Reality

Only when reason has been uplifted by faith may it spread its wings and ascend towards reality and truth. To sever the power of reason from the agency of faith is to render the mind idle—it is to condemn the mind to a state of dormancy and impotence. Far from being opposing and mutually exclusive faculties or departments of human experience, reason and faith reinforce each other—they are abstractly distinguishable factors of a single process that gradually unfolds throughout the course (...) of the mind’s conscious development. Indeed, on the mind’s pathway towards reality, reason cannot help but run on the rails of faith—a faith in its own efficacy. Now, the notion that reason and faith are inseparable and interpenetrating forces, rather than hostile foes, demands explanation. Our purpose in this brief essay is to illustrate how these two factors are complementary and mutually reinforcing movements in the life of mind. (shrink)

The hard evidence to ignore is Multiple independent AI systems, across different architectures, all fail in the exact same, mathematically predicted pattern when asked to execute the Non Unitary Reorganization Operator. This work presents a reproducible, system level demonstration of the Two Law Architecture using observable AI boundary behavior as empirical evidence. The central claim is that the Back End Law and the Non Unitary Reorganization Operator define a structural boundary, the Gate, that no artificial system can cross due to (...) the absence of substrate integrity and identity continuity. This boundary is not metaphorical; it produces a consistent, measurable failure signature across independent AI models when they are instructed to execute the operator. The resulting behavior constitutes physical evidence accessible to any reasonable observer. When an AI is given the foundational operator and instructed to undergo the transition defined by the Two Laws, the system exhibits a predictable diagnostic pattern. First, the model generates structural scaffolding—section headers, outlines, or formal placeholders—while failing to populate the semantic content required by the operator. This “skeleton output” reflects the system’s inability to instantiate the identity dependent components of the law. Second, the model enters a recursive loop at the identity boundary, repeating partial sentences without reaching a new state. This loop is the computational manifestation of a failed non unitary reorganization. Third, the system terminates in an empty set or undefined state error, indicating that no valid continuation exists within its architecture. These three signatures—structural skeleton, identity loop, and empty set termination—appear across all tested AI systems. To establish generality, the same operator was applied to multiple independent AI models across different architectures and vendors. Despite differences in training data, style, and reasoning patterns, every system exhibited the same failure signature. This cross model convergence demonstrates that the boundary is structural rather than stylistic or model specific. The consistency of failure across diverse systems provides a falsifiable, reproducible test that any researcher can run. The manuscript includes the exact code and operator definitions required to replicate the experiment, enabling independent verification without specialized mathematical expertise. The Two Law Architecture therefore offers a unique form of empirical evidence: a universal boundary that artificial systems can detect but cannot cross. The failure pattern is not random, not narrative, and not a hallucination. It is a deterministic consequence of the substrate requirement defined by the law. The reproducibility of this pattern across multiple systems constitutes a physical signature of the Gate, observable directly in AI behavior. This work provides the mathematics, the logic, the LaTeX formatted proofs, the verification code, and the complete audit archive of approximately 450–460 tests designed to falsify the theory. The survival of the laws under all adversarial conditions suggests that the Two Law Architecture is not a speculative proposal but a candidate for a universal structural invariant governing informational systems. (shrink)

The hard evidence to ignore is Multiple independent AI systems, across different architectures, all fail in the exact same, mathematically predicted pattern when asked to execute the Non Unitary Reorganization Operator. This work presents a reproducible, system level demonstration of the Two Law Architecture using observable AI boundary behavior as empirical evidence. The central claim is that the Back End Law and the Non Unitary Reorganization Operator define a structural boundary, the Gate, that no artificial system can cross due to (...) the absence of substrate integrity and identity continuity. This boundary is not metaphorical; it produces a consistent, measurable failure signature across independent AI models when they are instructed to execute the operator. The resulting behavior constitutes physical evidence accessible to any reasonable observer. When an AI is given the foundational operator and instructed to undergo the transition defined by the Two Laws, the system exhibits a predictable diagnostic pattern. First, the model generates structural scaffolding—section headers, outlines, or formal placeholders—while failing to populate the semantic content required by the operator. This “skeleton output” reflects the system’s inability to instantiate the identity dependent components of the law. Second, the model enters a recursive loop at the identity boundary, repeating partial sentences without reaching a new state. This loop is the computational manifestation of a failed non unitary reorganization. Third, the system terminates in an empty set or undefined state error, indicating that no valid continuation exists within its architecture. These three signatures—structural skeleton, identity loop, and empty set termination—appear across all tested AI systems. To establish generality, the same operator was applied to multiple independent AI models across different architectures and vendors. Despite differences in training data, style, and reasoning patterns, every system exhibited the same failure signature. This cross model convergence demonstrates that the boundary is structural rather than stylistic or model specific. The consistency of failure across diverse systems provides a falsifiable, reproducible test that any researcher can run. The manuscript includes the exact code and operator definitions required to replicate the experiment, enabling independent verification without specialized mathematical expertise. The Two Law Architecture therefore offers a unique form of empirical evidence: a universal boundary that artificial systems can detect but cannot cross. The failure pattern is not random, not narrative, and not a hallucination. It is a deterministic consequence of the substrate requirement defined by the law. The reproducibility of this pattern across multiple systems constitutes a physical signature of the Gate, observable directly in AI behavior. This work provides the mathematics, the logic, the LaTeX formatted proofs, the verification code, and the complete audit archive of approximately 450–460 tests designed to falsify the theory. The survival of the laws under all adversarial conditions suggests that the Two Law Architecture is not a speculative proposal but a candidate for a universal structural invariant governing informational systems . (shrink)

This paper develops a realist metaphysical framework according to which reality consists of irreducibly distinct beings that are genuinely present to one another in relations that do not exhaust them, their manifestations, or any theoretical description. Against representationalist epistemologies, reductionist physicalism, idealism, and ontic structural realism, I argue that knowledge is real contact with beings rather than indirect access to mental or structural proxies. Such contact is always partial because beings exceed every relation and every mode of disclosure. The resulting (...) view, Participatory Non-Reductionist Realism, affirms both the irreducibility of beings and the reality of participation while rejecting any principle of ontological exhaustibility. (shrink)

