Distributive Justice, Misc

Measures of need-based justice that have been proposed lately rely on a single dimension of need that is taken into account. This is shown to be problematic since humans experience different kinds of need that appear to be incommensurable.

Cosmopolitans like Gillian Brock, Charles Beitz, and Thomas Pogge argue that the principles of justice selected and arranged in lexical priority in Rawls’ first original position would—and should for the same reasons as in the first—also be selected in Rawls’ second original position. After all, the argument goes, what reasons other than morally arbitrary ones do we have for selecting a second set of principles? A different, though undoubtedly related, point of contention is the cosmopolitan charge that Rawls fails to (...) consider the unfavorable conditions that owe themselves to global factors. Perhaps there was a time when interconnectedness and interdependency between states was not a factor, but in the current global order, this is certainly not the case. While this paper will address other related cosmopolitan concerns mentioned in Brock’s work, it is these two points that are perhaps the two biggest threats to the Rawlsian project and, as such, it is these two points that will be the primary focus of this paper. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss justice in the distribution of resources, both within states and across different states. On one influential view, it is always unjust for one person to have less than another through no fault of her own. State borders, on this account, have no importance in determining which distributions are just. I show that an alternative approach is needed. I argue that distributions of wealth are only unjust in so far as they issue from unfair treatment. It (...) follows that not all inequalities in the distribution of goods are unjust. I use these results to explain how state borders do play a role in determining which inequalities are unjust, since some of these inequalities issue from unfair treatment of citizens by the state. (shrink)

I argue that taxation for redistributive purposes is a property rights violation, responding to arguments (due to Nagel, Murphy, Sunstein, and Holmes) claiming that individuals lack ownership of their pretax incomes.

How should a constitutional democracy distribute rights, opportunities, and burdens when inherited inequalities persist across generations, but living individuals are not identical to the historical agents or institutions that generated them? This essay addresses this problem through India's postcolonial democratic, legal, and economic transformation. It develops an analytical framework that differentiates between historical injustice, transmitted advantage or disadvantage, contemporary structural disadvantage, and individual circumstance. Moving beyond a simple opposition between methodological individualism and structural analysis, the essay defines reflexive democratic fairness (...) as a multidimensional practice distinct from, but complementary to, institutionalized distributive and corrective justice. It argues that claims for contemporary distributive intervention are strongest when historical injustice has demonstrable and continuing structural consequences, rather than being based upon ancestral moral liability alone. The essay also examines how precolonial Indian formations—heterogeneous, regional, and institutionally layered—were transformed through colonial enumeration, administrative classification, and modern state institutions. The framework is formalized through three core normative principles (Moral Separation, Epistemic Discipline, and Proportionality) and six operational policy tests (Targeting Precision, Causal-Mechanism Verification, Proportionality Calibration, Democratic Reviewability, Epistemic Reflexivity, and Non-Essentialization). Using affirmative action, the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) reservation, and colonial reparations as test cases, the essay argues that historically grounded policies require continuing scrutiny against empirical evidence, institutional purpose, and the dynamic relationship between historical structures and present circumstances. (shrink)

In a previous work, Aesthetics and Ethics as Cognitive Resonance, I argued that ethical evaluation does not rest on natural norms or prescriptive principles but emerges as a form of cognitive resonance between possible configurations of action and the cognitive–affective organization of the agents involved. The present article extends that framework to the political domain. The central claim is that many contemporary crises of representation and of the traditional left–right distinction stem from the persistent use of normative categories to describe (...) problems that are, in the first instance, allocative in nature. The article interprets merit and need not as opposing moral principles but as the extremes of a continuous allocative gradient along which concrete political decisions are positioned. This gradient is neither fixed nor ideological but dynamic, shifting in response to changing socio-economic, technological, and demographic conditions. In the absence of a natural norm from which criteria of justice could be deduced, politics is therefore understood here as the practice of contingent positioning along this gradient, oriented toward maintaining conditions of coordination and political resonance rather than toward the application of absolute values. The analysis is deliberately situated within the context of Western market economies, characterized by a long tradition of individualism, secularization, and discursive legitimation of political decisions, and does not aim to provide a general theory of politics applicable across all institutional and cultural contexts. Within this framework, the proposed perspective helps reinterpret both the crisis of traditional political categories and the contemporary paradox whereby materially need-oriented policies increasingly emerge from actors historically associated with merit, while forces traditionally linked to redistribution remain bound to a normative grammar misaligned with present systemic conditions. The aim of the paper is not prescriptive but clarificatory: to offer a conceptual description of politics compatible with systemic complexity, persistent conflict, and the absence of natural moral foundations. (shrink)

Technological visionaries often paint a future powered by clean energy, yet these optimistic visions tend to overlook the messy socio-political realities of such transitions. As A Just Transition for All: Workers and Communities for a Carbon-Free Future (MIT Press) powerfully illustrates, there is a vast difference between a so-called ‘just’ transition and one that is genuinely just. This book offers a much-needed, thought-provoking, and meticulously documented exploration of how political and business leaders can ensure fairness for all stakeholders—especially vulnerable workers (...) and their communities—as the world shifts toward a carbon-free future. -/- "As time passes, news about the now hotter Earth buzzes through the bird village. Those kingfishers residing along the banks of the Red River often report drying riverbeds and skinny fish. As Kingfisher casts his gaze upon the events that have unfolded, he can’t help but feel a sense of unease creeping up within him. He decides to collect all the scientific information concerning climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. An elite squad with a unique talent for gathering vital information is formed for emergency information collection." -In GHG emissions, Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher Story Collection, Vuong (2025)- . (shrink)

