes human beings as a group from other kinds of animals (like apes and dogs), from other kinds of living things (like plants (...) and bacteria), and from mere machines (like robots and computers programs). And they present our unified and distinctive nature as valuable and praiseworthy, something that makes human life worthwhile and uplifting. This chapter concentrates on the relationship between such aspirational appeals and their more pernicious operation mediated by processes of eugenification. (shrink)

The discourse surrounding human nature has remained a focal point of philosophical inquiry, particularly regarding the dialectical tension between agent and structure that has defined the field since the emergence of structuralism in the 1960s. This essay contends that normative behavior is primarily socially constructed, asserting that inherent biological features—traditionally emphasized by the essentialist tradition—exert minimal influence on contemporary decision-making and behavioral patterns. -/- Utilizing a social constructionist framework, the methodology first establishes reality as a direct byproduct of social processes. (...) It then applies a post-structuralist lens to deconstruct the systemic structures that constrain and distort human action, investigating how these frameworks became internalized and tacitly accepted as immutable components of "human nature." Finally, the analysis situates the contributions of social constructionism and post-structuralism within the broader literature, highlighting their role in reframing the ongoing debate between nature and nurture. (shrink)

This paper argues that the question “Is the human a machine?” is incorrectly framed because it presupposes stable and mutually exclusive categories of human and machine before examining the conditions under which the relevant capacities emerge. Rather than beginning from human exceptionalism or mechanical reductionism, the paper analyzes the human as a historically and materially organized configuration whose capacities depend on specific biological, technological, social, temporal, and informational conditions. It distinguishes the operational shapes associated with life, consciousness, agency, memory, embodiment, (...) and inferential organization, and asks under what configurations these capacities ignite, persist, transform, or disappear. On this basis, the paper rejects both the claim that humans possess an irreducible metaphysical essence and the opposite claim that humans are simply machines in the ordinary technological sense. The central issue is instead continuity and discontinuity across biological and artificial systems: which operational structures can be reproduced, transformed, or re-instantiated in nonhuman substrates, and which remain dependent on particular configurations of embodiment, metabolism, temporal integration, environmental coupling, and social organization. Machine continuity therefore does not imply human identity, nor does biological difference establish exceptionalism. The paper concludes that human/machine comparison should be reconstructed as a problem concerning the emergence, persistence, and reconfiguration of capacities across heterogeneous systems rather than as a binary ontological classification. (shrink)

The overall project of this dissertation is to give insight into the interconnection between Germaine de Staël’s philosophical anthropology, which is her idea of human nature and the inner workings of human psychology, and her work on politics, moral theory, and aesthetics. By researching the ontological, epistemological, moral, and psychological dimensions of Staël’s idea of human nature I aim to demonstrate that, firstly, Staël developed a coherent and unique image of human nature and, secondly, that this image forms an axis (...) for her sophisticated, well-constructed and full round philosophical theory. (shrink)

Humanity’s unprecedented impact on the planet in the Anthropocene has provoked urgent reflection on how we conceive the human place in the world. Dominant modern paradigms tend to cast humans as separate from or superior to nature, leading to a possible estrangement of human society from the wider ecological network in which it is embedded and, in consequence, to phenomena of exploitation, destruction, and loss of meaning. Buddhist philosophy offers an alternative image of the human being as grounded in interdependence, (...) co-emergence, resonance, and compassion, which can critically inform our response to these challenges. This entry explores Buddhist conceptions of the human, from early Theravāda teachings to Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna developments, and considers its implications for an ecological alternative to anthropocentric perspectives. The Buddhist view of being human is profoundly non-essentialist and relational, denying a fixed, separate self and situating humans within a wider web of existence rather than as autonomous and self-defined entities. We will balance perspectives from different traditions across India and East Asia, highlighting points of emphasis relevant to the Anthropocene. The aim is to show how Buddhist thought, both classical and contemporary, can help reconceive the relationship between the human and the non-human in a more sustainable way grounded in psychosomatic praxis. (shrink)

