Feminism: Marriage and Civil Unions

Romantic relationships between professors and students, between employers and employees, and between other partners at different points on an institutional hierarchy are widely regarded as morally troubling. Popular explanations as to why have appealed variously to violations of institutional duties, to the impossibility of sexual consent within such relationships, and to the vices of the more powerful partner. I advance an alternative explanation. Romantic relationships, I argue, are already hazardous in their own right. We are distinctively exposed to and dependent (...) on our partners, which gives them the ability to interfere with us in significant ways. This makes romantic relationships ripe for what republicans call “domination”—a situation in which one person is vulnerable to the arbitrary interference of another. Romantic partners can avoid this objectionable condition by achieving a rough equality of power, which will prevent either partner from interfering with impunity. However, significant asymmetries of institutional power make this balancing act harder to achieve and, therefore, make domination harder to avoid. Extending the theory of freedom as non-domination in this way, therefore, not only helps solve a tricky ethical puzzle but also demonstrates the surprising capacity of republican theory to illuminate personal relationships. (shrink)

This article undertakes a philosophical analysis of the forms of relationship within the framework of the ontology of finite continuity. The central thesis is that relationship requires form for continuity, but agency requires the possibility of changing form for its own continuity; therefore, the ethical problem is not the existence of form, but the monopoly of form and the prioritization of its continuity over the continuity of agency. By defining "institutional monopoly" as a four-layered mechanism in which institutions, society, norms, (...) and the subject successively transform a specific form into the sole legitimate form, the article demonstrates how a "relationship" is converted into "institutional identity." The "automatic mask" in this framework is introduced not as the primary definition of marriage, but as the consequence of the monopoly of form. By presenting a model of the "ethical plurality of relationship," in which consent, responsibility, revisability, sufficiency, and non-destruction of the other's agency serve as ethical constraints, the article concludes that no form of relationship is inherently erosive; erosion begins when the continuity of form is prioritized over the continuity of agency. The "post-monopoly human," as a philosophical ideal type, is a subject who has acquired the capacity to distinguish between the continuity of relationship and the continuity of a specific form, and who has transcended its monopoly rather than rejecting form altogether. -/- Keywords: ontology of form, institutional monopoly, stabilization of form, institutional identity, responsible suspension, ethical plurality of relationship, post-monopoly human, finite continuity. (shrink)

This essay examines the institution of marriage within the philosophical framework of Morteza Niami, presenting it as an imposed automatic mask and a machine for the extraction of existential energy.

The inequitable distribution of domestic and caring labour in different-sex couples has been a longstanding feminist concern. Some have hoped that having both partners at home during the COVID-19 pandemic would usher in a new era of equitable work and caring distributions. Contrary to these hopes, old patterns seem to have persisted. Moreover, studies suggest this inequitable distribution often goes unnoticed by the male partner. This raises two questions. Why do women continue to shoulder a disproportionate amount of housework and (...) childcare despite economic and cultural gains? And why is there a widespread one-sided misrepresentation within different-sex couples about how domestic and caring work is distributed between the two partners? We answer these questions by appealing to affordance perception – the perception of possibilities for action in one's environment. We propose an important gender disparity in the perception of affordances for domestic tasks such as the dishwasher affording emptying, the floor affording sweeping and a mess affording tidying. We argue that this contributes not only to the inequitable distribution of domestic labour but to the frequent invisibility of that labour. We explore the consequences of this hypothesis for resistance and social change. (shrink)

El imperativo cultural de la monogamia impregna toda la arquitectura jurídica del Estado y, al mismo tiempo, la excede, saturando las relaciones sociales de formas no siempre evidentes. A partir de ese presupuesto, este trabajo se centra, geográficamente, en Brasil y, temporalmente, en el contexto abierto por la pandemia de covid-19, con el objetivo de defender la hipótesis de que la monogamia se ha visto reforzada en cuanto principio organizador del campo de la sexualidad y de las relaciones de parentesco (...) durante el episodio pandémico. El análisis propuesto pretende alertar, además, sobre las formas en que las normas de excepción implementadas durante las crisis pandémicas se sedimentan en el cuerpo social, pasando así a formar parte constitutiva del orden público. (shrink)

