Ethics of Virtual Reality

A virtual reality translation of Philippa Foot's original "Trolley Problem." These modules are free to download and use in the classroom and for research/x-phi purposes. -/- *Requires an Oculus Rift or HTC Vive and VR capable computer. To open the files, uncompress the downloaded .zip folder and run the executable (.exe) file.

The subject of the article is the philosophical and cultural methodology of digital "virtual reality", comparing the declarations of developers with the practical possibilities and social consequences of using such technologies. The developers presented projects of online digital content services for all five senses using special equipment (glasses, headphones, interactive gloves, joysticks, costumes, printers of smells and tastes, etc.). It was assumed that virtual reality would surpass the reliability of previous multimedia content and interactive computer games, and the persuasiveness and (...) attractiveness of traditional technical means of art and the press. Failure to fulfill these promises has led to significant losses since 2022 for leading companies developing digital virtual reality technologies Meta (recognized by the court as an extremist organization on 03/21/2022, activity is limited in the territory of the Russian Federation), Microsoft HapticLinks, Cave, AlloSphere, Teslasuit, VRealizer. There was a need to assess how and to what extent the methodology used and the predicted capabilities of digital virtual reality were correct. Philosophical and cultural analysis as a research method reveals: the developers of digital virtual reality promised the methodologically impossible, reducing human perception to the "sum" of the external "five senses" out of connection with the "self", inner sensitivity, bodily self-perceptions. A person is only partially amenable to algorithmized digital interaction; a critical barrier to digital virtuality is the socio-cultural identity of society and personality. The novelty of the results of the analysis lies in the conclusion: digital virtual reality in many respects is fundamentally inferior in effectiveness to traditional technical means of sensory and emotional impact and cognition, used both for creative and destructive purposes. In terms of creative potential, digital virtual reality is inferior to the technical means of art, science, education, upbringing, etc., and in terms of destructive capabilities, it is already used in the press and other mass communications technologies for manipulating public and individual consciousness, as well as psychotropic substances that cause addiction. National regulation of the development of digital "virtual reality" is recommended, aimed at protecting and developing the socio-cultural identity of Russian citizens and society, as well as for cognitive and educational purposes. It is recommended to limit the remote use of such developments to trusted domestic Internet services. (shrink)

This chapter provides a general overview and introduction to the law and ethics of virtual sexual assault. It offers a definition of the phenomenon and argues that there are six interesting types. It then asks and answers three questions: (i) should we criminalise virtual sexual assault? (ii) can you be held responsible for virtual sexual assault? and (iii) are there issues with 'consent' to virtual sexual activity that might make it difficult to prosecute or punish virtual sexual assault?

This chapter investigates how terrorist and extremist actors have begun to exploit immersive technologies – including virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), mixed reality (MR), and metaverse platforms – for propaganda, recruitment, training, and operational planning. Noting the early development stage of these tools and their adoption, we trace the development of immersive technologies, examine the misuse of these environments by terrorist and extremist actors, and suggest new approaches which can help prepare for emerging threats. In the first section, immersive (...) technologies are situated by tracing the emergence of scholarly and policy interest in VR/AR/MR and metaverse spaces and critically assessing whether the field has been ‘overhyped’ despite significant investment. We then outline empirical developments by examining documented cases and patterns of how terrorist and extremist actors have already engaged with VR/AR/MR and metaverse platforms. Finally, we assess plausible future misuse and examine governance challenges likely to emerge over the near-to-medium term. (shrink)

Virtual reality (VR) induces a radical psychological reorientation. Yet descriptions of this reorientation are often steeped in theoretically misleading metaphors. We offer a more measured account, grounded in both philosophy and cognitive psychology, and use it to assess the claim that VR promotes moral learning by simulating another’s perspective. This hypothesis depends on the assumption that avatar use produces experiences sufficiently similar to those of others to enable empathic growth. We reject that assumption and offer two arguments against it. Empathy (...) relevant to moral learning requires interpretive effort and contextual understanding, not just a shift in perspective. And VR’s open-ended, user-driven structure tends to reinforce prior assumptions rather than unsettle them. Still, avatar use may have a different effect on moral learning, which we call self-fragmentation. By loosening the boundaries of the self, VR may expand the range of people one is disposed to empathize with. (shrink)

