Intentional Action

It is reasonably well accepted that the explanation of intentional action is teleological explanation. Very roughly, an explanation of some event, E, is teleological only if it explains E by citing some goal or purpose or reason that produced E. Alternatively, teleological explanations of intentional action explain “by citing the state of affairs toward which the behavior was directed” thereby answering questions like “To what end was the agent’s behavior directed?” Causalism—advocated by causalists—is the thesis that explanations of intentional action (...) are both causal and teleological. By contrast, non-causalism—advocated by non-causalists—is the thesis that explanations of intentional action are teleological but not causal. Familiarly, the problem of causal deviance plagues causalism. But while some have supposed that the problem is grave enough that causalism is bound to suffer a global breakdown, the rumors of causalism’s demise are greatly exaggerated. In what follows, I note that every instance of causal deviance is also an instance of teleological deviance and that teleological deviance is a problem for causalist and non-causalist alike, a problem that causalists may be better able to deal with. Or so I argue. (shrink)

I contend that there are two dogmas that are still popular among philosophers of action: that agents can only desire what they think is good and that they can only intentionally pursue what they think is good. I also argue that both dogmas are false. Broadly, I argue that our best theories of action can explain the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one thinks is not at all good, that we need to allow for the possibility of intentionally pursuing what (...) one think is not at all good, and that if we can intentionally pursue what we think is not at all good then we can desire it on similar grounds. (shrink)

In his What is intention, Bratman proposed that intentions can be seen as both inputs and outputs of practical reasoning. However, he chose not to pursue a full theory to distinguish which outputs of practical reasoning are intentions and which outputs are not. Building on Bratman’s analysis of intention, we develop a sequence of theories. An initial naive theory suggests that an event is intended if it cannot be excluded without undermining the agent’s goal. However, this approach fails in non-trivial (...) cases with causal dependencies. A revised theory is then offered to incorporates an agent’s subjective understanding of causal relation ships to better align intentions with practical reasoning. Finally, the theory is further extended to account for probabilistic beliefs, defining intentions as commitments to altering event prob abilities based on an agent’s reasoning process. The resulting framework is evaluated through thought experiments, addressing limitations in earlier approaches and capturing the stability and practical role of intentions. The paper concludes by situating the theory as a step towards completing Bratman’s work on intention. (shrink)

A murder is an intentional killing, but some killings happen by mistake or accident. Although mistakes and accidents are unintended parts of an action, some jurisdictions prosecute unintended homicides as murder crimes in at least three patterns of cases. Together, these propositions present a puzzle that undermines a fundamental principle of criminal responsibility: An agent must unify the elements of a crime as a matter of their agency for criminal responsibility to attach. I examine five insightful ways to interpret this (...) principle in the literature, and I argue that none can account for all three case patterns. Primarily, I offer a solution to the puzzle based on the intentional causation relation. According to this solution, although intentionally acting does not involve the intent to cause every change one makes as part of the action, it does involve intentionally causing all such changes, including the mistakes or accidents. (shrink)

Intentions play at least three roles in our psychological life: helping us think about the future, shaping our deliberation concerning what to do, and guiding us in doing what we do. This paper focuses mainly on the latter, also known under the head of intention in action. I discuss specific assumptions, such as that intentions represent states of affairs as the result of actions and that it is precisely in virtue of performing such a representational function that they can guide (...) us in acting. I argue that representational assumptions have problematic consequences concerning how both actions and their results relate to time. To avoid such difficulties, I offer a nonrepresentational and ecologically based explanation of the guiding role of intention. (shrink)

Not all actions are intentional actions. What separates merely doing something from intentionally doing something? One point of separation seems to be luck. Too much luck, or luck of a certain variety, seems to undermine the possibility of acting intentionally. This naturally leads to the idea that intentional action presupposes reliable success. I argue against this idea. Taking inspiration from Gareth Evans’ account of singular thought, I argue that what separates mere action from intentional action in lucky successes is a (...) difference in one's discriminative capacity. In order to intentionally act, an agent must possess the capacity to discriminate successful ways of doing what they try to do from ways of failing to do what they try to do. (shrink)

In Rational Powers in Action, Sergio Tenenbaum sets out a new theory of instrumental rationality that departs from standard discussions of means-ends coherence in the literature on structural rationality in at least two interesting ways: it takes intentional action (as opposed to intention) to be what puts in place the relevant instrumental requirements, and it applies to both necessary and non-necessary means. I consider these two developments in more detail. On the first, I argue that Tenenbaum’s theory is too narrow (...) since there could be instrumental irrationality with respect to an intention to X even if one is not yet engaged in any relevant intentional action. On the second, I argue against Tenenbaum’s claim that “an agent is instrumentally irrational if she knowingly fails to pursue some sufficient means to an end she is pursuing.”. (shrink)