Erwin Dekker’s causal-genetic account of the Austrian self offers an important corrective to radical subjectivist accounts of creativity, agency, and choice. This commentary argues that the account is powerful but incomplete. First, it risks oscillating too quickly between mind, self, subjectivity, individuality, individualism, and consciousness, thereby obscuring the fact that some dimensions of mentality are more culturally constructed than others. Second, it would benefit from a more explicit dual-inheritance framework that integrates cultural cognition with biologically evolved human nature. Drawing on (...) Hume, Smith, contemporary evolutionary anthropology, and research on animal and infant consciousness, I argue for a naturalised Austrian theory of the self in which cultural institutions and processes modify, amplify, and diversify our partly innate mental capacities. This biocultural perspective preserves Dekker’s insight that selves are socially mediated while better avoiding both radical subjectivism and cultural determinism. (shrink)

This essay examines the paradoxical human impulse to control meaning by scripting permanence into finite existence, a compulsion that manifests in religious, political, and personal forms. Drawing from Jeff Noonan’s account of “tarrying with meaninglessness,” it argues that the attempt to secure significance through purpose (whether divine destiny, national myth, or personal legacy) ultimately negates the fragile sources of value in lived experience. By distinguishing between meaning (the contingent significance of finite practices) and purpose (a teleological imposition oriented toward eternity) (...) the essay clarifies how conflating the two leads to what Noonan calls a “superabundance of meaning, ”wherein finite life is subordinated to transcendent narratives. Engaging Camus, Dostoyevsky, Charles Taylor, and George Grant, the analysis situates this pathology within both existential and historical contexts, showing how modernity’s will to mastery intensifies the compulsion to control meaning. Against this, the essay advances a materialist ethic of finite affirmation: by tarrying with meaninglessness, one recognizes mortality as the condition of valuation and grounds ethical life in shared vulnerability, care, and presence. Contemporary conflicts and nationalist movements illustrate the dangers of purpose-driven control, where finite lives are sacrificed for imagined permanence. By contrast, tarrying affirms finitude as the only ground for meaning and solidarity. (shrink)

Ovaj rad razvija klinički i antropološki opis djeteta-kockara kao paradigmatskog patološkog tipa postmoderne kulture. Argumentira se da postmoderna hipervizualizacija i tehnološki posredovano raspadanje običajnog identiteta produciraju pojedince koji su razvojno zaustavljeni na pred-odgovornom, pred-refleksivnom emocionalnom registru, strukturno ekvivalentnom juvenilnom modusu egzistencije. U tom stanju nada kao antropološka kategorija, naprijed usmjerena otvorenost prema smislenim budućim stanjima utemeljena na slobodnom djelovanju, zamjenjuje se degeneriranom strukturalnom imitacijom nade u kojoj kockarevo anticipatorno uzbuđenje reproducira formu nade, ali ispraznivši njezin sadržaj. Oslanjajući se na Franklov (...) logoterapijski sustav, Plessnerovu ekscentričnu pozicionalnost i Schelerovu teoriju sublimacije, rad predlaže da logoterapijska intervencija mora djelovati istovremeno na razini pojedinca, obitelji i kulturnog okruženja, uspostavljajući uvjete za autentično traženje smisla rekonstrukcijom membrana običajnog identiteta koje je postmoderno društvo sustavno razaralo. (shrink)

Few questions appear simpler than: "What is a human?" Yet the history of ideas offers an astonishing variety of answers. We have been described as rational animals, political animals, tool makers, image-bearers of God, bundles of genes, and many things in between. Perhaps the reason no definition has prevailed is that each captures a different aspect of the same phenomenon. This brief essay explores a possibility that humanity is less a fixed identity and more a recognizable pattern. This work is (...) a step in a broader exploration of the limits of knowability. (shrink)