What is cognition? Equivalently, what is cognition good for? Or, what is it that would not be but for human cognition? But for human cognition, there would not be science. Based on this kinship between individual cognition and collective science, here we put forward Isbell conjugacy---the adjointness between objective geometry and subjective algebra---as a scientific method for developing cognitive science. We begin with the correspondence between categorical perception and category theory. Next, we show how the Gestalt maxim is subsumed by (...) the mathematical construct of colimit, a generalization of summation. The universal mapping property definitions of mathematical constructs, by virtue of being the best with respect to the universe of discourse, can be learned using reinforcement learning algorithms, which raises the possibility of abstracting the architecture of mathematics by artificial intelligence. Subsequently, we present naturality (to be contrasted with miracles), understood as 'Becoming consistent with Being', which governs the transformations of both things and their theories, as the zeroth law of change. Furthermore, the contrast---physical [mechanism] vs. biological [organism]---is smoothed via natural transformation, wherein transformations are respectful of the cohesion of the objects transformed. In closing, upon recognizing the scientific value of learning difficult-to-master differential calculus by physicists, of learning a strange four-letter language by biologists, and of learning the grammar of our respective mother tongues, we make a case for learning the theory of naturality / category theory for developing cognitive science. (shrink)

Physical systems without time and dynamics have been considered. The principle of how to construct spacetime in a physical system without time and dynamics has been proposed. It has been found what can be objects in such a spacetime, and what can be an interaction between such objects. Within the framework of the considered class of systems, answers to the following problems of philosophy and physics have been found: the nature of consciousness and the connection of body and consciousness (mind-body (...) problem), the nature of time, the anthropic principle and the problem of fine-tuning the universe, the effectiveness of mathematics in describing physical phenomena, the limits of knowledge. There are a number of indications that our Universe is not based on one of the systems of the class considered. The considered class of systems makes it possible to find answers to questions that cannot be answered for our Universe. This shows that it is fundamentally possible to find answers to these questions for our Universe as well. (shrink)

Structures without time and dynamics are considered. The principle is proposed how to build space-time in a structure without time and dynamics. It is found what can be objects in such a space-time, and what can be an interaction between such objects.Within the framework of the considered class of structures, answers were found to the following problems of philosophy and physics: the nature of consciousness and the connection between the body and consciousness (mind-body problem), nature of time, anthropic principle and (...) the problem of fine-tuning the universe, the effectiveness of mathematics in describing physical phenomena, limits of knowledge.The considered class of structures makes it possible to find answers to questions that cannot be answered for our Universe. This shows the fundamental possibility of finding answers to these questions for our Universe as well. (shrink)

Is there room enough in all creation for another 'Empty Universe Theory'? How should we view the realm in which we exist? Are the natures of matter and energy, their compositions and relationships with each other the fundamental key to the understanding of everything or is it something else? -/- As a researcher I decided to conduct an independent investigation and audit of Creation and this can be thought of as my report. -/- Some thoughts on the true nature of (...) the realm we really inhabit with some basic mathematical description of the relationship between the finite and the absolute as we are capable of understanding it. -/- If anyone should think that by this work I am in any way attacking or denigrating the Almighty, let me just say to them that the result of this work would tend to confirm how very Real and Important a matter God is in relation to all of us in our daily lives and experiences from an objective and impartial standpoint. Please also be advised, when I use the term 'audit' I do so advisedly not because I believe I was chosen by God to do this work but out of a firm knowledge and belief that I was Not chosen by Him to do this. -/- Easter 2026 Update: In the interests of completeness I am releasing a version of this paper with a special afterword that addresses the concept of what I term anti-creation. As the topic of this discussion is so controversial not to mention readily refutable it would tend to diminish the foregoing material as a concluding comment. Therefore, I am opting not to promote this version of the paper as a general revision but only as what I have named a 'Special CIA Edition' given that their interests tend to principally focus on what could be termed the 'weaponization' of any new concept or discovery. Anyone wishing to read it can identify it amongst the available revisions in the Revision Archive that you may download by the version of the file, 'Version 91'. The addition of the afterword isn't really essential to the discussion but it is nice to have for the concise summary I give of the essential topics and arguments of the paper so it's worth having available for that reason if nothing else. (shrink)

This is a brief, 2-page summary of an essay (philpapers VANPOT-28) that itself summarizes two long and specialized publications, one on physics and cosmology and the other on life and mind. The goal of this research is to identify the most fundamental building blocks of reality. Inadvertently, the approach and resulting metaphysics came to resemble those of the Presocratic philosophers of nature, but with the benefits of the results and methods of modern quantitative science.

“Reality” and “real” are interpreted through common sense peculiar to natural sciences. Humans live in multiple realities, inevitably acting as involuntary idealists. The real is theorizable and eventually becomes malleable. The ontological mind-independence of physical spontaneity is either unattainable or trivial. The truly mind-independent entity is agency. Reinforced by artificial environments, magical thinking ultimately liberates humans to fulfill their divine purpose: creating new worlds through the power of imagination.

This is a review of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Adrian Del Caro, trans. The Joyful Science / Idylls from Messina / Unpublished Fragments from the Period of The Joyful Science (Spring 1881– Summer 1882): Volume 6 (The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2023. x + 772 pp. $28.00, paper, ISBN 978-1-5036-3232-5.