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental. One prima facie promising way to account for this platitude is through Anscombe’s Practical Knowledge Principle (PKP), which holds that intentionally doing something requires knowing that you are doing it intentionally. While (PKP) offers strong anti-luck credentials, it has the problematic implication that intentional action becomes luminous. This chapter critiques some existing attempts to weaken (PKP) and introduces an alternative rooted in performance-theoretic virtue epistemology. The proposed framework distinguishes between two grades of intentional (...) action, each with different levels of protection against luck in action. Both involve knowledge of what we are doing, but in different ways: the first grade requires externalist knowledge secured by apt practical belief, while the second – reflective or R-intentional action – demands also second-order knowledge of one’s abilities and their reliability in the relevant performance conditions. This two-tiered, virtue theoretic approach, which gives knowledge of abilities a central role at the second order, is shown to offer several explanatory advantages in action theory. (shrink)

Self-control requires intentionally resisting what we most want to do. Yet we do what we most want to do, if we do anything intentionally at that time (The Law of Desire). Therefore, self-control is impossible. So runs a well-studied puzzle. The three standard accounts assume that if a desire is our strongest desire, then it is stronger than all others. But that assumption is false. For we may have desires of equal strength. I describe cases which feature tied desires, self-control, (...) and doing what we most want to do. Following insights from computer science (Buridan’s Principle), equal-strength desires are possible any time we try to decide. My proposal may also be used to bolster all three standard analyses. (shrink)

One kind of temporally extended agency involves planning your action in advance. This paper argues that there is also a different kind of temporally extended agency, characterised by planning that is partly retrospective in nature. Incorporative agency constitutively involves an agent planning to continue acting in such a way as to integrate some of their earlier activity into a to-be-completed extended action. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the possibility of incorporative agency, explicate the distinctive mechanism through which (...) it is possible, and outline several kinds of conditions under which it can be rational to exercise. Finally, I argue that attending to the possibility of incorporative agency enables us to answer two sceptical challenges, concerning intentional skilled action that is initiated by automatic motor responses and intentional mental activity under content-involving descriptions. (shrink)

There is a debate amongst epistemologists about whether knowledge-how can be Gettiered (e.g. Stanley and Williamson (2001), Poston (2009), Stanley (2011a,b), Cath (2011, 2015), Carter and Prichard (2015a,b), Carter and Poston (2018), Pavese (2018), and others). The primary aim of this paper is to show that both sides of this debate have largely been talking past one another. Because neither side has been explicitly clear about the requirements for Gettiered knowledge-how, each side has been making unrecognized assumptions about the kind (...) of cases that can (or cannot) Gettier know-how. I argue that it is these assumptions which explain why proponents accept, and opponents deny, that Gettier-cases can arise and undermine knowledge how. With these assumptions laid bare I can accomplish the second aim of this paper: To articulate what this debate hinges on and the impediments to settling it. (shrink)

We explore new connections between the epistemologies of mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning to offer a novel perspective on skilled behavior and its relationship to practical knowledge. We argue that practical knowledge is "easy" in the sense that, by manifesting one's skills, one has a priori propositional justification for certain beliefs about what one is doing as one does it. This proposal has wider consequences for debates about intentional action and knowledge: first, because agents sometimes act intentionally in epistemically hazardous (...) environments, these justified beliefs do not always rise to the level of (practical) knowledge. Second, practical knowledge is more intimately related to basic knowledge than has been appreciated. Third, an attractive "middle way" opens between the Anscombian tradition of defending a necessary connection between intentional action and practical knowledge and the more recent tradition of explaining away substantive epistemic conditions on intentional action. (shrink)

The paradoxical nature of intentional self-deception has led many philosophers to view self-deception as predominantly non-intentional. I propose that approaching self-deception from an agency-theoretic perspective allows us to rescue the idea that self-deception can at least be driven by intention. By modeling the ‘acting as if’ method of self-deception with agential layering, developed by Nguyen [2020. Games: Agency as Art. New York: Oxford University Press], I argue that intention-driven self-deception is no more mysterious than other activities that involve self-effacing ends: (...) ends we must pursue indirectly. That is, self-deception can occur when agents pursue the self-effacing end of forming what they take to be an epistemically unjustified belief by submerging themselves in a layer of agency in which they can act as if they already hold that belief. By intentionally adopting this pretense and shaping their agency around it, they forget that their agency is layered at all, and may thereby form a full-fledged belief. This model avoids objections to views that treat self-deception itself as intentional and does so while appealing only to resources already used to explain our everyday activities. I then apply my model to a core case of bad faith from Sartre to show that intention-driven self-deception can clarify how we are responsible for inauthenticity. (shrink)