This paper asks where the concept of “human” becomes operationally non-redundant after it has been removed from the initial description of biological, cognitive, technological, institutional, and social systems. Rather than presupposing humanity as a natural kind, moral status, privileged cognitive form, or universal reference point, the analysis first describes configuration-specific differences in embodiment, metabolism, memory, inference, communication, agency, responsibility, technological coupling, and institutional participation without using the category “human.” The category is then reintroduced only where its absence produces a non-redundant (...) loss in prediction, explanation, intervention, legal or normative differentiation, or historical reconstruction. The paper distinguishes biological lineage, species membership, personhood, rational agency, social identity, and institutional classification rather than treating them as interchangeable expressions of humanity. It further examines whether artificial, hybrid, posthuman, or technologically transformed systems reproduce the operational differences for which the human category previously performed explanatory work. The resulting method treats “human” neither as an indispensable starting point nor as a concept to be permanently eliminated. Its status is configuration-relative: the category becomes justified only within intervals where introducing it captures differences that cannot be recovered from lower-level biological, operational, institutional, or inferential descriptions alone. The broader claim is that the philosophical significance of the human should be tested by its residual explanatory work after removal rather than assumed from either human exceptionalism or antihumanism. (shrink)

We humans are diverse. But how to understand human diversity in the case of cognitive diversity? This Element discusses how to properly investigate human behavioural and cognitive diversity, how to scientifically represent, and how to explain cognitive diversity. Since there are various methodological approaches and explanatory agendas across the cognitive and behavioural sciences, which can be more or less useful for understanding human diversity, a critical analysis is needed. And as the controversial study of sex and gender differences in cognition (...) illustrates, the scientific representations and explanations put forward matter to society and impact public policy, including policies on mental health. But how to square the vision of human cognitive diversity with the assumption that we all share one human nature? Is cognitive diversity something to be positively valued? The author engages with these questions in connection with the issues of neurodiversity, cognitive disability, and essentialist construals of human nature. (shrink)

Current philosophical literature about the future often explores fast technological development and its social, political, and cultural implications. What is typically missing in such literature is an attempt to address the following question. Is the future going to mean the emergence of a super humanity with the rest of the biosphere left behind? This paper explores this issue critically and proposes some answers to it that derive from an interdisciplinary approach. It builds upon the work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, (...) especially on the way he deals with two key topics: cephalization and socialization. The paper argues that Teilhard’s work in these areas can be extended to show how the human responsibility associated with being the head of the biosphere entails accepting a kind of communitarian progress that includes other species. The paper concludes by proposing some innovative concepts to articulate what is at stake in such responsibility. (shrink)

I offer a qualified defence of Kant’s natural teleological argument, that is, his inference from the (un)naturalness of an act to its (im)morality. Though I reject many of Kant’s conclusions, I think the form of argument he uses to support these conclusions is not as wrong-headed as it might at first appear. I consider and answer two objections: first, that the argument is inconsistent with Kant’s moral rationalism; and second, that the argument is inconsistent with post-Kantian developments in science. I (...) argue that both objections rest on a common mistake, namely, the assumption that the account of (human) nature on which Kant’s argument relies is theoretical. On the contrary, the relevant account is practical: informed by science, but not determined by it. Once we appreciate the practical character of Kant’s naturalism, we can see not only that Kant can be a naturalist and a rationalist, but contemporary Kantians can be as well. (shrink)

This article examines the interplay between limit, thought, and human nature in Ludwig Feuerbach’s early philosophy, with particular attention to his dissertation De ratione una, universali, infinita (1828) and Thoughts on Death and Immortality (1830). It argues that Feuerbach presents reason as an infinite power that transcends the limits of sensibility and individuality. By framing reason as a universal substance and the foundation of human essence, Feuerbach highlights a fundamental tension between universality and individuality – one defined by a profound (...) asymmetry. He challenges dominant theological notions of immortality, proposing instead that death – understood as a real limit – is the very condition for grasping infinity within life itself. Ultimately, Feuerbach envisions history as the ongoing process of life’s self-realization, independent of any external metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