This article evaluates seven strategies for managing the high costs of GLP-1 receptor agonists (GLP-1RAs) like semaglutide and tirzepatide for weight management: complete exclusion of coverage, annual cost increase caps, lifetime cost caps, tiered access, formulary reevaluation, subscription payment models, and patent reform. The authors assess each strategy against three ethical objectives: benefiting people and preventing harm, showing equal moral concern, and mitigating disadvantage. Complete coverage exclusions, arbitrary reimbursement caps, and lifetime limits are deemed unethical as they fail to meet (...) these objectives. Tiering access based on relative benefit is considered justifiable, though current implementation often unfairly favors diabetes over obesity treatment. The authors recommend formulary reevaluation as the most ethical approach for smaller health plans, allowing them to prioritize more cost-effective treatments. For larger payers with market power and for governments, subscription payment models and patent reforms are potentially ethical solutions if implemented sustainably. The authors conclude that health plans should avoid ad hoc restrictions on GLP-1RAs in favor of comprehensive policy reforms that ensure sustainable access to these and future breakthrough treatments. (shrink)

Glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists, such as semaglutide, and dual GLP-1 and glucose-dependent insulinotropic polypeptide (GIP) receptor agonists, such as tirzepatide, have been found to be effective for treating obesity and diabetes, significantly reducing weight and the risk or predicted risk of adverse cardiovascular events. There is a global shortage of these medications that could last several years and raises questions about how limited supplies should be allocated. We propose a fair-allocation framework that enables evaluation of the ethics of current (...) practices and could guide governments, professional societies, and physicians in allocation decisions. (shrink)

Policymakers worldwide currently share the general consensus that filling the climate finance gap will require attracting private investments. In this article, we discuss a family of instruments aimed at achieving this goal, so-called Blended Finance (BF) instruments. BF uses public resources to improve the risk/reward profile of relevant mitigation and adaptation projects in order to render them vastly more attractive to private investors. Political economy and critical macrofinance scholars have generally taken a critical stance towards BF. We contribute to this (...) debate by arguing that BF also threatens to violate central climate justice-relevant fairness considerations. In particular, we claim that because BF inherently requires supported projects to be profitable, it unfairly generates financial flows from citizens in developing countries to private investors in developed countries. This contradicts central fairness requirements of plausible climate justice approaches, which necessitate that net financial flows move in precisely the opposite direction, from developed to developing countries. We discuss various objections to our argument and finally end by defending a policy approach aimed at increasing the fiscal space of developing countries before turning to private finance, which we consider much more likely to preserve climate justice. (shrink)

Many scholars of organizations see social enterprise as a promising approach to advancing social justice but neglect to scrutinize the normative foundations and limitations of this optimism. This article draws on Rawlsian political philosophy to investigate whether and how social enterprises can support social justice. We propose that this perspective assigns organizations a duty to foster institutional capacity, a concept we define and elaborate. We investigate how this duty might apply specifically to social enterprises, given their characteristic features. We theorize (...) six different mechanisms through which social enterprises might successfully discharge this duty. These results affirm the value of conversation between organizational studies and political philosophy and shed new light on debates regarding social enterprise, institutional theory, and several other topics. (shrink)

Classical liberals have a long and convoluted history with the welfare state. Welfare policy has engaged liberals ever since the debates round poor relief, land ownership, and distributive justice in authors like John Locke, Thomas Paine, Herbert Spencer, and Henry George. However, the majority of the welfare state debate, from David Hume and Adam Smith to Milton Friedman and Richard Epstein, has been conducted primarily on the basis of rule-consequentialist reasoning, weighing the expected (long-term) costs and benefits of different institutional (...) rules. Classical liberals tend to be primarily concerned with welfare in the “happiness of individuals” sense and only secondarily with welfare in the “government handout” sense. This necessitates an investigation into the expected benefits and costs of various institutional rules and social policies. As a result, any disagreements about the best institutional pathway forward must be settled through comparative institutional analysis. Today, it seems to me that the classical liberal perspective must choose between two alternative pathways, each of which has its pros and cons, and each of which seems compatible with the abstract and general rules of the market society: 1) The Minimally Redistributive State based on a classical liberal constitution supported by robust market institutions and a civil society mosaic of polycentric mutual aid networks; or 2) The Welfare State of Law which, in addition to all of the above, adds a few carefully rule-bound and market-conforming redistributive mechanisms, the most important of which is the robust guarantee of something like a conditional minimum income scheme or an unconditional UBI/NIT scheme. In addition, the 3) “Third Way” models of the Social Market Economy and the Free Market Welfare State are also sometimes included as a third option. (shrink)