Philosophical orthodoxy has it that intentional action consists in one’s intention appropriately causing a motion of one’s body, placing the latter as (conceptually and/or metaphysically) prior to the former. Here I argue that this standard schema should be reversed: acting intentionally is at least conceptually prior to intending. The argument is modelled on a Williamsonian argument for the priority of knowledge developed by Jenifer Nagel. She argues that children acquire the concept KNOWS before they acquire BELIEVES, building on this alleged (...) developmental priority of knowledge to establish its conceptual priority. I start by taking a closer look at Nagel’s argument, canvassing extant objections to do both with the empirical adequacy of her claims and their philosophical implications. Doing so allows me in the second part of the paper to draw lessons that inform the construction of a revamped parallel argument for the priority of ACTS INTENTIONALLY. (shrink)

Is it possible to donate unpaired vital organs, foreseeing but not intending one's own death? We argue that this is indeed psychologically possible, and thus far agree with Charles Camosy and Joseph Vukov in their recent paper on 'double effect donation.' Where we disagree with these authors is that we see double effect donation not as a morally praiseworthy act akin to martyrdom but as a morally impermissible act that necessarily disrespects human bodily integrity. Respect for bodily integrity goes beyond (...) avoiding the aim to kill: not all side effects of deliberate bodily interventions can be outweighed by intended benefits for another even if the subject fully consents. It is not any necessary intention to kill or harm another or oneself that makes lethal donation/harvesting illicit but the more immediate intention to accept or perform surgery on an (innocent) person combined with the foresight of lethal harm and no health-related good for him or her. Double effect donation falls foul of the first condition of double effect reasoning in that the immediate act is wrong in itself. We argue further that the wider effects of such donation would be socially disastrous and corrupting of the medical profession: doctors should retain a sense of nonnegotiable respect for bodily integrity even when they intervene on willing subjects for the benefit of others. (shrink)

Is it possible to donate unpaired vital organs, foreseeing but not intending one’s own death? We argue that this is indeed psychologically possible, and thus far agree with Charles Camosy and Joseph Vukov in their recent paper on “double effect donation.” Where we disagree with these authors is that we see double-effect donation not as a morally praiseworthy act akin to mar- tyrdom but as a morally impermissible act that necessarily disrespects human bodily integrity. Respect for bodily integrity goes beyond (...) avoiding the aim to kill; not all side effects of deliberate bodily interventions can be outweighed by intended benefits for another even if the subject fully consents. It is not any necessary intention to kill or harm another or oneself that makes lethal donation/harvesting illicit but the more immediate intention to accept or perform surgery on an (innocent) person combined with the foresight of lethal harm and no health-related good for him or her. Double-effect donation falls foul of the first condition of double-effect reasoning in that the immediate act is wrong in itself. We argue further that the wider effects of such don- ation would be socially disastrous and corrupting of the medical profession: doctors should retain a sense of nonnegotiable respect for bodily integrity even when they intervene on willing subjects for the benefit of others. (shrink)

Recent research has begun to investigate sensory processing in relation to nonclinical variation in traits associated with the autism spectrum disorders (ASD). We propose that existing accounts of autistic perception can be augmented by considering a role for individual differences in top-down expectations for the precision of sensory input, related to the processing of state-dependent levels of uncertainty. We therefore examined ASD-like traits in relation to the rubber-hand illusion: an experimental paradigm that typically elicits crossmodal integration of visual, tactile, and (...) proprioceptive information in an unusual illusory context. Individuals with higher ASD-like traits showed reduced effects of the rubber-hand illusion on perceived arm position and reach-to-grasp movements, compared to individuals with lower ASD-like traits. These differences occurred despite both groups reporting the typical subjective experience of the illusion concerning visuotactile integration and ownership for the rubber hand. Together these results suggest that the integration of proprioceptive information with cues for arm position derived from the illusory context differs between individuals partly in relation to traits associated with ASD. We suggest that the observed differences in sensory integration can be best explained in terms of differing expectations regarding the precision of sensory estimates in contexts that suggest uncertainty. (shrink)

It has been recently proposed that our evaluations of the relative adequacy of unreflective skilled action ought to be grounded in sociocultural normativities; that is, with respect to what is standardly done according to general practice or custom. This paper claims that the normative dimension of unreflective skilled action ought to be understood too in terms of a formal temporality, according to which an unreflective skilled action is adequate iff it fulfils the subdoxastic preferences of the acting agent. More precisely, (...) this position, inspired by an analysis of early Heideggerian phenomenology and modern-day neuroscience, positions the formal-temporal dimension of the normativity of unreflective skilled action as more fundamental than the sociocultural dimension of normativity for multiple reasons, without reducing the normativity of said behaviour to this agent-centred level. (shrink)