I argue that communities have a moral responsibility to repair and prevent moral damage that some survivors of domestic violence may experience. This responsibility is grounded in those communities’ complicity in domestic violence and the moral damage that may result. Drawing on Claudia Card’s work on domestic violence, I first explain two forms of moral damage that some survivors may experience. These are: 1) normative isolation, or abusive environments that are marked by distorted moral standards about the abuse itself, and (...) 2) coerced self-betrayal, the coercive entrapment of the survivor’s agency, emotions, and beliefs to express the will of the abuser. Though the abuser is always the primary cause of abuse, I argue that survivors’ communities can contribute to a climate that facilitates domestic violence by, for instance, sustaining harmful norms about gender roles, shaming survivors, protecting abusers, and not wanting to interrupt “private matters.” When this complicity exists, I argue that communities have a moral responsibility to create structures that repair and prevent moral damage from domestic violence. Finally, I sketch out some practical considerations for building these structures. These involve creating violence-resistant communities that protect survivors, hold abusers accountable, and help survivors reclaim their agencies. (shrink)

This paper explores Ksenija Atanasijević's (1894 - 1981) understanding of the ethical basis of feminism. It highlights her understanding that feminism as such has an ethical basis. Her criticism of the degrading position of women which, according to her, has its origins in a family based on the male violence against women is also pointed out. The paper also points to Ksenija Atanasijević's understanding of the universal goals of feminism, goals that are not directed only at women. The author points (...) out that despite the explicit distancing of Ksenija Atanasijević in relation to Marxism, especially the Marxist conception of class hatred, some of her positions are similar to the positions which Karl Marx presented criticizing Hegel. The author notes that at the time when she wrote her works, these views of Marx could not have been known to her. In conclusion, the author points out that for Ksenija Atanasijević the freedom of the individual forms the ethical basis of feminism. (shrink)

Desde un enfoque multidisciplinar y plural, "Feminismo e identidades de género en Japón" reúne una colección de ensayos que permiten conocer los debates intelectuales del feminismo japonés contemporáneo, así como las vigentes discusiones sobre las identidades de género y las orientaciones sexuales en aquel país. Los temas tratados desvelan, por un lado, la riqueza de la historia y del presente del feminismo en Japón, tanto en la voz de pensadoras y activistas pioneras, como a través del giro colectivo y radical (...) que a mitad del siglo pasado percutió críticamente los roles de género en una sociedad atravesada, como tantas otras, por el patriarcado. Asimismo, en el istmo que conecta, pero también desplaza, la situación del siglo XX y el momento actual, el volumen pone el foco en asuntos controversiales como la lucha por la igualdad de trato y derechos en el colectivo homosexual, las tensiones legales y médicas en torno a las identidades de género, y la negociación y renegociación constantes de las subjetividades femeninas en la literatura y las producciones audiovisuales. Editado por Montserrat Crespín Perales (UB), el libro dibuja un tapiz con múltiples hilos que se ofrecen para pensar con y a través de las reflexiones y las tensiones que el feminismo y los estudios de género en Japón subrayan en una contemporaneidad volátil y desencajada, esperando enriquecer con ello las discusiones globales actuales. (shrink)

This chapter presents a Kantian account of innate right in relation to the issues of abortion, sodomy, and obscenity laws. At first blush, Kant does not appear to have much to offer as we seek plausible philosophical accounts of the legal permissibility of abortion, authorizing consent for sexual activities, and the use of erotica. I demonstrate that, despite appearances, Kant’s legal-political writings do provide the philosophical resources required. Indeed, Kant’s philosophical ideas can help us capture the seriousness of the wrongdoing (...) involved in outlawing abortion, non-procreative and non-binary sexual activities, and erotica for any rational social, embodied beings as well as the heinousness involved in enforcing them against rational embodied, social _human_ beings. I argue that Kant’s account of human nature and evil can explain why we consider violations of bodily integrity—whether _de facto_ legally permitted or not—particularly serious and heinous legal failings. (shrink)