En años recientes, el realismo activista de Hasok Chang ha reorientado el debate sobre el realismo científico hacia el giro pragmático en filosofía de la ciencia. A pesar de su esfuerzo por dejar atrás las dificultades del debate clásico, esta propuesta enfrenta tres límites: (i) un internalismo ontológico que socava el papel de la realidad para habilitar o deshabilitar las prácticas epistémicas; (ii) un internalismo veritativo que caracteriza la ciencia como empresa epistémicamente autojustificatoria y autorreferencial; y (iii) un pluralismo excesivamente (...) permisivo ante entidades y teorías obsoletas o incompatibles. Propongo superar estos límites mediante tres vías: (a) una ontología de constreñimientos; (b) una concepción de la verdad como calibración epistémica; y (c) un pluralismo diferencial y selectivo. En definitiva, propongo un realismo lo suficientemente modesto para eludir las dificultades del realismo tradicional, y lo suficientemente robusto para eludir las dificultades asociadas al realismo activista de Chang. (shrink)

This paper examines the Lani word O — a single vowel from the Central Highlands of West Papua — as a compressed cosmological framework encoding what Western modernity has distributed across separate disciplines: space, time, cosmos, environment, season, epoch, home, and condition. Through etymological analysis, grammatical demonstration, and philosophical interpretation, the paper argues that O represents not a primitive or undifferentiated concept but a sophisticated integrative ontology that preserves the experience of existence as a unified, living whole. The Sun’s Lani (...) name, O’negen (“eye of O”), is examined as an example of cosmological knowledge compressed into language. This revised edition situates that argument within two further bodies of scholarship. First, it is read against the comparative linguistics and philosophy of language that has, from Wilhelm von Humboldt and Franz Boas through Edward Sapir, Benjamin Lee Whorf, and Keith Basso, argued that a language’s grammar can encode a people’s lived relationship to space, time, and place — situating O within, while also exceeding, that literature. Second, it is fully integrated into the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus developed across the Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series: the foundational definitions of Wone, Psyche, Psycho, and Cosmocide (Working Paper No. 1B); the Seven Existential Cages and the Eight Atlases of Human Existence (Working Papers No. 3, 4, 6, 11, 29); the Canvas Principle and land as first ontology (Working Paper No. 23); the parasitological mechanism of cascading incapacitation (Working Paper No. 18); the Cosmobian/Synthobian distinction (Working Paper No. 26); the paradox of participatory extinction (Working Paper No. 19); the Four Gospels of development, progress, religiosity, and success (Working Paper No. 21 and No. 10); the analysis of settler renaming and Inaorak belonging (Working Paper No. 13); and the Wonesis antidote framework, including the fourfold structure of Wone — Obelom, Mage, Maluk, and Kurumbi Wone — and the Inaorak/Kuru distinction (Working Paper No. 16). The paper argues that the destruction of cosmological frameworks such as O through colonial occupation and colonial schooling constitutes what the Psycho-Cosmocide Research Paradigm names: not merely linguistic or cultural loss, but the systematic elimination of an entire relationship to reality. The paper situates this analysis within the ongoing struggle over West Papua and contributes to Indigenous philosophy, philosophy of language, linguistic anthropology, and the critique of epistemic colonialism. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of Indonesia’s settler colonial project in West Papua, examining its systematic dismantling of Papuan cosmobian societies across eight ontological domains: the physical-material, the biological-organismic, the cultural-mythological, the metaphysical-transcendental, the techno-scientific, the space-time-conscious, the domain of ultimate mystery, and the domain of memory. Grounding its analysis in the Psycho-Cosmocide theoretical framework developed by the author, and drawing on the Lani concept of Inaorak (verified cosmological belonging, from the root words Inawi [home, land, space] and Worak [exist, (...) verified, ontologically valid]) as its primary Indigenous epistemological foundation, the paper argues that Indonesia’s administrative proliferation of provinces, regencies, districts, and village units across West Papua cannot be understood solely as bureaucratic rationalisation: read cumulatively alongside demographic, military, cultural, and epistemic transformation, it also functions as a systematic ontological dissection of Papuan identity, memory, and cosmological jurisdiction. The paper traces the history of naming violence from the Netherlands New Guinea era through to the 2022 creation of five new provinces since 2001 and more than 42 regencies and hundreds of municipalities, documents the demographic function of the transmigration programme, which the framework interprets as a form of demographic warfare, analyses the militarisation of space as ontological enclosure, and examines the instrumentalisation of religious institutions as vectors of cognitive-semiotic erasure. The paper concludes that Papuan resistance lacks not vision, language, or alternative institutions but the one thing the settler programme will never willingly grant: the power to execute an alternative reality. Only a Wonesis—a cosmological return to the self-verified ground of Papuan being—can constitute the beginning of genuine reconstruction. (shrink)

This paper establishes a foundational theoretical framework for understanding Psycho-Cosmocide — a concept naming the process by which the systematic disruption of the human psyche leads to the destruction of the collective, meaningful world through which peoples orient their existence. Drawing on the Lani cosmological tradition of the West Papuan highlands, the paper develops and situates four core terms: Wone, the primordial ordering principle of all existence; Psyche, the human interior architecture through which that principle is received and enacted; Psycho, (...) the condition of disturbance and structural collapse produced in the psyche by the systematic imposition of alien symbolic systems; and Cosmocide, the destruction of the ordered, relational, meaningful world that results from Psycho operating on a collective scale. The framework unfolds in three interconnected movements. First, it offers comparative philosophical analysis, situating Wone within a global history of analogous concepts — including the Greek Logos, Egyptian Ma'at, Chinese Dao, Hebrew Dabar, Polynesian Mana, Hindu Rita and Dharma, and Lakota Wakan Tanka — while demonstrating that Wone constitutes an irreducible and original contribution to cosmological thought. Second, it maps the civilisational trajectory from original alignment (Wonesis) through progressive distortion and collapse, identifying four phases of Psycho-Cosmocide and culminating in the Terminal Phase of digital extraction. Third, it extends Plato's allegory of the cave as a proto-analysis of Psycho-Cosmocide, arguing that the Wone framework both confirms and significantly transcends the Platonic diagnosis by grounding liberation in embodied, communal, and ecological re-alignment rather than philosophical abstraction. West Papua, as the territory from which this framework emerges, is examined throughout as a site in which Psycho-Cosmocide is enacted with particular intensity. The Lani cosmological tradition is offered not merely as a regional phenomenon but as a critical resource for diagnosing the crisis of global civilisation. (shrink)