The rapid expansion of Big Tech companies into various societal domains (e.g., health, education, and agriculture) over the past decade has led to increasing concerns among governments, regulators, scholars, and civil society. While existing theoretical frameworks—often revolving around privacy and data protection, or market and platform power—have shed light on important aspects of Big Tech expansionism, there are other risks that these frameworks cannot fully capture. In response, this editorial proposes an alternative theoretical framework based on the notion of sphere (...) transgressions, which draws on political philosopher Michael Walzer's theory of justice. The editorial not only introduces the sphere transgressions framework, but it also highlights its potential to generate novel research questions. Furthermore, this editorial introduces eight articles and one commentary from a group of interdisciplinary scholars that critically examine Big Tech expansionism by reflecting on this expansionism from the perspective of different societal spheres or by engaging with the sphere transgressions framework itself. (shrink)

Sufficientarians face a problem of arbitrariness: why place a sufficiency threshold at any particular point? One response is to seek universal goods to justify a threshold. However, this faces difficulties (despite sincere efforts) by either being too low, or failing to accommodate individuals with significant cognitive disabilities. Some sufficientarians have appealed to individuals’ subjective evaluations of their lives. I build on this idea, considering another individualized threshold: ‘tolerability’. I respond to some traditional challenges to individualistic approaches to justice: ‘expensive’ tastes, (...) and adaptive preferences. Finally, I end by offering some suggestions about how this relates to policymaking. (shrink)

The planetary justice and energy justice frameworks have largely developed in isolation from each other. Both frameworks are relevant for the energy transition, which is needed to limit transgressions of planetary boundaries but can also give rise to injustices. Based on a systematic review of the literatures on planetary justice and energy justice, we suggest that these two frameworks can complement each other in conceptualising and analysing justice issues in the energy transition. Systemic injustices that are often overlooked by energy (...) justice can be addressed by planetary justice through its non-anthropocentric approach grounded in the planetary boundaries framework. Planetary justice can also build on the analytical strength of energy justice and its increasing focus on intersectional and whole-system approaches. We argue that planetary justice needs to move forward by integrating the scope, scale and tenets of justice and taking pluralism and epistemic justice as preconditions for conceptualisation. (shrink)

In the literature on global justice, the issue of economic growth in developed countries has received only scant attention. Where addressed, it is widely presumed to be either detrimental or irrelevant from the perspective of the world’s poor. This contribution aims to challenge this disregard by arguing that affluent countries have a duty of global justice to pursue economic growth deriving from their widely recognised obligation to eradicate global poverty.

Multicultural Citizenship: Legacy and Critique allows the philosopher an opportunity to consider the evolution and transformation of Will Kymlicka's theories from Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Canonical in the field of multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka's work developed an original way of recognizing and accommodating ethnic groups and national minorities through liberal democratic principles. This new volume brings together expert scholars to evaluate the impact of Kymlicka's book on their own views and the field's general progression over the past (...) three decades and brings Kymlicka to face new questions challenging multiculturalism and re-evaluate the main ideas of his original theory by reflecting on its development. Through engagement with the contributors' chapters, Kymlicka ends this edited collection with proposals for new ways of understanding multiculturalism at a time of rising anti-immigration populism and natalist movements. This book offers a modern outlook on multiculturalism with contributions from a diverse group of authors as well as Will Kymlicka himself and will be of great interest to scholars and students of migration, nationalism, minority rights, sociology, law, and politics. (shrink)

Recently, there has been much discussion of ‘fair machine learning’: fairness in data‐driven decision‐making systems (which are often, though not always, made with assistance from machine learning systems). Notorious impossibility results show that we cannot have everything we want here. Such problems call for careful thinking about the foundations of fair machine learning. Sune Holm has identified one promising way forward, which involves applying John Broome's theory of fairness to the puzzles of fair machine learning. Unfortunately, his application of Broome's (...) theory appears to be fatally flawed. This article attempts to rescue Holm's central insight – namely, that Broome's theory can be useful to the study of fair machine learning – by giving an alternative application of Broome's theory, which involves thinking about fair machine learning in counterfactual (as opposed to merely statistical) terms. (shrink)

The demands of fair machine learning are often expressed in probabilistic terms. Yet, most of the systems of concern are deterministic in the sense that whether a given subject will receive a given score on the basis of their traits is, for all intents and purposes, either zero or one. What, then, can justify this probabilistic talk? We argue that the statistical reference classes used in fairness measures can be understood as defining the probability that hypothetical persons, who are representative (...) of social roles, will receive certain goods. We call these hypothetical persons “representative individuals.” We claim that what we owe to actual, concrete individuals—whose individual chances of receiving the good in the system might be extreme (i.e., either zero or one)—is that their representative individual has an appropriate probability of receiving the good in question. While less immediately intuitive than other approaches, we argue that the representative individual approach has important advantages over other ways of making sense of this probabilistic talk in the context of fair machine learning. (shrink)

Di Bello and O’Neil argue that innocent defendants in criminal trials have a right to not be exposed to a greater risk of false conviction than other innocent defendants facing similar charges. They argue that this right is violated when profile evidence is admitted to trial but not when other forms of evidence, such as eyewitness testimony or trace evidence, are admitted. In this article I show that all kinds of evidence can lead to unequal risks of false conviction and (...) that Di Bello and O’Neil’s argument to the contrary is unsound. (shrink)