Sex, Love, and Gender is the first volume to present a comprehensive philosophical theory that brings together all of Kant's practical philosophy — found across his works on ethics, justice, anthropology, history, and religion — and provide a critique of emotionally healthy and morally permissible sexual, loving, gendered being. By rethinking Kant's work on human nature and making space for sex, love, and gender within his moral accounts of freedom, the book shows how, despite his austere and even anti-sex, cisist, (...) sexist, and heterosexist reputation, Kant's writings on happiness and virtue (Part I) and right (Part II) in fact yield fertile philosophical ground on which we can explore specific contemporary issues such as abortion, sexual orientation, sexual or gendered identity, marriage, trade in sexual services, and sex- or gender-based oppression. Indeed, Kant's philosophy provides us with resources to appreciate and value the diversity of human ways of loving and the existential importance of our embodied, social selves. Structured on a thematic basis, with introductions to assist those new to Kant's philosophy, this book will be a valuable resource for anyone who cares about these issues and wants to make sense of them. -/- Alternatively: Sex, Love, and Gender identifies a set of possibilities that define human beings’ sexuality. These sets come with their own concepts, which specify how the possibilities are realized and what effects they have on our lives lived together. Partly the task is descriptive. The description has to be plausible. Plausibility comes from the phenomenology (and not the other way around). Partly the task is normative. The normative content also has to be plausible. Plausibility here comes from vindicating the principles that underwrite the possibilities that define human beings’ sexualities and sexual experiences and behaviors lived by human beings and from the philosophical explanations and conclusions that follow. Overall plausibility, then, comes from discursive analysis of alternatives, from a priori argument, and, in the evaluative case, from showing how the Kantian account of a good life fits with reasonable conceptions of goodness consistent with the phenomenology of human lives. Although this exploration leads us, as we will see, to most corners of Kant’s practical philosophy, including his metaethics and metaphysics, the main focus is on an account of human sex, love, and gender explored explicitly with respect to happiness and ethics (virtue) and justice (right). It is because of this focus that the book is divided into two parts: Part 1 (“Human Sexuality and Virtue”) and Part 2 (“Human Sexuality and Right”). (shrink)

This chapter presents a Kant-based account of the challenges involved in realizing affectionately loving, sexual, and gendered lives in ways that are emotionally healthy and morally responsible. To this end, I introduce and make use of Kant’s accounts of the predisposition to good, the propensity to evil, the faculty of desire, truthfulness as our sacred moral duty, the highest good, vital forces, perfect and imperfect duties, characters (temperaments), and friendship. If we are genuinely committed to truthfulness, I argue, our faculty (...) of desire—through its abstract conceptual, associative, and aesthetic-teleological powers—can enable us to develop our sexual, loving, gendered selves such that they are consistent with striving for the highest good understood as a union between happiness and morality, and between our natural and moral vital forces. (shrink)

This chapter engages complexities concerning systemic justice in relation to sex, love, and gender. It shows how philosophical ideas in Kant’s account of public right in combination with his full account of human nature, yields a position that can take on systemic issues of dependency (including the state’s right and duty to fight poverty) and oppression (including through public laws protecting sexual or gendered minorities). In addition, I show how Kant’s account of different kinds of external forces people may find (...) themselves subjected to—“barbaric,” “anarchic,” “despotic,” and “republican”—help us capture the moral complexity facing oppressed and vulnerable populations in different legal-political circumstances. Finally, I argue that the ultimate aim for states is to establish a legal-political whole characterized by the citizens governing themselves wisely through active participation in public debate and public institutions. (shrink)

This chapter provides a Kantian account of private right in relation to marriage and trade in sexual services. I argue that in addition to various non-ideal reasons and reasons based on equality that make same-sex couples want to have a right to marry, there are ideal reasons why they want such a right. I also extend this argument to defend the right to marry for non-binary, symmetrical polyamorous partners. Regarding trade in sexual services, I maintain that Kant’s account of bodily (...) rights can explain why one never gets an enforceable right to have sex with another person even if one has a right to get some of the money back if a contract is broken. Importantly, these arguments hold regardless of what someone may think from the point of view of virtue or religion. (shrink)

This chapter links Kant’s account of human nature to unruly sexual activity and to the consequences of sexual or gendered violence and oppression. I use the account to explore the temptation of engaging in sexual violence and oppression, the damage sexual wrongdoing can do, why and how we can heal from sexual violence, why there are historical patterns to sexual violence and oppression, and why, despite the fact that our sexually loving selves are unruly and have as possible corollaries the (...) strongest of human emotions (passions), we are morally (ethically and legally) responsible for them. This chapter also shows how sexualized wrongdoing can be used as part of violent oppression and atrocities. Additionally, Kant’s accounts of barbarism and of formal and material wrongdoing enable us to describe how human beings can face conditions or situations in which there is no morally good way out, without abandoning Kant’s idea of absolute moral prohibitions. (shrink)