Suicide is a complex act whose meanings, while sometimes tragic, vary widely. This chapter surveys the ethical landscape surrounding algorithmic methods of suicide prevention especially as it pertains to social media activity and to the moderation of online suicide communities. We begin with a typology of suicide, distinguishing between varied goals in which suicide may factor as a means. Suicides should be understood as an act with varied eliciting desires, meanings, consequences, and ethics. Further,while many suicides may be grounded on (...) irrational desire, we argue that a desire to suicide may nonetheless be rational in some cases. We then offer a survey of the attempts by social media corporations to create suicide prediction algorithms and launch interventions aimed at preventing suicide as well as an overview of the current ethical debate. We argue that the values embedded within algorithmic suicide prevention nudges are “thick” in a substantive sense and deserving of scrutiny. Given that debates about the rationality, meaning, and permissibility of suicide are common and subject to intracultural and cross-cultural differences, we maintain that the task of suicide prediction is ill-suited to algorithmic approaches. Despite an algorithm’s ability to quantify a complex phenomenon like suicide risk and its appearance of objectivity, any suicide prediction algorithm is thoroughly subjective and involves moral judgments all the way down. Any such algorithm would necessarily impose a normative stance on suicide onto its user base that is subject to reasonable intra and cross-cultural disagreement. (shrink)

This chapter argues that simulations can, in certain contexts, play a significant role in cultivating character traits. If developing virtue requires practice, we must ask whether simulations can provide experiences comparable to those in the physical world. The chapter contends that simulations – especially extended reality (XR) simulations – possess properties such as context realism and perspectival fidelity that enable them to generate virtually real experiences. Because users experience these as if they were genuinely occurring, they can meaningfully contribute to (...) moral development. After examining how XR simulations can shape both virtuous and vicious character traits, the chapter turns to the normative question of whether simulations should be designed explicitly to foster virtue. It offers practical guidelines for ethically responsible XR design and considers the moral and structural limits of what such technologies can, and should, achieve. If virtue ethics is correct, then some games should neither be played nor created. (shrink)

To create an inclusive environment means thinking about, or rethinking, its structure so as to make it as inclusive as possible for individuals who use it. Recent advances in extended reality (XR) technologies have shown tremendous promise in this respect. Blended environments, those that include physical and digital elements, are especially promising because they allow developers and users to co-create social spaces that empower users to represent themselves and others with an eye toward inclusivity. This is a paper about how (...) not to create such spaces. I will argue that the psychology of XR, especially the psychology of XR embodiment, should help us understand the limits of these technologies for enabling environments. First I will explain what XR technologies and how they enable a form of embodiment, XR embodiment. I’ll then explain the psychology of XR embodiment. XR embodiment should be taken seriously as a new possibility for the creation of selves but it has limitations. Virtual reality (VR) is often praised for its power to enhance empathy and thus to be a powerful tool for enabling environments. I argue that these claims are mistaken. While XR embodiment can be a transformative tool for identity formation, it cannot enhance empathic understanding of others. I then explore the social and legal implications of XR embodiment. If XR bodies are rightfully a component of a person’s self then if we want to create more inclusive and enabling environments we need to revisit the legal and social norms around bodies. Current laws (e.g., sexual harassment law) fail to take XR embodiment into account and thus fail to enable inclusive environments. I end the paper by suggesting that XR embodiment poses fundamental metaphysical questions about the relationship of the self to the physical body. These questions need to be addressed before enabling environments are possible. (shrink)

This article introduces the concept of virtual trespassing, a novel privacy violation enabled by photographic virtual reality (VR). Photographic VR refers to VR experiences that allow users to inhabit real captured spaces through 360° photography or video. We argue that the privacy risks posed by access in photographic VR exceed those associated with analogous forms of access in traditional 2D photography like Google Street View. Our argument extends Helen Nissenbaum’s (2004) contextual integrity theory of privacy beyond informational privacy to include (...) sensorial privacy. Contextual integrity can be violated not only through the inappropriate flow of one’s personal information, but also through inappropriate access to one’s sensorial personal space (Véliz, 2018). Photographic VR makes possible unique kinds of contextually inappropriate access to one’s sensorial personal space through its capacity to create a sense of presence, a feeling of “being there.” We draw on empirical research on presence in VR to support our argument before outlining different forms of virtual trespassing and identifying an inherent value-privacy tradeoff in photographic VR. Specifically, the same capabilities that make photographic VR valuable (presence, authenticity, and unrestricted access) also enable privacy violations. We conclude by suggesting practical privacy measures grounded in contextual integrity theory that can mitigate virtual trespassing while preserving the technology’s unique value proposition. (shrink)