Are corporations the problem? Can reforms in the area of corporate responsibility (e.g., more stakeholder governance) lead to any real changes? The goal of the paper is to analyse debates concerning the Citizens United case, corporate personhood, the stakeholder theory, the affected interests principle and, finally, deeper fallacies with respect to the rights of capital embedded in Marxism and conventional economic theories of capital and corporate finance. The last analysis considers another institution at the root of the problems of the (...) current economic system: the renting of human beings in the employment relationship – which has also corrupted the original idea of a corporation that dates back to medieval times. (shrink)

AI technology promises to be both the most socially important and the most profitable technology of a generation. At the same time, the control over – and profits from – the technology is highly concentrated to a handful of large tech companies. This chapter discusses whether bringing AI technology under collective ownership and control is an attractive way of counteracting this development. It discusses justice-based rationales for collective ownership, such as the claim that, since the training of AI systems relies (...) on a form of enclosing of the data commons, the value created by those systems should be fairly distributed. It also considers democracy-based rationales, like the suggestion that collective ownership is needed to ensure democratic control over the way this crucial technology is being developed and deployed. The paper also discusses possible forms of collective ownership, like publicly funded advanced AI research and democratically controlled AI companies. It concludes that the case for shifting to a model with collective ownership is the most compelling when based on the concern that the private model could come to concentrate economic and political power to such a degree that it threatens institutions designed to promote justice and democracy. (shrink)

Este libro reúne una serie de contribuciones que abordan, desde distintas disciplinas y enfoques, el diseño, la implementación y la evaluación de las políticas de protección social en América Latina. Los capítulos son reformulaciones de los problemas y respuestas presentados en el Workshop Internacional “Protección social y pobreza: abordando la multidimensionalidad del problema”, llevado a cabo en mayo de 2024. Durante el evento, se presentaron estudios sobre el impacto de los programas de transferencia de ingresos en países del Cono Sur, (...) como Argentina, Uruguay, Brasil y México. La obra refleja la multidimensionalidad del problema, integrando análisis normativos, económicos y políticos, así como perspectivas etnográficas y jurídicas. A través del estudio de casos como el Programa Prospera (México), el Programa Bolsa Família (Brasil) y el programa Acompañamientos de Familia (Argentina), el libro ofrece una mirada crítica sobre los alcances y desafíos de estos programas en el contexto de la pobreza y la exclusión social en la región. A partir de estas experiencias, no solo se busca evaluar las políticas actuales, sino también reflexionar sobre estrategias futuras para enfrentar estos desafíos. (shrink)

The moral, legal, and political assessment and categorization of the provision of a social minimum is controversial because it borders on being an essentially contested concept from at least four distinct perspectives through which political economic activity is evaluated: the market viewpoint (commutative perspective), the labor and production viewpoint (contributive perspective), the public institution viewpoint (distributive perspective), and the unproductive expenditure or complementary consumption viewpoint (donative perspective). This paper will focus on the viewpoint of public institutions responsible for determining what (...) constitutes a socially just distribution of a social minimum. To accomplish this, it will outline a conceptual framework in which the distribution of a social minimum can be meaningfully debated in conceptually transparent terms. The hypothesis behind building this platform is that understanding the social minimum as a distribuendum should be based on an understanding of distributable goods as a valuable kind of resource, whether material or immaterial. Accordingly, the paper will outline the conceptual variations of a resource-oriented understanding of the social minimum as a requirement of distributive justice. (shrink)

This article presents a philosophical and legal analysis of the transformation of the concept of responsibility in the era of cyborgization, defining the methodological foundations for a shift toward understanding the distributed agency of the augmented subject. To this end, the author first reconstructs historically developed notions of will, intention, and responsibility. Further, applying contemporary theories of "extended mind," actor-network theory, and posthumanism, the work demonstrates the possibility and necessity of rethinking the boundaries of the "self." To this end, drawing (...) on empirical cases such as neural interfaces and popular culture, the author identifies specific problematic areas for law and ethics. Methodologically, the work applies a cyborgian eclecticism approach to integrating productive approaches in an interdisciplinary analysis. The author concludes that classical foundations of responsibility lose their practical applicability when cognitive processes begin to be distributed between biological and technical categories. Given these emerging trends, there is a clear need to move from the binary logic of "guilty/not guilty" to a scale/modal model of responsibility, where responsibility is perceived within the context of the actor's contribution within a hybrid system. This article lays the conceptual foundation for practical solutions that will be presented in the second part of the study. // В статье представлен философско-правовой анализ трансформаций понятия ответственности в эпоху киборгизации, определяются методологические основания для перехода к пониманию распределенной агентности дополненного субъекта. Для этого автор, в первую очередь, реконструирует исторически складывавшиеся представления о воле, намерении и ответственности. Далее, с приложением современных теорий «расширенного разума», акторно сетевой теории и постгуманизма, в работе демонстрируется возможность и необходимость переосмыслить границы «Я», для чего, основываясь на эмпирических кейсах, таких как нейроинтерфейсы, и на образах в массовой культуре, автор выделяет конкретные проблемные точки для права и этики. Методологически в работе применяется подход киборгианского эклектизма для объединения продуктивных подходов в междисциплинарном анализе. Автор приходит к выводу, что классические основания ответственности теряют прикладную работоспособность в условиях, когда когнитивные процессы начинают распределяться между категориями биологического и технического. В условиях развития таких тенденций очевидна необходимость перехода от бинарной логики «виновен/не виновен» к шкаловой/модальной модели ответственности, где ответственность воспринимается в рамках вклада актора, существующего в гибридной системе. Данная статья закладывает концептуальный фундамент для практических решений, которые будут представлены во второй части исследования. (shrink)