To inquire into some question Q is to try to answer Q. To understand inquiry, we must understand what constitutes success in this endeavor. What it is to answer Q? The issue has been systematically neglected in philosophical work on inquiry. It raises a real puzzle. A judgment with a content p that actually settles Q doesn't necessarily constitute answering Q. To answer Q, a judgment must have additional significance connecting p with Q. It's not clear what gives a judgment (...) such significance in inquiry. This article introduces this unsolved “problem of answering,” explains its difficulty, and draws a comparison with the problem of inference. (shrink)

In Piñeros Glasscock (2020) I presented a version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument against the Anscombean thesis that intentional action entails knowledge. I defend this argument from recent criticisms by Beddor and Pavese (2022) and Valaris (2021). I argue that contrary to what my past self and my critics suggest, the conclusion of this anti-luminosity argument does not rest on the existence of essentially intentional actions. The argument can be recast based on the humbler premise that agential cognition must represent actions (...) as intentional. I show that this claim is well motivated by precisely the considerations of control behind the objections. (shrink)

When faced with a hard decision, we can and sometimes should decide decision-making away, for instance by flipping a coin. At first, this strategy might look suspect: it seems that conforming with the verdict of a coin flip and φ-ing as a result involves making the decision to φ. To address this worry, we inquire into the psychological structures that make deciding decision-making away possible. Our main contention is that it involves conditional intentions: you form the intention to φ if (...) the coin lands heads and ψ otherwise. We then rely on the nature of the conditional intentions involved to argue that we do not make the decision to φ when the coin flip tells us to φ⁠. We conclude by exploring the normative status of deciding decision-making away. Not only is it often permissible, whether the choice situation is mundane or life-defining, deciding decision-making away may sometimes be required, for example, to promote equality in shared agency or fairness in distribution. (shrink)

“Essential Indexical Thesis” is a label for a collection of theses claiming there are essential connections between explanations of actions and the first-person perspective (or de se mental state). Recently there are two notable defences for essential indexical theses: Babb’s defence of the thesis that all intentional actions are essentially indexical, and Francescotti’s defence of the thesis that necessarily all intention-to actions have de se origin. Through a critical examination of these defences, I discover that although Francescotti has defended a (...) de dicto claim that “necessarily, an intention-to action results from an intention that necessarily has de se content”, his defence remains compatible with the de re claim that “no (first-order) action necessarily results from an intention that necessarily has de se content”, because his defence fails to eliminate another de re claim that “no (first-order) action necessarily is an intention-to action.” Since Francescotti’s defence is compatible with the first de re claim, the essential indexical thesis he defends is vulnerable to the risk brought up by this de re claim: if the first de re claim is true, then no (first-order) action is necessarily/essentially indexical in Francescotti's sense. To fix this problem, I demonstrate that some (first-order) actions, for example, looking-for and pursuit, necessarily are intention-to actions. Then I propose my defence for a new essential indexical thesis called the further restricted essential indexical thesis. (shrink)

For most of modern philosophy, intentional action begins with a gap — between perception and response, between stimulus and choice. Within that gap, intention forms. Responsibility follows from what happens there. Algorithmic mediation progressively closes that gap before the agent reaches it. This paper argues that the most significant transformation produced by recommender systems, adaptive interfaces, and automated decision infrastructures is not the elimination of human agency but its reconfiguration. Options are ranked and filtered in real time according to predictive (...) models. The environment of choice is assembled in advance. By the time action occurs, the trajectory has largely been set. Individuals still act. But increasingly, as the paper puts it, the system decides what it means to decide. Under these conditions, intention no longer consistently precedes action. It emerges retrospectively — as interpretation of trajectories already in motion, rather than as the origin of what follows. Decisive moments dissolve into sequences of micro-interactions. Responsibility becomes difficult to localize because authorship has already dispersed. The paper proposes that agency persists in such environments, but shifts from originating trajectories to confirming or modulating system-generated ones. This reconfiguration produces a structural tension: normative frameworks continue to attribute responsibility to individual agents while the architecture of intention that once grounded such attribution gradually contracts. Agency requires friction. What contemporary systems systematically remove is precisely that. (shrink)

Does lying require an intention to deceive? Deceptionists answer 'Yes', while Non-Deceptionists answer 'No'. Non-Deceptionists point to a host of purported counterexamples in support of their position. Deceptionists are left unconvinced. By forging a stronger link between the lying and action-theoretic literatures, I offer a new argument against the Deceptionist position. One that must be responded to differently if it is to be countenanced by Deceptionists. I conclude by advancing a promising middle ground between these two positions.