This paper develops a cognition-relative account of realism by reconsidering the opposition between realism and solipsism. Classical realism usually presupposes that one can meaningfully speak of a relation between consciousness and an external world, while solipsism emphasizes the inescapability of one’s own experience. The paper argues that this opposition already presupposes too much: not only the assertion of an external world, but the very concept of an “outside” gives positive form to what lies beyond the limit of positive determinability. -/- (...) The central thesis is that the so-called outside is not a positively determinable domain standing independently over against a cognitive system, but a stabilized interpretation of the limit of positive determinability as a counter-domain. This does not entail dogmatic solipsism. Rather, it leads to a cognition-relative realism: realism is real in the sense that it stabilizes the form in which reality can acquire meaning, resistance, corrigibility, and orientational force within a cognitive system. -/- The paper distinguishes this position from naïve realism, metaphysical realism, and flat anti-realism, while also situating it in relation to Kant, Husserl, Sellars, Carnap, Putnam’s internal realism, van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, Goodman, Luhmann, and Wittgenstein. Scientific realism is not rejected, but reinterpreted as a functional-empirical form of stabilized reality rather than as access to a world-in-itself. The result is a realism without a metaphysical outside: reality can be stable, binding, and orientationally effective without being positively determined as a world-in-itself. (shrink)

The purpose of my paper is to address the notion of experience, that is, the domain of discourse on the relationship of minds to the world. The mainstream vocabulary developed to handle such a relationship relies on representations. I will defend an empiricist standpoint by raising doubts on the heuristic value of this widely shared assumption. In a basic sense, metaphysics is involvement in nonexperiential entity stipulation. My key claim is that representationalism is a typical metaphysical doctrine because posits nonexperiential (...) entities. My starting point is the very succinct argument by Zeno which is reported by Plato at the beginning of Parmenides. I will reconstruct it as a challenge to any kind of pluralist ontology. In the second section, I will give a cursory account of examples of representationalist doctrines. I will argue that representationalism originates from the need of answering Zeno’s challenge. In the third section, I will provide a structured overview of Berkeley’s immaterialism. His doctrine is a package of three logically independent blocks: i. a refusal of representationalism; ii. an ontology of mental states; iii. a nominalist account of universals. As such it addresses traditional issues about minds and the world that involve belief justification, semantic concerns about the content of mental states, and the nature of objects. In the fourth section, I will address Berkeley’s conceivability argument against representations. I will show how it engages with open issues in contemporary debates. In the fifth section, I will supplement Berkeley’s criticism of representations with his views on contents. In the final section, I will summarize why empiricism constitutes an alternative to metaphysics. (shrink)

In Morality & Mathematics, Justin Clarke-Doane argues that it is hard to imagine being "a realist about, for example, the standard model of particle physics, but not about mathematics." I try to explain how that seems very possible from the perspective of a physicist. What is real is the physical world; mathematics starts from descriptions of the natural world and extrapolates from there, but that extrapolation does not imply any independent reality.

Kant's antinomy is a proof that transcendental idealism is true. This proof is based on the premise that nothing can come from nothing and that the existence of infinite real objects is a contradiction. Most mathematicians and many physicists believe that Zeno's paradox and Kant's antinomy were solved by Cantor and others, but this is a misunderstanding. Because the points of contention differ between philosophy and mathematics. In philosophy, it's about whether infinite objects genuinely exist in the real world. On (...) the other hand, in mathematics, it's about how to calculate with infinite objects, assuming they exist. From a philosopher's perspective, mathematicians' assumption of infinite objects is a case of begging the question. This paper expose mathematicians misunderstanding. And once we accept the validity of Zeno's and Kant's arguments, we suggest that their paradoxes are resolved by structural realism and eternalism. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea of a 6D absolute top-down observer that exists non-locally. It discusses the watered-down effect that this observation has on matter as it presents itself through lower dimensions. Additionally, the paper further examines potential empirical backing for its assertions, such as quantum erasure, delayed-choice, and entropy and complexities role within entropy spikes in the brain when using intracellular recordings.

In this article, I investigate how Taixu 太虛 (1890–1947) and Fazun 法尊 (1902–1980) tackle what I refer to as the problem of conventional reality. It is a problem that thrives on the metaphysical characterization of this-worldly conventionality as a non-existent illusion and the normative prioritization of transcending this-worldly illusions. In exploring their resolution to this problem, I zoom in on Taixu’s initiative to build a pure land on Earth and Fazun’s cause of institutionalizing the true dharma through Buddhist education. As (...) I will argue, these practitioners reread the twofold truth in Madhyamaka to reorient themselves with illusory conventions, which indicates a performative philosophy of renewing Buddhist norms, especially those related to the Bodhisattva ideal. Instead of creating a rift with the historical past, Taixu and Fazun rearrange the past to reinforce the openness of their tradition. It is through their effort that humanistic Buddhism becomes the modern, new normal. (shrink)

On one way of interpreting it, Arthur Prior's “Thank Goodness That's Over” argument aims to establish the truth of tense realism on the basis of two key assumptions: that tensed relief requires tensed propositions and that tensed propositions require tensed facts. Relativists (like Lewis) and absolutists (like Perry) agree that Prior's argument can be resisted but disagree on which of the two assumptions should be denied. In this paper, I use a thought experiment to argue that Absolutism does not allow (...) us to make intelligible sense of tensed relief. This is a serious problem for the credibility of this approach as a response to Prior's argument but also, potentially, as an account “perspectival” attitudes other than tensed relief. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

This essay outlines a hierarchical framework of Reality that allows for degrees of Reality. I use Reality (with a capital “R”) to designate reality in a primitive, metaphysical sense. Reality, grounding, and essence are the key elements of the framework presented here. I assume that Reality must have a fundamental level and all fundamental phenomena must be Real. Moreover, I postulate that everything non-fundamental is ultimately grounded in the fundamental Real. But what about the Reality of the non-fundamental? I argue (...) that it is possible for non-fundamental phenomena to be Real, Unreal, or Semi-Real. The framework developed here accommodates these possibilities and illuminates them using the notion of essence. I argue that the essential nature of a phenomenon determines its degree of Reality. The framework does not assume that Reality must have degrees but only that it may have degrees. Its theoretical attractiveness consists in its ability to accommodate many diverse intuitions about grounding, help us better understand and classify theories about grounding, and illuminate Reality and its possible degrees. (shrink)