This paper addresses the ethics of VR through sociohistorical contextualization. It integrates social science literature about the context of VR’s original conceptualization, which has so-far been neglected in philosophy. Situating VR in this way reveals that the context and much of the discussions surrounding it are deeply shaped by different varieties of techno-utopian ideologies. The paper distinguishes two strands of this techno-utopianism relating to VR, one being humanist and regarding VR as fostering communication and empathy, the other one being transhumanist, (...) envisioning it as enabling us to overcome human limits and scarcity. The philosophical case for these utopianisms is distilled as consisting in an ideal of immediacy and abundance. These concepts are systematically evaluated from a Hegelian perspective. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose incorporating virtual-reality-presented thought experiments (VRTEs) to enhance the quality of undergraduate courses on classic works in applied ethics. Thought experiments are a key method in applied ethics for eliciting intuitions as evidence for or against theories. However, our interviews and surveys show that undergraduates often struggle with imagination deficiencies, add undescribed details, apply pre-endorsed theories, lack seriousness, and show disinterest when reading written thought experiments, hindering their engagement and critical thinking. We argue that VRTEs may (...) mitigate these challenges by providing concrete visualisations, immersive experiences, embodiment, interactivity, and controlled reaction times. Feedback from our pilot practice indicates that VRTEs have the potential to mitigate these challenges. To enhance the benefits, we recommend allowing sufficient time for the development of VRTEs and alternating between traditional paper-based teaching and VRTE sessions. We also address potential objections to our teaching approach. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between immersion, emotion, and imagination in virtual reality (VR), focusing on two seemingly distant domains: Alejandro G. Iñárritu’s installation Carne y Arena (2017) and VR-based workplace safety training. Both cases demonstrate that simulated environments can elicit authentic emotional responses – such as fear, stress, or vulnerability – yet the implications of these experiences diverge sharply. Drawing on theories of presence and the “paradox of fiction”, we argue that VR should be understood not as a substitute (...) for imagination but as a heightened form of fiction that depends on the user’s willingness to engage in make-believe. While Carne y Arena frames affect as an entry point for moral imagination within an explicit artistic and symbolic context, occupational safety training instrumentalizes emotion as a means of behavioral conditioning within a productivist framework. The danger in both domains lies not in immersive experience itself but in mistaking a single simulation for the fullness of lived reality. (shrink)

Communication technologies change the way we relate to each other and ourselves. In this essay we analyze the effects that extended reality (XR) technologies are likely to have on conceptions of the self, romantic relationships, and other associated concepts like sexual orientation. While these technologies are in their infancy, key psychological and philosophical concepts are already being explored. We begin by defining extended reality and the family of technologies that make it possible. We pay special attention to the way these (...) immersive technologies ground the experiences of presence which can become virtually real. These experiences provide a useful framework for understanding the phenomena of XR embodiment. XR embodiment, the experience of one's self as embodied in XR, opens up the possibility of blended physical and digital narrative selves which form the basis of new forms of relationships. In a future where XR is incorporated into the basic social and political structures of society, XR embodiment and virtually real experiences challenge normative concepts like sex and sexual orientation. Contemporary conceptions of the self, sex, consent, and love emerged in purely physical contexts to help us navigate the limitations of physical embodiment. XR embodiment requires a new ethical framework to make room for these possibilities. We end the paper by assessing ethical risks XR embodiment can introduce for XR developers, and researchers. (shrink)

What kind of knowledge does one have when one knows what it is like to, say, fall in love, eat vegemite™, be a parent, or ride a bike? This Element addresses this question by exploring the tension between two plausible theses about this form of knowledge: (i) that to possess it one must have had the corresponding experience, and (ii) that to possess it one must know an answer to the 'what it is like' question. The Element shows how the (...) tension between these two theses helps to explain existing debates about this form of knowledge, as well as puzzling conflicts in our attitudes towards the possibility of sharing this knowledge through testimony, or other sources like literature, theories, and simulations. The author also offers a view of 'what it is like' knowledge which can resolve both the tension between (i) and (ii), and these puzzles around testimony. (shrink)