In this paper, I raise two challenges to Wayne Wu's proposal that intentions are practical memories. The first questions whether practical memories possess the functional roles that Michael Bratman's influential planning theory identifies for intention. The second suggests that a conception of intention as practical memory obscures the logic of intention in our ordinary ethical thought and talk. Both challenges are grounded in methodological reflections on the sources of disagreement in the philosophy of action.

This paper discusses a deflationary theory of human action developed by John Hyman. His theory of human action comprises two central claims, one about the general nature of action, another about the mark of human agency. An action is the causing of a change by a substance. A human action, as opposed to sub-personal actions, is one that results from the integrated operations of our cognitive and motor systems. Taken together these two claims offer a minimalist theory of human action (...) that does not appeal to intention, the will or the power to choose. The first claim is by now familiar in the literature, not so the second one. This paper offers a critical discussion of this second claim. I shall argue that it sits uncomfortably with certain kinds of mental action. As a fix, I argue that we should appeal to the functional role of the executive system to specify the relevant kind of integration characteristic of human action. I proceed to show how the revised proposal shares the appeal of Hyman’s view while avoiding its difficulties. (shrink)

Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472 – 1529) is famously associated with the view that knowledge and action are unified (zhī xíng hé yī 知行合一). Call this the Unity Thesis. Given standard assumptions about what it means for a person to know, it may seem that the Unity Thesis is clearly false: I can know that p without currently acting in p-related ways, and I can know how to φ without currently φ-ing. My aims in this paper are, first, to draw on (...) recent work in epistemology to explain and defend the Unity Thesis and, second, to argue that it offers us an attractive conceptual alternative to a standard way of thinking about the nature of intentional action. The first step of my argument draws on the idea that what distinguishes intentional actions from bodily events is the presence of knowing-to – that is, an agent is φ-ing intentionally if and only if she is currently doing something because she knows to do it as a way for her to φ. Such a notion of knowing-to allows us to explain otherwise puzzling features of the Unity Thesis, including the claim that knowing and acting occur simultaneously. In the second step, I argue that the Unity Thesis can help us avoid various long-standing issues in the philosophy of action, including the problem of deviant (formal) causation. (shrink)

An account of what sort of causal integration is necessary for an agent to exercise agency is offered in support of a soft-line response to Derk Pereboom’s four-case argument against source-compatibilism. I argue that, in cases of manipulation, the manipulative activity affects the identity of the causal process of which it is a part. Specifically, I argue that causal processes involving direct manipulation fail to count as exercises of intentional agency because they involve heteromesial causal deviance. In contrast, standard deterministic (...) causal processes do not involve heteromesial causal deviance and are agency-preserving. The upshot is that there is a relevant difference between a causal process involving direct manipulation by another agent and a deterministic causal process that involves no such intervention. If this is right, then Pereboom’s four-case argument does not pose a threat to source-compatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)

Most human action is improvised rather than planned in advance. But how do we improvise? I develop an account of what it means for improvisation to involve ‘making things up as you go along’: improvising involves planning what to do after you have already started doing it. I explore the philosophical consequences of this account of improvisation: what psychological profile improvisors must have; how the improvisational plans that are adopted during action can causally guide the action that one is already (...) in the course of performing; what this means for how we should deliberate about and decide upon various options in the course of an improvisational performance. The main payoff is a discussion that improv(is)es on existentialist themes, in order to argue that humans can gain meaningful unity in their lives by means of improvising the performance of a self-constituting project over the whole course of their existence. (shrink)

Probably no part of Fear and Trembling has received more philosophical attention than Problema I, on the teleological suspension of the ethical. It is a dense, potent, and difficult section of argumentation. Unfortunately, beginning in the first paragraph, English translations have suf- fered from a peculiar difficulty in providing a clear and precise translation of its definitions and so also of the dialectical impetus of the section. In this article, I review existing translations, show the difficulties they introduce into the (...) argument, and suggest a better way of expressing Problema I in English. In conclusion, I show how getting the translation right draws Kierkegaard into the main philosophical debates about action theory alongside figures like Aristotle and Kant, and clar- ifies the scope of Silentio’s “paradox” as a particular challenge for understanding the practical reasoning of religious believers. (shrink)