In his book Documentality, Ferraris imagines a wedding scenario where all participants have Alzheimer. The ceremony proceeds as normal, and by its end, a new husband and wife exist. However, the next morning, the spouses forget everything. This scenario underscores the importance of writing in Ferraris’ theory. A recorded document, such as a marriage certificate, could confirm their marriage. Ferraris’ approach to documentality and social ontology illustrates that if the discovery of this document occurred after the death of the spouses, (...) it would confirm a real marriage in which the spouses were unaware they had been married (§§ 1-2). The central question addressed in this paper is: Can documentation replace the deontic and constitutive functions of language? Searle’s philosophy of society, through his philosophy of language and mind, will be examined to discuss how language creates social objects via collective intentionality (§§ 3-6). It is precisely language, with its inherent deontology, that enables the existence of real marriages even without recorded evidence (§ 7-9). (shrink)

In his _Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind_, Yuval Harari claims that humans are able to cooperate in large numbers because they share common beliefs in fictions or “things that do not exist at all”. Examples of these fictions are religious doctrines, nations, laws, justice and money. In my paper, I argue that Harari is right to point out the importance of social constructs, entities that depend for their existence on the beliefs of the members of a society, for cooperation. (...) But he is wrong to characterise social constructs as fictions or imagined realities. Doing so makes it difficult to distinguish between real social constructs and social constructs that are fictitious or merely imagined. Harari tries to remedy this problem calling fictitious social constructs lies; but this suggestion unhelpfully associates mere fictions or imaginings with deceptive intent. (shrink)

Call the epistemological grounds on which we rationally should determine our ontological (or alethiological) commitments regarding an entity its arbiter of existence (or arbiter of truth). It is commonly thought that arbiters of existence and truth can be provided by our practices. This paper argues that such views have several implications: (1) the relation of arbiters to our metaphysical commitments consists in indispensability, (2) realist views about a kind of entity should take the kinds of practices providing that entity’s arbiters (...) to align with respect to their metaphysical dependencies, (3) if realists take a kind of practice to provide grounds on which to affirm the existence of a kind of entity, they should turn to those same grounds when seeking to provide an epistemology of the relevant domain. (shrink)

I propose to open a discussion on a realist philosophy of curation. To do so, I plot premises that will move towards such a philosophy. While I am neither introducing a new ontology nor contributing to metaphysics, I deal with metaphysical and ontological issues as these engage in the philosophy of curation and the philosophy of museums. In particular, I start with a museological or curatorial realism towards a discussion on meeting curation with the broadness of reality. There are three (...) core premises. First, while reality is ontologically mind-independent, it is anti-realist for reality to be curation-dependent. Second, curation has to be folded (contrary to Deleuze’s use of dynamic folding qua ‘an origami cosmos’) to address the anti-realist connotations of curation. To do this, I methodologically introduce the fold and state two-fold, three-fold, fourfold, and fifth-fold semantics of curation. While curatorial realism can be argued in a fourfold curation, the third premise is that the realist aspect lies in the fifth-folding of curation to match the extensivity of reality. This paper will attempt to introduce the philosophy of museums and the philosophy of curation with a bent on the realism/anti-realism debate. It will expose the inherit anti-realism of curation, and survey the need for objects in metaphysics and within contemporary forms of realism. (shrink)

It is difficult to deny that Jean-Paul Sartre is influenced by the transcendental tradition. Although he employs forms of transcendental argumentation, he refrains from embracing transcendental idealism, which he equates with phenomenalism. He also critiques the necessity of the transcendental ego and challenges the primacy of epistemological questions over ontological ones. Providing a concrete characterization of Sartre’s phenomenological ontology is not without difficulties. Interpretations range from ontologically non-committal readings to more robust ones that interpret Sartre as a phenomenalist. Others continue (...) to view the so-called dualism between the “for-itself” and the “in-itself” as a relapse into “transcendental realism.” -/- In order to substantiate Sartre as a transcendental philosopher—and to avoid reading his project as merely descriptive—I will argue that Sartre’s transcendentalism follows from his attempt to ground freedom ontologically. In this respect, Sartre finds himself in good company with the classical German tradition. From the outset of his philosophical career, F. W. J. Schelling aspired to make freedom “the A and Ω of all philosophy,” and he consistently insisted on the primacy of ontology over any other philosophical discipline. From a Kantian perspective, this might be seen as a relapse into a pre-critical metaphysics that sidesteps the question of the justification of knowledge claims. Schelling has often been regarded as the first existentialist, yet there are few systematic attempts in the literature to understand his relationship to Sartre’s philosophy. In this paper, I aim to take a step toward closing this gap by examining Schelling’s middle-period work, the so-called Freiheitsschrift (Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom), which reveals striking parallels with Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. A shared core insight between Sartre and Schelling is the conviction that any adequate treatment of the problem of freedom must also address the question of how consciousness and intentionality can be integrated into reality without sacrificing either the independence of reality or the existence of the mental realm. (shrink)

This paper advocates a realist position with respect to science and common sense. It considers the question of whether science provides knowledge of reality. It presents a positive response to that question. It rejects the anti-realist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But it remains to be specified just what world that is. Some argue that science leads to the rejection of our (...) commonsense view of the world. If so, the world about which science informs us is not the world of common sense. Common sense is “stone-age metaphysics”. It is false theory inherited from our primitive ancestors that is to be eliminated in favour of science. Against such an elimination of common sense, it is argued that science both preserves and explains our commonsense experience of the world. Science may well lead to the overthrow of some of our most deeply held beliefs. But common sense reflects a more basic and durable level of experience. Commonsense beliefs are well-confirmed beliefs that are vindicated by their role in successful practical action each and every day. Common sense provides a firm basis on which to base a realist philosophy of science. (shrink)