Virtual reality is not only a prowess of technological advancement and AI, but also an element that extends the horizons of human existence and complicates the way of approaching various phenomena of the physical world, for example, violence. Its practice in virtuality leads to a series of challenges, especially when virtual reality is considered as genuine reality. This text delves into virtual violence, the influence of AI on it and the problems that its conception implies. To analyze this phenomenon, parallax (...) is proposed as a concept that helps to understand its development. This theory invites us to see violence in different ways, thus influencing the vision of morality in the virtual world. Although these reflections outline difficulties, a position is proposed that invites to urgently address the need for an applicable morality to virtual and physical fields, emphasizing dignity as the purpose of human practices. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Virtual reality (VR) is an increasingly popular artificially mediated, immersive experience that is accessed through a headset. Recent research is starting to provide evidence about the positive impact that virtual reality technology can have on teaching and learning. This research, to date, has been primarily undertaken in higher education and in disciplines related to the health sciences. In this article, the possibilities, and problematics of using virtual reality in taught character education approaches are explored. The article proposes that VR (...) can bring four learning opportunities for character educators that would not be possible in the traditional classroom. These expansive, immersive, embodied and autonomous learning opportunities can be harnessed to educate six components of virtue. In the article, the risks of VR use for character education are also investigated. The aim of the article is to get ahead of the EdTech developers and provide theoretical, conceptual and practical insights that will help ensure that the promise of VR to enhance character education can be realised. (shrink)

What happens when worldly reality is no longer constituted by the durable presence of things, but by the projected impact of the self? This article takes the popular slogan of charitable entrepreneurship, “Make an impact!”, as a symptom of the privatization of what Arendt once called the 'worldly reality' in everyday social media interactions. It juxtaposes two caricatured social-media ideal types—the Poetry-Slam Personality and the Big-Picture Personality—and traces, in the identity of their apparent opposition, the disappearance of the world as (...) a political space of reliable appearances. (shrink)

How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation to (...) X. Virtual pluralism is the view that they belong to more than one value-salient kind. I argue for two claims. First, virtual monism is mistaken. Minimally some virtual Xs are Xs, while others are not. Second, dualistic virtual pluralism is also mistaken because it is too coarse grained. Instead, I argue for fourfold pluralism: virtual items either represent an original's properties or reproduce essential properties and do so to lesser or greater extents. This gives us four value-salient kinds of virtual X: virtual reproductions, simulations, representations, and simulacra of X. I apply this view to various debates in the literature and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds. (shrink)

Extended Reality (XR) and Large Language Model (LLM) technologies have the potential to significantly influence higher education practices and pedagogy in the coming years. As these emerging technologies reshape the educational landscape, it is crucial for educators and higher education professionals to understand their implications and make informed policy decisions for both individual courses and universities as a whole. This paper has two parts. In the first half, we give an overview of XR technologies and their potential future role in (...) higher education. Then, we discuss the benefits and challenges of adopting and integrating XR technologies into higher education settings. Finally, we offer recommendations for educators, administrators, and policymakers on how to approach the adoption of this set of technologies and set institutional policy to take advantage of its benefits while minimizing its potential negative consequences. In the paper’s second half, we discuss LLMs - specifically Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPTs). Again, we provide an overview of this rapidly developing technology and examine its unprecedented and potentially disruptive impact on higher education pedagogy. We delve into the benefits and limitations of GPTs, highlighting the pedagogical and ethical challenges they may pose. Finally, we present actionable recommendations for instructors and administrators at both the course level and the university-wide level to guide policy decisions concerning these transformative technologies. (shrink)