Questions of fair allocation arise regularly throughout our lives, ranging from the trivial to the significant, for governments, private companies, associations, families, and friends. This article discusses the nature of allocative fairness, which is focused on the fair distribution of divisible and indivisible goods. The recent literature on allocative fairness takes John Broome's discussion of fairness as the proportional treatment of claims as its starting point. On this view, a claim is a reason why an individual ought to receive a (...) good. This article discusses the nature of allocative fairness, claims, and goods. The most prominent allocative procedures in the literature are discussed, including equal allocation, equitable allocation, markets, lotteries, and queues. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Peter Mwipikeni argues that Thaddeus Metz’s appeal to an African relational ethic to suggest reforms that would promote global economic justice is misguided. According to Mwipikeni, the problem is that Metz’s ideas are offered within the context of a “racialised world order” that is fundamentally and structurally unjust. Without first tearing the current system down, there can be no true economic justice on the African continent, while those benefiting from the racism would not (...) accept Metz's prescriptions. We counter that Mwipikeni’s critique mistakenly evaluates Metz’s proposed reforms based on the likelihood that they would be adopted, instead of on whether they would promote justice in principle, where such a critique in fact plagues Mwipikeni’s own, more radical proposals to a much greater degree. We also argue that incorporating more aspects of Metz’s communal ethic into the discussion demonstrates that it would in fact reject any racist system, including by forbidding such a system in the first place and subsequently prescribing compensation for its victims if it did arise. (shrink)

Com uma história que ultrapassa cem anos, a ciência da mensuração da pobreza foi impulsionada pela necessidade de critérios mais sistemáticos para determinar tanto a extensão do fenômeno quanto aquelas pessoas com direito à assistência social. Discuto dois dos principais produtos dessa história: as linhas de pobreza e as abordagens para sua mensuração. As linhas separam as pessoas em pobreza ― aquelas cujo nível de carência está abaixo da linha ― daquelas fora dela ― aquelas cujo nível está acima. E (...) se pobreza é uma carência, nem todas as carências caracterizam pobreza. Não por acaso, cada abordagem se distingue por definir que tipo de carência faz da pobreza o que ela é. Aqui, apresento seis abordagens: monetária, subsistência, privação relativa, necessidades básicas, capacidades e direitos humanos. Mas entre pesquisadores, persiste a falta de consenso, seja sobre como traçar a linha de pobreza ou sobre qual abordagem é mais adequada. Relacionado a isso, concluo que diagnósticos sobre a pobreza de uma sociedade exigem o emprego não de uma, mas de diferentes medidas. (shrink)

In this paper, I am concerned with how healthcare systems ought to transition away from the greenhouse gas emissions that they have historically relied on to provide care. I address two questions in relation to this issue. The first is what emissions target should healthcare systems adopt? Second, is how should the burdens of mitigation be shared fairly in light of that target? I argue that sufficientarianism offers an attractive way to answer both of these questions because it is better (...) situated to strike the right balance between healthcare benefits and the costs of mitigation than rivals. Sufficiency describes the view that what is important from the perspective of distributive justice is that individuals have enough. I argue that this ideal can be used to set a threshold of enough health from which an emissions threshold can be set. Once an emissions threshold is in place, this can be used to demarcate permissible from impermissible emissions in healthcare. In turn, the emissions threshold provides guidance on which emissions are liable to mitigation and when it would be fair for healthcare to shoulder the associated burdens. Permissible emissions, on the other hand, are necessary to secure sufficiency and so healthcare's mitigation responsibilities should be altered in light of this. I also discuss various alternative methods of setting an emissions target like net zero, zero emissions, emissions grandfathering and emissions egalitarianism. I point to several issues with these approaches. (shrink)

School boosters are tax-exempt organizations that engage in fundraising efforts to provide public schools with supplementary resources. This paper argues that prevailing forms of school boosting are defeasibly unjust. Section 1 shows that inequalities in public education funding in the United States violate John Rawls’s two principles of domestic justice. Section 2 argues that prevailing forms of school boosting exacerbate and plausibly perpetuate these injustices. Section 3 then contends that boosting thereby defeasibly violates Rawlsian principles of nonideal theory for rectifying (...) injustice. Thus, boosting should be presumptively either made illegal or substantially reformed. Finally, Section 4 responds to potential objections. (shrink)