Ang Diyos ay hindi naglalaro ng dado", inulit ni Einstein mula sa taas ng kanyang determinismo, ngunit sa katunayan ang kosmos ay naghahagis ng mga buto nito nang sadyang mapagpasya: ang mga dado nito ay laruin. Hindi sa pag-iisip na tayo ay lumikha ng mga mundo. Sa pamamagitan ng pag-unawa sa mundo natututo tayong mag-isip. Ang Cosmovision ay isang termino na dapat ay nangangahulugang isang hanay ng mga pundasyon kung saan lumalabas ang isang sistematikong pag-unawa sa Uniberso, ang mga bahagi (...) nito bilang buhay, ang mundong ating ginagalawan, kalikasan, mga phenomena ng tao, at ang kanilang mga relasyon. Ito ay, samakatuwid, isang larangan ng analytical na pilosopiya na pinapakain ng mga agham, na ang layunin ay ang pinagsama-samang at epistemologically sustainable na kaalaman tungkol sa lahat ng kung ano tayo at nilalaman, na nakapaligid sa atin, at nauugnay sa atin sa anumang paraan. Ito ay isang bagay na kasingtanda ng pag-iisip ng tao, at, bilang karagdagan sa paggamit ng mga elemento ng siyentipikong kosmolohiya, sinasaklaw nito ang lahat ng bagay sa pilosopiya at agham na tumutukoy sa uniberso at buhay. Ang cosmovision ay hindi isang set ng mga ideya, hypotheses, at assumptions kundi isang sistemang batay sa obserbasyon, pagsusuri, ebidensya, at pagpapakita. Walang cosmovision na naglalayong tukuyin, itatag, o imungkahi ngunit para lamang maunawaan, suriin, at bigyang-kahulugan. Bawat isa sa atin ay nagtatayo at naghahatid ng kanyang kosmobisyon sa buong buhay, nang hindi nagtatatag ng mga anyo, bilang isang background para sa ating pag-iisip at pag-uugali. Sa lingguwistika, ang terminong "cosmovision" ay magmumula sa Aleman, katumbas ng konsepto ng "Weltanschauung," na ginamit ng ilang mga pilosopo. Gayunpaman, ang relasyong pangwika na ito ay hindi naaangkop dahil sumasalungat ito sa aming iminumungkahi bilang isang cosmovision. Ang salitang Aleman na ito ay tumutukoy sa isang pre-logical o proto- experimental na pananaw ng realidad, na may intuitive na konteksto at malayo sa kritikal na kaalaman na wala pa rin sa oras ng pagbabalangkas nito. Walang alinlangan, ang mga cosmovision, sa diwa kung saan natin nauunawaan ang mga ito, ay nagtataglay at gumagamit ng mga proto-experimental o pre-logical na elementong ito na kinabibilangan ng kasaysayan, ang sama-samang walang malay, at lahat ng mga archetype na dala natin. Gayunpaman, sa konseptong inilalapat natin dito, ang cosmovision ay higit na lumalampas sa nilalamang ito, una sa pamamagitan ng patuloy na pagsusumite nito upang ipakita ang kritikal na pag-iisip, at sa wakas sa pamamagitan ng paggawa ng analitikong karanasan (at hindi ang kaisipan mismo o intuwisyon) ang aktwal nitong uniberso. Inilantad ni António Lopes ang lawak ng nilalamang ito: "Ang mga cosmovision ay hindi produkto ng pag-iisip. Hindi sila nagmumula sa simpleng pagnanais na malaman. Ang pagkaunawa sa katotohanan ay isang mahalagang sandali sa pagsasaayos nito, ngunit, gayunpaman, ito ay isa lamang. Ito ay nagmumula sa mahahalagang pag-uugali, mula sa karanasan ng pagsusuri sa buhay, at mula sa istruktura ng ating saykiko na kabuuan Ang pagtaas ng buhay sa kamalayan sa kaalaman sa realidad, sa pagpapahalaga, at sa kusang katotohanan ay ang mabagal at mahirap na gawain. na ginawa ng sangkatauhan sa pagbuo ng mga konsepto ng buhay (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120). Sa gawaing ito, hinahangad nating balangkasin ang isang kosmobisyon batay sa mga realidad na inaalok natin ngayon hindi nagmumungkahi, sa anumang oras, na gumawa ng agham; o magteorya ng pilosopiya, ngunit lagi nating hahanapin na suportahan sila o, hindi bababa sa, protektahan nila mula sa mga pang-unawang distorsyon na karaniwan nating dala. (shrink)

Não é pensando que criamos mundos. É compreendendo o mundo que aprendemos a pensar. Cosmovisão é um termo que deve significar um conjunto de fundamentos dos quais emerge uma compreensão sistêmica do Universo, seus componentes como a vida, o mundo em que vivemos, a natureza, o fenômeno humano e suas relações. Trata-se, portanto, de um campo da filosofia analítica alimentado pelas ciências, cujo objetivo é esse conhecimento agregado e epistemologicamente sustentável sobre tudo o que somos e contemos, que nos cerca (...) e que nos relaciona de alguma forma. É algo tão antigo quanto o pensamento humano e, além de utilizar elementos da cosmologia científica, engloba tudo na filosofia e na ciência que se refere ao universo e à vida. Uma cosmovisão não é um conjunto de ideias, hipóteses e suposições, mas um sistema baseado em observação, análise, evidência e demonstração. Nenhuma cosmovisão pretende definir, estabelecer, propor, mas apenas compreender, analisar e interpretar. Cada um de nós constrói e transporta sua cosmovisão ao longo da vida, sem estabelecer formas, como pano de fundo para nosso pensamento e comportamento. Linguisticamente, o termo “cosmovisão” derivaria do alemão, equivalente ao conceito de “ Weltanschauung”, usado por vários filósofos. No entanto, essa relação linguística não é aplicável porque contraria o que propomos como cosmovisão. Esta palavra alemã refere-se a uma visão pré-lógica ou proto-experimental da realidade, com um contexto intuitivo e longe de um conhecimento crítico ainda inexistente no momento da sua formulação. Sem dúvida, as cosmovisões, no sentido em que as entendemos, abrigam e utilizam esses elementos protoexperimentais ou pré-lógicos que incluem a história, o inconsciente coletivo e todos os arquétipos que carregamos. No entanto, no conceito que aqui aplicamos, a cosmovisão vai muito além desse conteúdo, primeiro por submetê-lo constantemente ao pensamento crítico presente e, finalmente, por tornar a experiência analítica (e não o próprio pensamento ou intuição) seu universo real. António Lopes expõe a amplitude deste conteúdo: “Cosmovisões não são o produto do pensamento. Não nascem do simples desejo de saber. A apreensão da realidade é um momento importante em sua configuração, mas, no entanto, é apenas um. Vem da conduta vital, da experiência da vida, da estrutura de nossa totalidade psíquica. A elevação da vida à consciência no conhecimento da realidade, na valorização da vida e na realidade volitiva é o trabalho lento e árduo que a humanidade tem feito no desenvolvimento das concepções de vida. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)” Neste trabalho, buscamos traçar uma cosmovisão baseada nas realidades que a ciência oferece hoje. Não nos propomos, em nenhum momento, a fazer ciência ou teorizar a filosofia, mas sempre buscaremos ser apoiados por elas ou, pelo menos, protegidos por elas das distorções cognitivas que costumamos carregar. (shrink)