This chapter argues that in order to overcome the problems haunting Kant’s own account, we simply need to do what he should have done. We need to correctly incorporate Kant’s complex account of human nature and freedom into our theory of sex, love, and gender. Kant’s writings can show us a way to rethink sexual or gender identity and sexual orientation as capturing the various ways in which we subjectively (first-personally) experience our own embodied, sexual, and affectionate forcefulness—a basic way (...) of feeling directed toward ourselves and others as embodied, social beings—that any good development of our sexual, affectionately loving, gendered selves must be attuned to. Additionally, once we unhook Kant’s analysis of our teleological and aesthetic employment of the imagination regarding sexuality from his unjustifiable binary assumptions, we can engage the richness of human sex, love, and gender in the necessary nuanced, respectful ways. (shrink)

This chapter provides an interpretation of Kant’s own account of the traditional genders (man and woman) with particular attention to the historically oppressed gender (woman). I explain how Kant’s full account of human nature, including his teleological arguments, in combination with how we use the imagination aesthetically when being sexual, loving, or gendered inform his account of the traditional gender ideals of the man and the woman: the man associated with the idea of the sublime; the woman with that of (...) the beautiful. The chapter concludes by arguing that although Kant himself failed to solve the puzzle of genders, sexual or gendered identities, and sexual orientations—including how they do not fit neatly into the two traditionally dominant categories of man and woman—his general suggestions that understanding sex, love, and gender requires appeals to embodied, social human nature, teleological judgments, and an aesthetic use of the imagination are worth exploring further. (shrink)

Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State, by ChambersClare. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xi + 226.

Volume 97, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 418-418.

Recently, the US has joined many European jurisdictions in extending civil marriage to same sex as well as different sex dyads. Many liberals regard this as a development worth entrenching. But a prominent recent liberal challenge to civil marriage claims otherwise. According to this challenge, by defining and conferring civil marriage, the state privileges some relationships over others that serve equally well the important liberal goal of fostering effective liberal citizenship, in violation of a prominent interpretation of the doctrine of (...) state neutrality. Theorists who press this challenge, such as Elizabeth Brake and Tamara Metz, argue that it can be met effectively only by dismantling civil marriage and replacing it with more inclusive state-maintained arrangements. So far, prominent responses to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage have focused on the special value of either the relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, or the special value of civil marriage itself. In this article, I develop an alternative reply to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage, one focusing instead on the special vulnerabilities of some of the liberally valuable relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, amorous caregiving dyads. (shrink)

What defines family law? Is it an area of law with clean boundaries and unified distinguishing characteristics, or an untidy grouping of disparate rules and doctrines? What values or principles should guide it – and how could it be improved? Indeed, even the scope of family law is contested. Whilst some law schools and textbooks separate family law from children’s law, this is invariably effected without asking what might be gained or lost from treating them together or separately. Should family (...) law and children’s law be distinguished or treated together? One would expect disagreement on these questions in any context. In bringing together theorists from multiple jurisdictions and at least two primary disciplines, we should not be surprised to find deep differences in approach reflecting different methodologies and foundational questions. The tension between them, we hope, can illuminate and enrich discussion on all sides. (shrink)

This article defends the thesis that, in light of the postulates of liberal ethics, it is not possible to put forward universal arguments in support of any form of marriage. The existing forms of marriage should be either deemed unjust or founded on specific arguments recognized within a particular political community and determining the understanding of justice in a particular society. It defends the thesis that the requirement of universality, and consequently of impartiality, is not met, since behind every form (...) of marriage there is a certain “minimum” anthropological approach. Marriage is discussed as a privilege granted to particular groups by the political community. The comments are made with reference to the discussion between Krzysztof Saja and Tomasz Sieczkowski concerning the problem of discrimination against same-sex couples in Polish legislation. (shrink)

The significant co-occurrence between men’s violence against female partners and child abuse and neglect is well documented. It is less clear how child safety should be managed in family violence research with their mothers. This issue is salient to isafe, a New Zealand–based Internet intervention study testing improvement in safety decisions and mental health outcomes for women experiencing intimate partner violence. This article discusses the legislative, professional, and ethical considerations that contribute to the development of the child safety protocols and (...) discusses the development of the isafe protocol. Hypothetical scenarios of the application of the isafe protocol are used to illuminate the issues and provide a basis for future discussion. (shrink)

In this collection, liberal and feminist philosophers debate whether marriage reform ought to stop with same-sex marriage. Some authors argue for abolishing marriage or for new legal forms such as polygamy or temporary marriage. Others argue that the liberal values justifying same-sex marriage do not entail further reform.