This correspondence from The Lancet addresses critiques and responses regarding ethical frameworks for allocating scarce medical resources, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. Emanuel and Persad defend their position that scarcity is a reality requiring principled allocation decisions, responding to Smith's assertion that viewing scarcity as inevitable is "problematic and irresponsible." They argue that without effective ethical guidance, well-resourced individuals will monopolize scarce resources while others debate ending scarcity theoretically. The authors emphasize five fundamental values for fair allocation. They critique "first (...) come, first served" approaches that favor privileged populations with internet access and mobility. The correspondence also addresses concerns about public engagement, sustainability principles, and the distinction between resource allocation and fair compensation for essential workers. The authors conclude that ethical values are only one piece of the allocation puzzle and that fair allocation also requires robust institutional infrastructure to ensure equitable distribution of scarce medical resources. (shrink)

Philanthropy involves the voluntary contribution of money or other goods and resources for broadly public purposes. Unlike taxation, contributions are not coerced: rather, their magnitude, their direction, and often their specific use is determined by the donor’s discretion. Unlike the case of ordinary market exchange, the giver does not ask or receive payment for what she offers, though she may receive psychological, reputational, or even material benefits from her gift (e.g., she may feel a “warm glow”, see her name above (...) a building or on a wall honoring donors, receive perks from the organizations she supports, or enjoy tax benefits). What constitutes a “public purpose” is of course controversial, but for now we adopt a very broad definition (excluding, e.g., gifts to family and friends and politicians or electoral campaigns, but otherwise inclusive as to beneficiaries and purpose). It satisfies most ordinary understandings of philanthropy for a gift simply to be other-regarding. -/- Note that the above definition focuses on philanthropy as a practice. Alternative definitions might attempt to specify the philanthropic motivation (i.e., love of humanity, altruism, or public-spiritedness) or philanthropic organizations as a legal category. While this entry engages with these other meanings of philanthropy, a practice-based definition provides the most appropriate lens through which to evaluate philosophical reflection on practices of voluntary giving and receiving. Motives of altruism or beneficence can animate many actions not ordinarily classed as cases of philanthropy (e.g., a decision to run for office), and the legal and tax treatment of philanthropy varies across time and jurisdictions. Additionally, we do not, for the purposes of this entry, draw a distinction between “charity” and “philanthropy”, or assume a necessary contrast between philanthropy and justice: the relationship of philanthropy to justice is a complicated matter that we discuss below. -/- We begin with a historical survey of the role of gift-giving in philosophical traditions, followed by a discussion of the relationship between charity or philanthropy and justice. We then turn to a more detailed discussion of philosophical perspectives on the ethics of philanthropy (e.g., moral questions for prospective givers and recipients) and the politics of philanthropy (e.g., questions about philanthropy’s relationship to the state and to political values like democracy and freedom). Finally, we consider some more specific topics of contemporary philosophical controversy. (shrink)

In this chapter I systematically distinguish a variety of ways to relationalize economics, and focus on a certain approach to relationalizing normative economics in the light of communal values salient in the African philosophical tradition. I start by distinguishing four major ways to relationalize empirical economics, viz., in terms of its ontologies, methods, explanations, and predictions, and also three major ways to relationalize normative economics, in regards to means taken towards ends, decision-procedures used to specify ends, and ends themselves. Then, (...) in the rest of the chapter I address what would be involved in relationalizing the ends of economic choices, given certain ideals of communal relationship characteristically prized by sub-Saharan philosophers, particularly southern African adherents to ubuntu. I advance communal answers to the two large questions of what an economy should distribute and how to engage with stakeholders, and suggest that the implications will be found plausible by many open-minded enquirers around the world. Although this chapter is a work of ethical philosophy, it is meant to be of broad interest to scholars in economics. (shrink)

An abridged version of an article published in 2011 focusing on its discussion of the ubuntu ethics of land reform.

Reprint of an article first appearing in Philosophical Papers (2017).

Moral diversity poses significant challenges for normative theory building, because no particular conception of justice may be agreeable to all members of society. Polycentrism offers a potential solution by allowing a plurality of local regulative principles. For deeply diverse societies, however, polycentrism fails conceptually. This chapter argues that Moehler’s (2018) multilevel social contract theory can overcome this problem. The theory disposes the quest for justice as the sole and exclusive objective and considers agents’ liberty and peaceful interaction as the primary (...) goals of (new) social contract theory and the basis for an open society. To clarify its nature, the chapter contrasts the vision of the open society provided by Moehler’s theory with the vision provided by Gaus’s (2021) theory. Both theories move beyond polycentrism and offer promising versions of a ‘new social contract’ that shows how diverse societies can progress and become more robust and open in their social fabric. (shrink)

This book features new approaches to social contract theory. Whereas traditional social contract theories and their adaptations in the twentieth century were developed for fairly homogeneous societies, societies in the twenty-first century often are characterized by conflicting first-order directives that stem from deep moral, political, religious, and cultural diversity. To address such diversity and the complexities of contemporary societies, new approaches (including formal approaches) to social contract theory have emerged that re-envision the social contract for a fragmented and sometimes polarized, (...) yet interdependent social world. New social contract theory explores how, in a world of continuous disagreement on questions of justice, in particular the ideals of liberty and equality, society can not only progress, but also flourish and become more robust and open in its social fabric. This book brings together, for the first time, defenders and discussants of new social contract theory. It includes contributions by eminent and emerging scholars in this field. The book clarifies the distinct features of new social contract theory and provides a valuable starting point for discussion of this novel movement in social contract theory. (shrink)