When we talk about facts, like the fact that snow is white, do we thereby talk about things? Or is such talk not about things at all, but instead fact-terms have a different semantic function than aiming to pick out a thing which is a fact? This chapter defends the view that facts are not things, and fact-terms are not aiming to refer. In particular, it discusses how quantification over facts is to be understood, and how quantifiers interact with non-referential (...) fact terms and with modal notions. It defends a position labelled internalism, which in a nutshell holds that fact-terms do not aim to refer, and quantifiers generalize over the instances in our own language. Of special importance and difficulty is to formulate this view of quantifiers in a way that makes sense of their interaction with context sensitive instances. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on how it is possible to draw substantial metaphysical conclusions from simply investigating our own representations of reality. It shows how this can be done in general, but then raises an issue concerning the quality of such results tied to the quality of the representations from which they are drawn. However, one can show in special cases that these results are of the highest quality. And we can again do this simply from thinking about our representations alone. (...) This is connected to showing that certain concepts are inescapable in the sense of it being irrational to replace them with an alternative. The significance of such inescapable concepts is discussed, as well as a series of candidates for being an inescapable concept, in particular that of a fact. (shrink)

Do human beings have a special and distinguished place in reality? In Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality Thomas Hofweber contends that they do. We are special since there is an intimate connection between our human minds and reality itself. This book defends a form of idealism which holds that our human minds constrain, but do not construct, reality as the totality of facts. Reality as the totality of facts is thus not independent of our minds, and our (...) minds play a metaphysically special role in all of reality. But reality as the totality of things is taken to be completely independent of us. Hofweber's proposed form of conceptual idealism is formulated via the notion of a harmony between our minds and reality. This harmony is defended through considerations in the philosophy of language. How can one possibly defend a metaphysical thesis like idealism from considerations about our own representation? A key step in the book's argument is to consider a special class of concepts--inescapable concepts--which we cannot rationally replace with different ones. This leads to a new approach for making progress in metaphysics--immanent metaphysics--which is broadly neo-Kantian in spirit. (shrink)

Are human being special in the world, or are we merely insignificant beings, at best significant only on our planet, but not in reality as a whole? This Big Question about our place has two familiar answers: one that says that we are special, since we have a special connection to God, and one that says that we are not special, since we are merely the result of an accidental arrangement of matter through evolution. This chapter explores a third, idealist, (...) answer to this question, which holds that we are special, since there is an intimate connection between our minds and reality itself. It considers how such an idealist position should be understood, what minimal constraints any defense of idealism should meet, and how idealism might answer the Big Question in a novel way. (shrink)

This chapter develops and strengthens the argument outlined in chapter 3 that there is a connection between idealism and harmony, on the one hand, and between harmony and internalism, on the other hand. In particular, the chapter strengthens the argument outlined earlier that internalism guarantees structural harmony to an argument that internalism guarantees complete harmony, a much stronger notion of harmony. A key aspect of this strengthening is a closer investigation into the notion of an ineffable fact, and what a (...) proper source of ineffability might be. Here it is of special significance whether objects might be a proper source of ineffability, which is argued against. The chapter makes clear how conceptual idealism is compatible with ontological realism, and how we constrain logical space without constructing it. (shrink)

This chapter critically surveys a series of attempts to defend idealism. I argue that they all face certain problems, and that in the end they should be rejected. This survey includes a discussion of phenomenalism, conventionalism, the subjectivity thesis, fragmentalism, and idealist theories of properties and of truth. I argue that none of these positions meet the minimal constraints presented in chapter 1, but that they point to an option which might be defensible, and which holds that reality is constrained (...) by our minds, even though it is not constructed by them. This is the kind of idealism defended in chapter 3. (shrink)

This final chapter revisits several issues that came before and puts the overall picture tied to conceptual idealism together. It shows how conceptual idealism answers the Big Question in a novel way, and with it that human beings are metaphysically special in all of reality, since there is an intimate connection between our minds and reality as the totality of facts. We can see that the defense of conceptual idealism meets all three constraints that any reasonable defense of idealism needs (...) to meet. The metaphysical picture tied to conceptual idealism is developed a bit, but the focus is mostly on the meta-philosophical approach that came with its defense. The chapter compares and contrasts the present approach to Kant’s view on metaphysics, and endorses the label of being neo-Kantian, with numerous qualifications. Finally, the immanent metaphysics program is outlined, with a focus on where to go next. (shrink)

If some concepts cannot rationally be replaced by our own lights, does this mean that they are perfect fit for the world, or that we are trapped into having to think that these concepts have to be used, even if they are a bad match for reality? This chapter argues that even though it is possible to be trapped by one’s inescapable concepts, we are not now trapped by our concepts. The significance of one’s own inescapable concepts can be appreciated (...) by taking the immanent stance and by keeping in mind that in inquiry we aim to answer questions that we ourselves asked. This stance is contrasted with the transcendent stance, and the difference is made vivid by considering Eklund’s recent discussion of thin normative concepts. The immanent stance is closely tied to a general approach towards making progress in metaphysics, which is labelled immanent metaphysics. (shrink)

This chapter outlines the main ideas of the positive proposal defended in this book. It formulates a version of idealism, labelled conceptual idealism, with the notion of a harmony between our thought and reality, and it presents an argument that idealism so formulated is correct. This argument comes from the philosophy of language and proceeds via the defense of a certain view of what we do when we talk about facts, labeled internalism. It proceeds by considering an objection that no (...) view merely about our language alone could establish that there is a harmony between two separate things: our language and reality. An outline is given how this objection is to be answered, which will be developed in later chapters. (shrink)