Shulamith Firestone's Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution was, upon its original publication, both radicacmen would be freed from the burden of childbirth, in which the nuclear family, gender roles, typical constructions of marriage and parenting are all a thing of the past, still for many seems radical, even forty-five years after its debut in 1970. With Firestone's recent passing, it is a particularly suitable time to reconsider her work in light of the medical, technological, and social changes (...) of the past few decades. Specifically, I wish to argue that the kind of future society that Firestone envisioned, which would be possible only through the use of certain medical technologies, has begun to be actualized within many trans-affirming communities. The greater the recognition of trans identities, trans lives, and trans relationships, the more we will approach the realization of the post-revolutionary society that she describes. In this essay, I consider Firestone's ideas on the issues of biological sex, gender, relationships, and parenthood, after which I will identify how present trans-affirming practices serve to support these Firestonian ideals. (shrink)

Many theorists defend enforceable relationship contracts, arguing that they should be available alongside state-recognized marriage or even that they are the best sort of legal regulation to replace marriage. This latter question is the subject of this chapter, which contrasts contract and directive models of regulation, and notes that contract appears to be more compatible with liberty. However, this appearance is illusory since contracts can undermine liberty, directives can enhance liberty, and even a contract regime requires default directives. Moreover, there (...) are various problems with the enforcement of relationship contracts. Specific performance is rarely appropriate in the relationship context. The alternative, fault-based compensatory alimony, risks causing injustice to vulnerable parties. Relational contract theory attempts to deal with some of these problems but has intrinsic limitations. The chapter concludes that contract is not the best replacement for marriage, advocating instead a system of piecemeal directives with limited possibilities for contractual deviation. (shrink)

Ought parents, in general, to value being biologically tied to their children? Is it important, in particular, that both parents be biologically tied to their children? I will address these fundamental questions by looking at a fairly new practice within IVF treatments, so-called IVF-with-ROPA ( Reception of Oocytes from Partner ), which allows lesbian couples to „share motherhood‟ with one partner providing the eggs while the other becomes pregnant. I believe that IVF-with-ROPA is, just like other IVF treatments, morally permissible; (...) but here I argue that the increased biological ties which IVF-with-ROPA allows for do not have any particular value beside the satisfaction of a legitimate wish, because there is no intrinsic value in a biological tie between parents and children; further, I argue that equality within parental projects cannot be achieved by redistributing biological ties. (shrink)

The central thesis of Susan Okin's Justice, Gender, and the Family—that the ideology of the traditional family is the linchpin of contemporary gender inequality in the US—remains significant more than a quarter-century after the book's publication. On a political register, Okin's insistence on structural analysis of gender inequality is an important corrective to recent mainstream feminist emphasis on individual women's choices. On an academic register, her work reveals the incoherence of scholarly classifications of feminist theories as “liberal feminist” or “radical (...) feminist” by confounding such distinctions. I argue that her thesis is best understood in relation to the early radical feminism of Juliet Mitchell's Woman's Estate, a book Okin praised. Placing Okin's work in the context of its radical roots clarifies her “linchpin thesis,” but also reveals the limitations of her argument: in her emphasis on what Iris Young has termed the “distributive paradigm of justice,” Okin unnecessarily adopts a much narrower definition of the family than did Mitchell, and overestimates the influence of economic vulnerability after divorce on women's capacity to exit marriage. I suggest modifications to her theory, and conclude by showing the continuing relevance of her argument for analyzing recent legal, policy, and demographic shifts. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to bring together two topics that are rarely put into conversation in the philosophical bioethics literature: lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer family equality on one hand, and, on the other, the morality of such alternative reproductive practices as artificial insemination by donor, egg donation, and surrogacy.2 In contrast to most of the philosophical bioethics literature on ARP, which has little to say about queer families, I will suggest that the ethics of ARP and the respect (...) for and protection of queer families are, in fact, intimately related topics.The connection can be clearly seen by considering the shape of the LGBQ rights.. (shrink)

This book provides a philosophical examination of the extent to which legalizing same-sex marriage can contribute to ending the discrimination and social stigma faced by LGBT men and women in the Western world.