In this paper we review digital technologies that can be used to study what the experiences of past peoples might have been. We focus on the use of immersive virtual reality (VR) systems to frame hypotheses about the visual and auditory experiences of past individuals, based on available archeological evidence. These reconstructions of past places and landscapes are often focused on visual data. We argue that we should move beyond this ocularcentric focus by integrating sound and other modalities into VR. (...) However, even those that emphasize sound in archaeology—as in archaeoacoustics (Scarre & Lawson, 2006; Diaz-Andreu & Mattioli, 2015; Suárez et al., 2016)—often retain a unimodal emphasis that limits how much we can understand of past peoples’ sensory experience. We argue that it is important to emphasize the importance of seeing and hearing at the same time (i.e. multi-modal sensory integration) in phenomenological archaeology. This is possible using immersive virtual reality systems that can engage users with both sight and sound simultaneously. (shrink)

David Ekdahl (2023), in a constructive and thoughtful commentary, outlines both points of agreement with and suggestions for further research arising from our paper ‘Crossing the Fictional Line: Moral Graveness, the Gamer’s Dilemma, and the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far’ (Montefiore & Formosa, 2023).

A long‐standing aim of cinema – in particular of ‘extreme’, ‘unwatchable’ or ‘feel‐ bad’ cinema – has been to acquaint viewers with extreme suffering. In this article I first offer an explication of that aim in terms of recent work in philosophy of mind, then exploit the resulting framework to examine claims to the effect that a new technological development, Virtual Reality, provides cinema's best shot at achieving that aim.

In this paper, we assess the impact of extended reality technologies as they relate to sexual forms of harassment. We begin with a brief history of the nature of sexual harassment itself. We then offer an account of extended reality technologies focusing specifically on psychological and hardware elements most likely to comprise what has been referred to as “the metaverse”. Although different forms of virtual spaces exist (i.e., private, semi-private, and public), we focus on public social metaverse spaces. We do (...) this to better explain how the concept of sexual harassment must be adjusted to such spaces and how approaches aimed at mitigating harassment must be sensitive to the type of metaverse spaces users utilize. We then offer a typology of sexual harassment for the metaverse focusing on three distinct forms of sexual harassment: (1) invariant (2) mixed variance or modified and (3) unique or metaverse specific. Although existing normative and legal frameworks may function well with respect to the first and, possibly, second forms of harassment, we argue such frameworks will not helpfully address metaverse-specific harassment. Ultimately, the changing nature of privately owned public spaces (POPS) which metaverses are likely to represent pose distinct ethical and regulatory challenges. (shrink)

Much of the excitement and concern with virtual reality (VR) has to do with the impact of virtual experiences on our moral conduct in the “real world”. VR technologies offer vivid simulations that may impact prosocial dispositions and abilities or emotions related to morality. Whereas some experiences could facilitate particular moral behaviors, VR could also inculcate bad moral habits or lead to the surreptitious development of nefarious moral traits. In this chapter, I offer an overview of the ethical debate about (...) using VR to improve morality. I start by clarifying the rationale of using VR for good, drawing on moral enhancement literature, branches of the science of morality, and the specific potentials of this technology. Then, I will briefly focus on three prominent domains of socio-moral improvement: the use of VR for enhancing empathy, reducing implicit biases, and improving pro-environmental behavior. After that, I shall consider three ethical objections to the enthusiasm for using VR in order to improve human morality. Finally, I will recapitulate the main points of the chapter and provide a few concluding thoughts on future avenues of discussion on how VR can make us act (morally) better. (shrink)

This report explores interactions between large-scale social simulations and catastrophic risks. It offers a tour of the surrounding theoretical terrain and brings together disparate literatures that bear on the topic.

The gamer’s dilemma offers three plausible but jointly inconsistent premises: (1) Virtual murder in video games is morally permissible. (2) Virtual paedophelia in video games is not morally permissible. (3) There is no morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual paedophelia in video games. In this paper I argue that the gamer’s dilemma can be understood as one of three distinct dilemmas, depending on how we understand two key ideas in Morgan Luck’s (2009) original formulation. The two ideas are (...) those of (1) occurring in a video game and (2) being a virtual instance of murder or paedophelia. Depending on the weight placed on the gaming context, the dilemma is either about in-game acts or virtual acts. And depending on the type of virtual acts we have in mind, the dilemma is either about virtual representations or virtual partial reproductions of murder and paedophelia. This gives us three dilemmas worth resolving: a gaming dilemma, a representation dilemma, and a simulation dilemma. I argue that these dilemmas are about different issues, apply to different cases, and are susceptible to different solutions. I also consider how different participants in the debate have interpreted the dilemma in one or more of these three ways. (shrink)

The Experience Machine The experience machine is a thought experiment first devised by Robert Nozick in the 1970s. In the last decades of the 20th century, an argument based on this thought experiment has been considered a knock-down objection to hedonism about well-being, the thesis that our well-being—that is, the goodness or badness of our … Continue reading The Experience Machine →.