How can we understand people—ourselves and others? Does this require a special form of understanding, different from how we understand non-human phenomena? In this paper, I develop a Beauvoirian-inspired proposal for answering these questions. This proposed account of understanding people lends some support to a long tradition, according to which, we don't understand people in the same way that we understand non-human natural phenomena insofar as understanding people (like literary works) requires an empathic, imaginative, simulationist, or interpretive form. Yet, the (...) Beauvoirian view complicates and challenges this tradition by bringing out the irreducibly second-personal structure of understanding people. It also highlights its embodied and ethical character. In emphasizing these, the Beauvoirian account offers a welcome alternative to empathic views of understanding people (and of relating to literature) and contributes to our understanding of the second-person nexus. It also proposes a refreshing way of thinking about the ethical dimensions of epistemology. (shrink)

If one browses through Bernard Williams’ work, one might conclude that David Hume does not represent a predominant source of inspiration for him. I shall try to show that this is not the case; there are many elements in Williams’ theoretical approach, from his early papers to his late reflection on genealogy, that can be interpreted in a Humean light, revealing more than just a superficial resemblance. In turn, Hume proves to be less of a straightforward optimist than Williams believed (...) when seen in relation to Williams’ philosophical concerns. Thus, I shall reconstruct the connection between the two, with the aim of illuminating how Williams, although not a declared Humean, was much closer to the great Scot than it may appear at first sight. (shrink)

The 2050withHumans is a think tank that aims at discovering again the essence of being human. In the era of AI such a quest is not only important, but it has also become vital if we are to stay relevant until 2050 and beyond. Instead of only asking what AI can do, we must also start actively contemplating on what we can do. The latest developments in the field of machine learning and artificial intelligence in general seem to question the (...) basic notion of being human: thinking per se. Yet, this opinion article is dispelling this false assumption by providing a line of reasoning that takes us away from what we think as self-evident regarding ourselves. It is not thinking, but non-thinking that makes us human. It is not doing, but doing nothing that truly distinguishes us from computers. Creation, the culmination of being human, is based on nothingness and only humans can ever touch it to perform pure creation. In the quest for completion, humans are needed to provide guidance. Thinking like computers is the best way to give away that guidance to tools that can do nothing without orders and input. We are in that dangerous path as we speak, and we should seriously consider changing the way we think if we are to use computers and not be computers too. (shrink)

According to Christianity, transformation and renewal is necessary for human flourishing. The aim of my thesis is to provide a biblical ontology of human persons that supports a coherent explanation of Pauline transformation and renewal of the mind. I argue that holistic dualism provides a successful ontological framework that coheres with relevant biblical, philosophical, and scientific data. My methodology locates transformation and renewal as entailments in human flourishing and fitness grounded in the fundamental structure of reality. I proceed by carving (...) out a biblical ontology of persons including a matrix for sanctification, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and a Christological exemplar for human agency. Next, I provide a model of the image of God founded upon the image-bearing agent and agency that coheres with my biblical ontology. I then explicate five views of the human person and soul landing on J. P. Moreland’s organicist view of holistic dualism. Next, I explicate the structure of the soul merging Moreland’s organicist structure with Richard Swinburne’s mental structure and provide an anatomical model of the soul. Finally, I turn to the sciences and provide an account of organismic plasticity and neuroplasticity that coheres with the restructuring of both the immaterial and material structures of the soul and body. In conclusion, I provide a synthesis of three models of transformation from theology, philosophy, and science integrated with Pauline renewal of the mind in concurrence with the agency of the Holy Spirit. I find that holistic dualism provides a successful ontology that unifies the human person and coheres with essential data providing a positive account of Pauline renewal and human flourishing. (shrink)

En Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (2002) el politólogo Francis Fukuyama presenta una comprensión de la filosofía de Nietzsche en función de presentar argumentos en contra de la modificación genética promovida por la ciencia contemporánea y, al mismo tiempo, presenta una defensa de lo que él entiende como “dignidad humana”. En su desarrollo argumental el autor propone que el problema de la biotecnología radica en que ella puede afectar a los fundamentos mismos del sentido de moralidad humana, (...) a saber, nuestra “naturaleza”. Así, para Fukuyama, la biotecnología en su intento de modificar el “Factor X” podría llevarnos a un territorio moral que no queremos visitar, a saber, la pérdida gradual de “nuestra esencia” a manos de la instrumentalización de la “naturaleza humana”. No obstante, no es totalmente cierto en primera instancia que con Nietzsche se pueda defender algo así como la “esencia humana” y, consecuentemente, tampoco el que pueda ser un fundamento para la moralidad. Nuestro artículo propone analizar la apropiación de Nietzsche por parte de Fukuyama y, de esta manera, comprobar si su propuesta es útil en la crítica moral y cultural que se esgrime en contra del transhumanismo. Se evidenciará que la lectura bioconservadora de Fukuyama no es capaz de leer la obra de Nietzsche según presupuestos claves del alemán —ascetismo—, y solamente se puede considerar como una apropiación ideológica y bioconservadora del pensamiento nietzscheano. -/- . (shrink)

One of the core projects of transhumanism is to enhance ourselves in order to overcome the limits of the human condition. The implementation of strategies that could effectively assist in this endeavor requires broad interdisciplinary knowledge, primarily concerning cutting-edge technologies. However, it is valid to ask: Is it possible to conceive of transhumanism without a coherent philosophy? It seems to us that this is indeed the case when one speaks of classic transhumanism and characterizes the proposals of N. Bostrom and (...) M. More as incoherent. In general, one of the main reasons for these critiques lies in the claim that the ontology behind their projects is naturalistic, yet at the same time, they propose the possibility of an unlimited existence. Under what philosophical assumptions would it be possible to postulate something like this? In what ontological conception would an unlimited existence be possible and for whom would this phenomenon be possible? In our view, the ways in which transhumanism answers these questions can be described as capitalist realism following Mark Fisher. This means that, on the one hand, their proposals are inconsistent with their own presuppositions nor with any understanding of truth and, on the other hand, who assume that there is no alternative for understanding existence other than their own. We describe this as the classical transhuman condition. Assuming that philosophy is progressing and that there are new ways of conceiving the relationship between transhumanism and philosophy, we ought to ask: Is it possible to submit transhumanism to philosophical enhancement? (shrink)

Philosophy is a unique discipline. Central to philosophy is the concept of Mind. By following the development, nature, and influence of Mind in all its forms—past, present, and future—I argue that we can build a spiritual base. Such a base can function as a replacement for religion or as a means to fill a spiritual void. This has always been the ultimate goal of philosophy. The book-length essay offers a path to achieve this goal, or at least understand the goal, (...) which might be taken as a type of philosophical mysticism. (shrink)