Intentional action is often accompanied by knowledge of what one is doing—knowledge which appears non-observational and non-inferential. G.E.M. Anscombe defends the stronger claim that intentional action always comes with such knowledge. Among those who follow Anscombe, some have altered the features, content, or species of the knowledge claimed to necessarily accompany intentional action. In this paper, I argue that there is no knowledge condition on intentional action, no matter the assumed features, content, or species of the knowledge. Further, rather than (...) follow the usual methodology in this debate of arguing by counterexample, I present an argument that explains why we continue to find counterexamples: intentional action and knowledge are regulated by thresholds under distinct pressures; in particular, the threshold of control regulating intentional action is disparately influenced by the role of intentional action in practical normativity. (shrink)

Intentional action is often accompanied by knowledge of what one is doing—knowledge that appears non-observational and non-inferential. G.E.M. Anscombe defends the stronger claim that intentional action always comes with such knowledge. Among those who follow Anscombe, some have altered the features, content, or species of the knowledge claimed to necessarily accompany intentional action. In this paper, I argue that there is no knowledge condition on intentional action, no matter the assumed features, content, or species of the knowledge. Further, rather than (...) follow the usual methodology in this debate of arguing by counterexample, I present an argument that explains why we continue to find counterexamples: intentional action and knowledge are regulated by thresholds under distinct pressures; in particular, the threshold of control regulating intentional action is disparately influenced by the role of intentional action in practical normativity. (shrink)

The strategic/terror bomber thought experiment is often employed in the contemporary debate on the principle of double effect (PDE). It is taken to show the intuitive appeal of PDE. In this paper, it is argued, however, that the thought experiment is used in a confused way. What is taken to be one thought experiments in fact is a series of subtly differing examples. Those differences, although subtle, bear on the applicability of these examples in the argumentation for PDE. The main (...) objectives of this paper are to provide a precise description and analysis of the variants of strategic/terror bomber thought experiments. The analysis shows that some variants are flawed mainly because of underdetermination of the cases by their descriptions and problems with rationality of the presented agents. This result seems to cast some new doubts on employment of the strategic/terror bomber thought experiment as an argumentative device supporting PDE. (shrink)

It is often hard to articulate a thought. Why should this be, if not that to have a thought is one thing, and to know it something else? In fact the gap between thought and its articulation is not epistemic. While it’s true that we come to know our thoughts better through articulation, it's not because a thought is already perfectly determinate despite my ignorance of it. Rather, we make the thought determinate through articulation. This connection between the determinacy of (...) the thinker’s knowledge of their thought and the determinacy of the thought itself is a mark of thought’s fundamentally first-personal character: what’s beyond the reach of my current powers of articulation cannot be an object of any attitude of mine. (shrink)

Emotions, like actions, this paper argues, are typically embodied processes that are responsive to reasons, where these reasons connect closely with the agent’s desires, intentions, or projects. If so, why are emotions, nevertheless, typically passive in a sense in which actions are not; specifically, why are emotions not cases of doing something intentionally? This paper seeks to prepare the ground for answering this question by showing that it cannot be answered within a widely influential framework in the philosophy of action (...) that has been dubbed the Standard Conception of Action, shared by such diverse theorists as G.E.M. Anscombe, Donald Davidson, Jennifer Hornsby, Michael Smith. and Michael Thompson. The Standard Conception approaches agency via the notion of someone’s doing something intentionally, and links the latter notion closely to that of doing something for a reason, so as to imply ‘Anscombe’s Thesis’ that, if someone is doing something for a reason, they are doing it intentionally. The paper shows how emotions, as reason-responsive embodied processes, counterexemplify this claim. Qua processes, they can aptly be described in the progressive, as cases of trembling with fear, exploding with anger, etc. They are a kind of ‘doing’ something, for a reason, yet not intentionally. (shrink)

It’s plausible that conception of new ideas for aesthetic works involves intentional action: we ask how and why artists conceive of their works, and we give them great praise for conceiving them. But such creative conception can’t just involve acting on an intention to conceive the new idea in all its particularity, since having that intention in the first place already requires you to have conceived that idea. Then what is the content of a creative intention that can guide the (...) process of creative conception? There are at least two existing models of creative intention: a value realization model endorsed by Nick Zangwill; and an inspiration/selection model set out by Monroe Beardsley, among many others. Each model fails to identify a way for a creator to be properly active in the origination of their own ideas. A better model, the refinement model, can combine the strength of both of these. On this model, a creator intends to do justice to some proto-work—a draft or component of a final idea which sets up a standard to be met in further refinement. The content of the creator’s intention is demonstrative in nature; an artist might have no insight into what she is trying to do except via her grasp on this proto-work. This model is illuminated by application to a real-world example of creative conception by the band Grizzly Bear. (shrink)