Evolutionary, game-theoretic approaches to justice and the social contract have become increasingly popular in contemporary moral and political philosophy. Peter Vanderschraaf’s (2019) theory of strategic justice represents the most recent contribution to this tradition and, in many ways, can be viewed as a culmination of it. This article discusses some of the central features of Vanderschraaf’s theory and relates them to contributions in this collection on strategic justice, conventions, and game theory. Some of the contributions directly address Vanderschraaf’s work, while (...) others explore related topics in game theory, bargaining theory, formal philosophy, rationality, equality, justice, and the theory of conventions. The goal of this collection is to bridge a gap between disjoint but closely related literatures that span a wide range of disciplines. The contributions allow readers to systematically engage with the topic of strategic justice, advance dialogue, and more easily follow this rich and expanding field of study. (shrink)

China’s rise to global power status is set to be amongst the primary shapers of politics and life more broadly in the 21st century. Yet despite its immense significance, political philosophers have been surprisingly quiet on the normative implications of China’s rise. This, I will argue, is a mistake. Not only does China’s rise generate interesting normative questions in its own right; it also upends some basic assumptions that many of us have hitherto adopted in our thinking about international distributive (...) justice. In the philosophical literature, the international order is often characterised by two sorts of states – developed and developing – with the former owing demanding duties and the latter having expansive permissions to further their own development. China’s status as both a genuine superpower and a middle-income country facing significant development challenges calls into question the continued functionality of such simplifying assumptions. Against the backdrop of China’s rise – and, to a lesser extent, that of other large emerging economies – this paper develops a more fine-grained account of how to conceive of states’ differential levels of advantage, distinguishing between states that are incapable, precariously capable, and robustly capable of realizing a minimally decent standard of domestic justice. This account reaffirms the assignment of the most onerous international duties to developed states, but also assigns duties and claims to developing states in a scalar fashion, with the upshot that better-off developing states in particular bear positive duties of international justice, owed to least-developed countries (LDCs). (shrink)

In our reply to critiques of our GLP-1 receptor agonist allocation framework, we explain that using potential years of life lost (PYLL) as a metric addresses racial health disparities without explicitly allocating resources based on race. This approach is "racism-conscious" and has legal and ethical challenges over race-based approaches. Meanwhile, though acknowledging the importance of cardiovascular risk assessment, we maintain in response to other interlocutors that focusing solely on immediate risk would ignore the broader goal of mitigating disadvantage. We emphasize (...) that our framework balances multiple ethical objectives beyond just maximizing medical benefits. (shrink)

Release dates: 30 January 2024 (UK and Europe), 18 March 2024 (North America). This collection of essays introduces scholars and students to the emerging field of the philosophy of money and finance. The field is a relatively new subdiscipline within the subject of philosophy. Although philosophical theorizing about money and finance dates back to Antiquity, the events of the 2008 financial crisis brought new urgency to a broad array of questions about finance, and the body of philosophical research on the (...) topic is growing. To date, there is no comprehensive introduction to this body of research – especially none which acknowledges its full breadth and potential. This volume aims to provide a much-needed introduction. -/- The volume is divided into the following four sections: Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Financial Economics, Ethics, and Political Philosophy. -/- . (shrink)

Given the technological constraints of long-duration space travel and planetary settlement, off-Earth humans will likely need to employ food systems very different from their terrestrial counterparts, and newly emerging food technologies are being developed that will shape novel food systems in these off-Earth contexts. Projected off-Earth food systems may therefore potentially “alienate” their users in new ways compared to Earth-based food systems. They will be susceptible to alienation in ways that are similar to such potential on Earth, where there are (...) points of overlap between off-Earth food systems and any of the multitudes of ways in which food systems on Earth are structured. They will also be susceptible to new forms of alienation, as we encounter scenarios that are genuinely structurally novel to humanity. These are especially important to consider since there are comparatively fewer analyses of these food systems where they differ from existing ones. We propose five non-exhaustive sources of value beyond nutrition our individual relationships with a food may possess: gustatory, social, cultural, epistemic, and authorial value. Using these, we offer examples of ways in which an off-Earth food system may exacerbate or alleviate alienation for humans in long-term off-Earth food systems. (shrink)

On at least most accounts of what global justice requires, those living in severe poverty around the world are unjustly disadvantaged. Remedying this unjust disadvantage requires (perhaps among other things) that resources currently possessed by well-off people are deployed in ways that will improve the lives of the poor. In this article, I argue that, contrary to the claims of some critics, well-off individuals’ effective altruist giving is at least among the appropriate responses to global injustice. In addition, I suggest (...) that effective altruist giving will often be among the best ways for such people to satisfy obligations that they have in virtue of being beneficiaries of global injustice. The argument that I offer for this conclusion has at least two important implications: first, critics of effective altruism who claim that it is incompatible with taking global injustice sufficiently seriously are mistaken; and second, effective altruists have reason to reject the non-normative accounts of the movement’s core commitments that have been advocated by some prominent proponents. (shrink)