This article analyses some familiar arguments both for, and against, same-sex civil marriage. I argue that it is not enough to defend gay marriage by a simple appeal to equality, unless one addresses the view that same-sex marriage would be contrary to the objective nature and purpose of marriage. I illustrate the ways in which a stand-off is reached in discussions of this particular matter. I also suggest that there is a mystery about what the from a faithful relationship to (...) marriage amounts to, but that part of the answer is that marriage embodies a state-recognized social transition. This is underpinned by the interest that society has in marriage, largely owing to its facilitating a stable environment for children. However, I suggest that marriage also properly functions as a way to uphold commitment and love, and conclude that that there is no good reason not to uphold those things in same-sex relationships. But I concede that religious organisations with theological objections to same-sex marriage should not be obliged to conduct gay weddings. (shrink)

This paper sets out the case for abolishing state-recognized marriage and replacing it with piecemeal regulation of personal relationships. It starts by analysing feminist objections to traditional marriage, and argues that the various feminist critiques can best be reconciled and answered by the abolition of state-recognized marriage. The paper then considers the ideal form of state regulation of personal relationships. Contra other recent proposals, equality and liberty are not best served by the creation of a new holistic status, such as (...) civil union, nor by leaving regulation to private contracts. Instead, the state should develop piecemeal regulations that apply universally. (shrink)

On November 4, 2008 California voters passed Proposition 8, and accordingly same-sex marriage was banned under the state constitution. Proposition 8 is now being considered by the Supreme Court. The proposition has sparked national debate about the nature of the relationship between the state and citizens’ sexuality and corresponding rights; calling into question the practice of allocating rights and privileges on the basis of sexuality and family form. Proponents of the proposition, who can be classified as predominantly socially conservative, want (...) to maintain the status and privileges of marriage for heterosexuals; arguing that allowing same-sex marriage threatens the legitimacy, sanctity and strength of traditional heterosexual marriage. This article examines the extent to which three Californian pro-same-sex marriage organizations (Equality California, Join the Impact, and the Courage Campaign) have challenged and/or appropriated social conservative and neoliberal discourses in their effort to gain access to the rights and privileges that are currently administered through marriage. (shrink)

One current line of argument against the legalization of same-sex marriage, advocated primarily by the New Natural Lawyers, is that marriage is a pre-political institution that has, as an essential element, a bodily union requirement. They argue that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union in their sexual activities and thus cannot meet the structural requirements of marriage. Accordingly, they argue that the same-sex marriage debate must be framed as a debate about what marriage is, and not, as it was in (...) the anti-miscegenation precedents, about who can get married. I argue that their position, which promulgates a set of pernicious stereotypes about same-sex couples, is, first of all, internally inconsistent. According to their own metaphysical principles about bodily union, they provide no rational basis for the claim that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union and thus that same-sex couples cannot be married. Second, I argue for a deflationary account of the significance of bodily union. While same-sex couples, like heterosexual couples, can realize bodily union, this sort of union has no moral significance and thus cannot be the factor that distinguishes marriages from other sorts of relationships. Finally, I suggest that they have no basis for their claims about the inferiority of same-sex relationships. (shrink)

This article points out: “The combination of men and women in families is irrational.” Men and women are two different “species.” They only require sexual activities from each other, which are considered the less time-consuming activities during their lives. Sex must be treated as an enemy of marriage, due to its inferior and treacherous nature, and should not be included in marriage. Men and women should not live together in a family, since this institution must be understood as a permanent (...) place for all family members and is expected to have a solid structure. The traditional family model is the result of men‟s enslavement of women and the exaggeration of the role of sex. This model creates an overwhelming advantage for men in selecting partners, proposing marriage, and other family activities. This article indicates: (i) The prominent family models existing between the group-marriage period and now are sex-based family models. (ii) Technical and social conditions nowadays require a new and sustainable base for a family. The selected targets in this study are the consanguineous and sworn relationships among same-sex people in case they choose to be heterosexual, (and in turn, among opposite-sex persons when they engage in homosexuality). For example, a family can consist of two blood brothers (or sworn brothers or cousins) with their children, in case they are heterosexual. This family model is named the non-sex based family (NSBF) model, since the sexual needs will be met outside the family. The article also outlines a post-patriarchal society with the presence of NSBFs, and argues that the new model should be seen as an essential development trend of society. (shrink)

This is a review of Elizabeth Brake's book Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality, and the Law (Oxford University Press, 2012).