When we read a list of words, are we doing something, or is it something that just happens to us? On the one hand, according to intention-for-action theories, reading can be active only if we do it intentionally, meaning that the action is caused and sustained by the agent’s intention. Many cases of reading seem to be intentional: consider, for instance, when a person is reading a novel, a newspaper article, or an academic paper. Yet, reading often seems to be (...) something that passively happens to us. It is sufficient that a word appears in front of us to make us read it. Numerous studies on the Stroop task – a well-known experimental set-up in the cognitive sciences – make clear that reading is unavoidable, suggesting that reading takes place regardless of the agent’s intention. This tension constitutes the reading puzzle. I argue that if intention is necessary for a process to be active, then intention-for-action theories fail to account for such a distinctive human activity as reading. I conclude that reading represents a real challenge to the intention-for-action theories and shows that what an agent can actively do should not be limited to behaviors that involve intentions. (shrink)

According to the Anscombean thesis, when one is doing something intentionally, one must know that one is doing it. Such agential knowledge of what one is doing is often called ‘practical knowledge’. According to the inferential account of practical knowledge, practical knowledge is inferred from knowledge of intention. Kieran Setiya famously argues that the inferential account cannot square with the Anscombean thesis. I propose two different readings of his argument and contend that neither of them works. I then present a (...) new argument to demonstrate the incompatibility between the inferential account and the Anscombean thesis by focusing on their temporal aspects. (shrink)

Essentially intentional actions are kinds of action that can only be done intentionally. Essentialism is the view that essentially intentional actions exist. Accidentalism is the view that essentialism is false. In my thesis, I develop and argue for naïve essentialism, a species of essentialism based on Michael Thompson’s naïve action theory. First, I present key features of naïve action theory and the broader Anscombean tradition, distinguish between essentially and accidentally intentional actions, and provide an argument for the existence of essentially (...) intentional actions. Second, I respond to three objections to my argument. Third, I argue that accidentalism is a reductive approach to action and faces some standard problems to such approaches. Fourth, I present three noteworthy implications of my defense of essentialism for the philosophy of mind and action. (shrink)

Reasons are not the same. Normative reasons need to be distinguished from non-normative reasons. Then, due to some considerations, we have to draw a distinction between explanatory reasons and motivating reasons. In this paper, I focus on a rather implicit assumption in drawing the explanatory-motivating distinction. Motivating reasons are mostly characterized as those reasons that the agent takes to be normative. This may imply that the agent always knows the reasons their motivating reasons. This I call the infallibility or transparency (...) assumption. This suggests that there is some sort of report condition on motivating reasons. In contrast, one may ask whether it is possible for the agent to be mistaken about what their motivating reasons are. I argue that we can distinguish motivating reasons and satisfy the motivations for the explanatory-motivating distinction without committing to this infallibility assumption. I briefly sketch a character-based approach to motivating reasons as an alternative. Next, I argue that, in addition to being important on its own, this account has implications for other debates. I illustrate this by mentioning cases such as recalcitrant actions as well as critically discussing one kind of counter-example presented against the guise of the good thesis. (shrink)

Psychological and philosophical studies have extended J. J. Gibson’s notion of affordances. Affordances are possibilities for bodily action presented to us by the objects of our perception. Recent work has argued that we should extend the actions afforded by perception to mental action. I argue that we can extend the notion of affordance itself. What I call ‘Introspective Affordances’ are possibilities for mental action presented to us by introspectively accessible states. While there are some prima facie worries concerning the non-perceptual (...) nature of introspection, I will argue that our internal mental lives share enough commonalities with experiences in our environment to warrant this extension. I will demonstrate the value of introspective affordances by showing how they allow us to explain an underexplored aspect of thought insertion. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a theory of autonomous agency that relies on the re-sources of a strongly cognitivist theory of intention and intentional action. On the proposed account, intentional action is a graded notion that is ex-plained via the agent’s degree of practical knowledge. In turn, autonomous agency is also a graded notion that is explained via the agent’s degree of practical understanding. The resulting theory can synthesize insights from both the hierarchical and the cognitivist theories of autonomy with (...) at least some aspects of the reason-responsiveness theories. Moreover, by treating practical knowledge and practical understanding as gradable no-tions, the paper offers a strategy to respond to enduring objections against cognitivism about intention, control, and autonomy. (shrink)

I issue a challenge for the view that deciding‐to‐A is rendered intentional by an intention or other pro‐attitude towards deciding. Either such an attitude cannot rationalize my deciding specifically to A for a reason I take to support doing A, or, fixing for this, cannot accommodate deciding without entertaining alternatives. If successful, the argument motivates the search for an account that does not source the intentionality of deciding in a rationalizing pro‐attitude.