The good of those who are worse off matters more to the overall good than the good of those who are better off does. But being worse off than one’s fellows is not itself bad; nor is inequality itself bad; nor do differences in well-being matter more when well-being is lower in an absolute sense. Instead, the good of the relatively worse-off weighs more heavily in the overall good than the good of the relatively better-off does, in virtue of the (...) fact that the former are relatively worse off. This paper articulates and defends the view just described. (shrink)

Human capital is that body of skills, knowledge, or dispositions that enhances the value of individuals’ contributions to economic production. Because human capital is both a byproduct of, and an important ingredient in, cooperative productive activities, it is subject to demands of justice. Here I consider what comparative justice in human capital benefits and burdens amounts to, with a special concern for the place of equality in allocating such burdens and benefits. Identifying these demands is complicated by the fact that (...) human capital is not discretely produced or exploited, making it difficult to envision human capital justice in historical terms. I defend a non-historical alternative that (I contend) both distributive and relational egalitarians can embrace, namely that that an allocation of human capital burdens and benefits is just only if under that distribution, no individual prefers another’s ledger of benefits and burdens to her own. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has helped to clarify the fair and equitable allocation of scarce medical resources, both within and among countries. The ethical allocation of such resources entails a three-step process: (1) elucidating the fundamental ethical values for allocation, (2) using these values to delineate priority tiers for scarce resources, and (3) implementing the prioritisation to faithfully realise the fundamental values. Myriad reports and assessments have elucidated five core substantive values for ethical allocation: maximising benefits and minimising harms, mitigating unfair (...) disadvantage, equal moral concern, reciprocity, and instrumental value. These values are universal. None of the values are sufficient alone, and their relative weight and application will vary by context. In addition, there are procedural principles such as transparency, engagement, and evidence-responsiveness. Prioritising instrumental value and minimising harms during the COVID-19 pandemic led to widespread agreement on priority tiers to include health-care workers, first responders, people living in congregate housing, and people with an increased risk of death, such as older adults and individuals with medical conditions. However, the pandemic also revealed problems with the implementation of these values and priority tiers, such as allocation on the basis of population rather than COVID-19 burden, and passive allocation that exacerbated disparities by requiring recipients to spend time booking and travelling to appointments. This ethical framework should be the starting point for the allocation of scarce medical resources in future pandemics and other public health conditions. For instance, allocation of the new malaria vaccine among sub-Saharan African countries should be based not on reciprocity to countries that participated in research, but on maximally reducing serious illness and deaths, especially among infants and children. (shrink)

In his insightful book, Trust in a Polarized Age, Kevin Vallier (2021) convincingly shows that the legitimacy and sustainability of liberal democratic institutions are dependent upon the maintenance of social and institutional trust. This insight, I believe, has value beyond the illustrious halls of post-Rawlsian, post-Gausian thought. Indeed, while I remain skeptical towards some of the premises of public reason liberalism, I am convinced that any liberal democratic political philosopher who takes the trust literature seriously and who has made their (...) (pragmatic or principled) peace with redistribution has good reasons to sympathize with the general outlines of the institutional palette that emerges out of his book. In this article, I will take for granted Vallier’s assumption that the erosion of social and institutional trust is a serious problem. This motivates investigating the trust-bearing attributes of the redistributive welfare state and the “principle of social insurance” that underpins it. I reconstruct and critically analyse Vallier’s case for a liberal democratic welfare state. I show that he makes a convincing public reason argument for universal social insurance but proceeds too hastily to exclude the principle of unconditionality from consideration. The rest of my paper consists of defending this claim by presenting two kinds of arguments— empirical and theoretical—that I think public reason liberals like Vallier, according to their own commitments, should be motivated to incorporate into their comprehensive discussion of the public justifications for and against basic income. They will show that Universal Basic Income (UBI), although it remains contentious, has some features that could appeal to a diverse citizenry, and thus tilt the balance of public reason judgments towards UBI. (shrink)

This book shows how collective pensions can be justified as a realization of reciprocity. Through the transfer of income from the middle to the later years of our lives, pensions provide a solution to the problem we would otherwise face of living so long that we find ourselves lacking sufficient resources to sustain ourselves and prosper throughout retirement. This solution is realized through the continual transfer of the fruits of the labour of those who are relatively young, healthy, and able-bodied (...) to those who are elderly, no longer in work, and often infirm, in a manner that involves cooperation over the life cycles of overlapping generations. Should these transfers be conceived and defended as the redistribution of resources between distinct individuals to eliminate unchosen misfortune? Or should they be conceived and defended as a form of cooperation between persons which is to the expected benefit of each? On this latter understanding, which the book adopts, a failure to provide pensions collectively would be condemned in large part as irrational because inefficient and wasteful, rather than being condemned as a breach of a duty to alleviate the unchosen misfortune of those who are known to be badly off. Here we have a reciprocity-based defence of pensions as constituting fair terms of social cooperation for mutual advantage. (shrink)