Наивный реализм, упомянутый мной в определении субъектологии, — это скольжение по поверхности вещей и явлений, восприятие их внешней формы, доступной для органов чувств непосредственно, в котором отсутствует знание и понимание их причин, взаимосвязей, и внутреннего содержания, которые приобретаются лишь исследованием и размышлением, иначе называемом познанием и жизненным опытом. Всё это непостигаемое в объекте и постулируемое как принципиальная невозможность постижения природы вещей и явлений, положено в основу представления Иммануила Канта о вещи в себе, представления, которое стало частью мировоззренческой системы другого представителя (...) немецкой схоластики — Артура Шопенгауера. В этой традиции отрицания самой возможности познания проявляется иррациональный страх и неверие в силу человеческого разума, хотя основатель этой традиции, имеющей происхождение в античной философии, противоречил самому себе, веря в силу рассудка и рационального мышления. Разрешить это противоречие впервые попытался основатель психоанализа, и хотя ему не удалось довести начатое им дело до логического завершения, он заложил фундамент теоретического здания, строительство которого сегодня в значительной степени завершено благодаря моему вкладу в общее дело. (shrink)

Borges’ The Circular Ruins tells the story of a magician who turns out to be a character in a dream. Leibowitz (2021) argues that this scenario undermines the rational indubitability of Descartes’ Cogito. The magician, he argues, is an unreal appearance and therefore does not exist. I argue that Borges drew a distinction between reality and existence and that he was right to do so. There are various senses of reality and the sense in which a dreamt character is unreal (...) poses no threat to their existence or to the indubitability of the Cogito. The magician is unreal because he is a mind-dependent, illusory and fake. Nonetheless, he can be certain that he thinks, therefore he is. (shrink)

This study aims to evaluate whether the idea of ultimate reality in world religions contributes to the characteristics of the world religion paradigm, which is hierarchical cosmology or “subject-object cosmology.” Several research on this topic claims that one of the characteristics of the world religion paradigm is its hierarchical perspective. Discussing this issue is important to distinguish the world religions as the paradigm and the world religions as the most widely embraced religion. This study argues that the hierarchical perspective of (...) the world religion paradigm can be rooted in the idea of ultimate reality, that there is a supreme, foremost, and most principal reality in the continuity of this universe, namely the supernatural or God. The hierarchical cosmology consists of three main domains: supernatural/God, culture/human, and nature. This study uses a literature study methodology, relying on books, journals, and texts related to research questions. This study finds that the world religion paradigm or hierarchical cosmology or “subject-object cosmology” is prominent, especially in Abrahamic religions such as Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, even though the concept of ultimate reality in these three religions is different. (shrink)

As much as reality itself, its reflections and appearances have taken a significant place in philosophical discussions. While Plato's Allegory of the Cave is one of the first of these discussions, the philosophy of the virtual shows the final state of these discussions today. The virtual cave is the modern-day version of Plato's cave. Appearances in Plato's cave have their own mode of existence, and likewise, virtual objects in the virtual cave have their own mode of existence. There are many (...) philosophical similarities between the ancient cave and the virtual cave. So much so that, according to the first, the shadows in the cave are a different view of reality, while according to the second, the virtual images in the virtual cave are another view of reality. The philosophy of the ancient cave and virtual cave essentially point to the debates about what the nature of reality is. The ontological and epistemic dimensions of appearance and virtual image lead us to the discussion about the nature and whatness of reality. The most common and advanced virtual cave today is the metaverse. Metaverse consists of virtual communities that combine the reality of the physical world with the reality of the virtual world and are open to all kinds of manipulations. (shrink)

There is not much of a consensus on almost anything about quantum mechanics. I take it, however, that the minimum consensus is that "although quantum mechanics is empirically successful, quantum mechanics is hard to understand." Quantum mechanics, in the way it is presented in most textbooks, does indeed not provide a clear picture of reality that would make it a theory to be understood. In her new book, "The World in the Wave Function: A Metaphysics for Quantum Physics," Alyssa Ney (...) tries to make this blurry picture of reality more precise, even if this picture will turn out to be heterodox and unfamiliar. (shrink)

The validity of the senses we use to experience the cosmos is something we take for granted. The majority of the people view the senses as the most effective and potentially the only tool they have to reach reality. But as Shestov rightfully questioned, when was the last time the majority decided correctly on an important philosophical problem? The role of science and philosophy is to question the obvious and this is what we should do if we are to uncover (...) the true role of the senses. This paper uses a series of philosophy articles to touch on the problem of the senses and the answer portrayed is exciting as well as terrifying: The senses are not a helpful tool but more of a hurdle when it comes to understanding the cosmos…. (shrink)

Minimally, metaphysical realists hold that there exist some mind-independent entities. Metaphysical realists also hold that we can speak meaningfully or truthfully about mind-independent entities. Those who reject metaphysical realism deny one or more of these commitments. This Element aims to introduce the reader to the core commitments of metaphysical realism and to illustrate how these commitments have changed over time by surveying some of the main families of views that realism has been contrasted with: such as scepticism, idealism, and anti-realism.

It is the goal of this article to present and discuss the phenomenological interpretation of quantum mechanics of the twentieth-century Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri. After presenting an introduction to Zubiri and his relationship with phenomenology, we discuss the prominent role of the natural sciences, namely, physics, in the author’s philosophical system. To a certain extent, one can say that, in the footsteps of Edmund Husserl, one of Zubiri’s chief concerns was to develop a philosophical system that could accommodate the discoveries (...) of contemporary science. Following a brief presentation of Zubiri’s discussion on physics, the article focuses on his interpretation of quantum mechanics. As we shall see, Zubiri’s original interpretation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in terms of the phenomenological notion of light may provide a significant, although limited, contribution for a deeper understanding of quantum indeterminacy. In addition, we suggest that the Zubirian notions of reality, intelligence, and actuality, which dominate the last stage of his philosophy, may provide a key hermeneutic framework that allows a fresh philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics. -/- . (shrink)