An action is agentially perfect if and only if, if a person tries to perform it, they succeed, and, if a person performs it, they try to. We argue that trying itself is agentially perfect: if a person tries to try to do something, they try to do it; and, if a person tries to do something, they try to try to do it. We show how this claim sheds new light on questions about basic action, the logical structure of (...) intentional action, and the notion of "options" in decision theory. On the way to these central ideas, we argue that a person can try to do something even if they believe it is impossible that they will succeed, that a person can try to do something even if they do not want to succeed, and that a person can try to do something even if they do not intend to succeed. (shrink)

Some actions we perform “just like that” without taking a means, e.g., raising your arm or wiggling your finger. Other actions—the nonbasic actions—we perform by taking a means, e.g., voting by raising your arm or illuminating a room by flipping a switch. A nearly ubiquitous view about nonbasic action is that one's means to a nonbasic action constitutes the nonbasic action, as raising your arm constitutes voting or flipping a switch constitutes illuminating a room. In this paper, I challenge this (...) view. I argue that one's means to a nonbasic action can cause rather than constitute it. In the process, we gain a clearer understanding of the scope of our agency—one that includes mental actions such as judgment and decision—and the pluralistic nature of basic features of action including control, purposefulness, and agent participation. (shrink)

In erkenntnistheoretischen Zusammenhängen hat sich für praktisches Wissen seit Ryle die Unterscheidung zwischen propositionalem knowing that und nicht-propositionalem knowing how etabliert. In der Handlungstheorie wird praktisches Wissen dagegen als ein im Handeln selbst als Wissen wirksames Wissen verstanden. Umstritten ist nach wie vor wie die Besonderheit dieser Wissensform angemessen zu erfassen ist. Der Band nimmt die Thematik des praktischen Wissens auf, indem unterschiedliche Diskussionsstränge zu diesem Begriff in historischer und systematischer Orientierung aus Handlungstheorie, Metaethik und Erkenntnistheorie zusammengeführt werden. Die Beiträge (...) wollen das Konzept eines praktischen Wissens hinsichtlich seiner Potentiale und weiterer Forschungsfragen erschließen und dabei als essentiell für die Grundlagen der praktischen Philosophie herausstellen. (shrink)

A satisfactory analysis of human deception must rule out cases where it is a mistake or an accident that person B was misled by person A's behavior. Therefore, most scholars think that deceivers must intend to deceive. This article argues that there is a better solution: rather than appealing to the deceiver's intentions, we should appeal to the function of their behavior. After all, animals and plants engage in deception, and most of them are not capable of forming intentions. Accordingly, (...) certain human behavior is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead. This solves our problem because if the function of A's behavior was to mislead, B's ending up misled was not an accident or a mere mistake even if A did not intend to deceive B. (shrink)

This paper offers an original argument for a Humean thesis about promising that generalises to the domain of normative powers. The Humean ‘natural unintelligibility’ thesis – prominently endorsed by Rawls, Hart, and Anscombe, and roundly rejected or forgotten by contemporary writers (conventionalists and non – conventionalists alike) – holds that a rational, suitably informed agent cannot so much as make a promise (much less a morally-binding promise) without exploiting conventional norms that confer promissory significance on act types (e.g., signing on (...) the dotted line) that would not otherwise have such significance. The argument (like Hume’s) is action-theoretic in character; its central premise is the Contribution Condition on acting with an aim: roughly, that doing X in order to (bring about) Y requires that the agent believe that their having X-ed on the occasion might come to fully or partly account for Y’s coming to pass. The argument generalises to the broader domain of exercises of normative powers, i.e., to acts that modify normative properties by ‘fiat’ or ‘stipulation’. This stipulative act has been characterised in three different ways, each of which is given due consideration. Finally, two different ways of accommodating the ‘natural unintelligibility’ thesis are considered, as is the thesis’s normative significance. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against recent modifications of the Knowledge Condition on intentional action that weaken the condition. My contention is that the condition is best understood in the context of Anscombe’s Intention and, when so understood, can be maintained in its strongest form.

Anscombean accounts claim that intentional action is essentially characterized by an agent's practical knowledge of what she is doing. Such accounts are threatened by cases in which an agent seemingly fails to know what she is doing because of a mistake in the performance. It thus seems that such accounts are incompatible with the factivity of practical knowledge. We argue that Anscombean accounts should not be defended, as has recently been suggested, by drawing on familiar anti‐skeptical strategies from epistemology, but (...) rather by attending closely to the specifically practical character of agential knowledge. (shrink)