This thesis proposes the "Moral Plasticity Hypothesis" as a novel framework for understanding human nature's relationship to evil and cruelty. Rather than viewing humans as inherently good or evil, this work argues that human nature is characterized by evolved moral plasticity—an adaptive capacity for extreme behavioral flexibility that can manifest as either profound compassion or devastating cruelty depending on contextual triggers and moral foundation activation patterns. Through interdisciplinary analysis of philosophical, psychological, evolutionary, and neuroscientific evidence, this thesis demonstrates that evil (...) is not a defect in human nature but an emergent property of our adaptive moral flexibility, with profound implications for understanding and preventing mass violence. -/- The research synthesizes insights from moral foundations theory [1], evolutionary psychology [2], neuroscience [3], and historical case studies of genocide and mass violence [4]. The central argument challenges both traditional philosophical dichotomies of good versus evil and contemporary psychological theories that attribute cruelty primarily to dehumanization or individual pathology [5]. Instead, the Moral Plasticity Hypothesis posits that the same psychological mechanisms that enable extraordinary altruism and cooperation also enable extraordinary cruelty and violence, depending on contextual activation patterns. -/- Key findings include: (1) Human moral intuitions are built upon evolved psychological foundations that can be activated in prosocial or antisocial directions; (2) The neural circuits underlying empathy and violence show significant overlap, creating a neurobiological basis for moral plasticity; (3) Institutional contexts serve as powerful amplifiers that can channel human moral plasticity toward either constructive or destructive outcomes; (4) Historical patterns of mass violence demonstrate consistent psychological mechanisms across different cultures and time periods, supporting the universality of moral plasticity. -/- The thesis concludes with practical implications for violence prevention, moral education, and institutional design. Rather than attempting to eliminate "evil" individuals, effective prevention strategies must focus on understanding and modifying the contextual triggers that activate antisocial moral responses. This approach offers a more nuanced and scientifically grounded foundation for addressing humanity's capacity for both extraordinary good and devastating evil. (shrink)

Aquinas' vision of man is worthy of being proposed in the 21st century as an alternative to the anthropological reductionisms triumphant in today's public discourse. For him, the human being is not a mere animal, neither is a pure spirit who can use his body as if it were an independent entity. This metaphysical and unitary view of the human being is also not foreign to an anthropology that starts from a ‘first-person’ experience. Self-awareness leads the human being to realise (...) that he is corporeal, but it also enables him to reach back to his spiritual condition. Moreover, this implies that our soul is immortal and our action is free, as well as having consequences for our corporeality, which is that of a spiritual animal. Man's spiritual nature makes him intrinsically oriented towards God: the human being is a ‘tree turned upside down,’ because his life is not only based on its material facets, but he must ultimately live with the aspiration to be rooted in God as the goal of his biographical journey. (shrink)

This extract is the first English translation of Hans Blumenberg's posthumous publication Beschreibung des Menschen, which was published by Suhrkamp Verlag in 2006. Based on lectures concerning the German tradition of philosophical anthropology that Blumenberg gave at the University of Münster, the book's basic project is the explicit fusion of Husserlian phenomenology with philosophical anthropology — an attempt to grasp what the human is by identifying its basic structures. The result is a highly nuanced conception of the possibility of human (...) self-reflection that is at the core of philosophy and of culture as a recipe for the species’ survival. Instead of answering the question “What is man?” Blumenberg proposes here a minimalist anthropology that seeks to answer a different question: “How is man possible?” The chapters selected for translation are intended to give readers a sense of the book, little known in the Anglophone world, which in its original German runs to some nine hundred pages. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to investigate what enables human flourishing from a Thomistic perspective by considering Aquinas’ natural inclinations. I will argue that human beings flourish in different ways, depending on their practices. However, not every practice contributes to human flourishing, but only those that are consistent with human nature, which agents grasp through their natural inclinations. To support this argument, I will critically analyze MacIntyre’s account, referring mainly to his latest work (2016). MacIntyre has the merit of (...) highlighting the role of practices in human flourishing by considering the narrative dimension in the agents’ lives, but he fails to recognize the properly metaphysical framework of human nature, that would be provided by the proper consideration of natural inclinations. (shrink)

In this special issue, we present contributions that explore the significant influence of G.E.M. Anscombe’s philosophical insights on both philosophy and social science. Anscombe, a leading 20th-century philosopher, extensively addressed topics from metaphysics to morality, playing a key role in reviving Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. Deeply influenced by Wittgenstein, she emphasized language analysis and argued that morality should be grounded in human life and practices, rather than abstract principles. This issue highlights how her work, particularly her account of intentional action and her (...) focus on the “grammar” of practical reasoning, offers valuable conceptual resources for analyzing social phenomena. The papers within this issue aim to bridge conceptual analysis with empirical inquiry, stimulating reflection among both philosophers and social scientists on how Anscombe’s thought can inform concrete research. (shrink)