Many have offered moral objections to video games, with various critics contending that they depict and promote morally dubious attitudes and behaviour. However, few have offered moral arguments in favour of video games. In this chapter, we develop one such positive moral argument. Specifically, we argue that video games offer one of the only morally acceptable methods for acquiring some ethical knowledge. Consequently, we have (defeasible) moral reasons for creating, distributing, and playing certain morally educating video games.

A leading philosopher takes a mind-bending journey through virtual worlds, illuminating the nature of reality and our place within it. Virtual reality is genuine reality; that's the central thesis of Reality+. In a highly original work of "technophilosophy," David J. Chalmers gives a compelling analysis of our technological future. He argues that virtual worlds are not second-class worlds, and that we can live a meaningful life in virtual reality. We may even be in a virtual world already. Along the way, (...) Chalmers conducts a grand tour of big ideas in philosophy and science. He uses virtual reality technology to offer a new perspective on long-established philosophical questions. How do we know that there's an external world? Is there a god? What is the nature of reality? What's the relation between mind and body? How can we lead a good life? All of these questions are illuminated or transformed by Chalmers' mind-bending analysis. Studded with illustrations that bring philosophical issues to life, Reality+ is a major statement that will shape discussion of philosophy, science, and technology for years to come. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that a virtual life would be less meaningful (perhaps even meaningless). As virtual reality technologies develop and become more integrated into our everyday lives, this poses a challenge for those that care about meaning in life. In this chapter, it is argued that the common assumption about meaninglessness and virtuality is mistaken. After clarifying the distinction between two different visions of virtual reality, four arguments are presented for thinking that meaning is possible in virtual reality. Following (...) this, four objections are discussed and rebutted. The chapter concludes that we can be cautiously optimistic about the possibility of meaning in virtual worlds. (shrink)

In this paper a new resolution to the gamer’s dilemma is presented. The first part of the paper is devoted to strictly formulating the dilemma, and the second to establishing its resolution. The proposed resolution, the grave resolution, aims to resolve not only the gamer’s dilemma, but also a wider set of analogous paradoxes – which together make up the paradox of treating wrongdoing lightly.

The trolley problem is one of the liveliest research frameworks in experimental ethics. In the last decade, social neuroscience and experimental moral psychology have gone beyond the studies with mere text-based hypothetical moral dilemmas. In this article, I present the rationale behind testing the actual behaviour in more realistic scenarios through Virtual Reality and summarize the body of evidence raised by the experiments with virtual trolley scenarios. Then, I approach the argument of Ramirez and LaBarge (2020), who claim that the (...) virtual simulation of the Footbridge version of the trolley dilemma is an unethical research practice, and I raise some objections to it. Finally, I provide some reflections about the means and ends of trolley-like scenarios and other sacrificial dilemmas in experimental ethics. (shrink)

This book examines the ethics of virtual reality technologies. New forms of virtual reality are emerging in society, not just from low-cost gaming headsets, or augmented reality apps on phones, but from simulated “deep fake” images and videos on social media. This book subjects the new VR technological landscape to ethical scrutiny: assessing the benefits, risks and regulatory practices that shape it. Though often associated with gaming, education and therapy, VR can also be used for moral enhancement. Journalists, artists, philanthropic (...) and non-governmental organisations are using VR films, games and installations to stimulate user empathy to marginalised peoples through a combination of immersion, embodiment and persuasion. This book critically assesses the use of VR for empathy arousal and pro-social behaviour change, culminating in the development of a VR “ethical tool” – a device to facilitate reflective ethical judgement. Drawing upon the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey, virtual reality is reshaped as “dramatic rehearsal”. This book explains how a combination of immersive environment-building, moral imagination, choice architecture and reflective engagement can stimulate a future-focused and empathic ethics for users of the technology. (shrink)

This chapter examines the application of virtual reality (VR) to prosocial behaviour change, news reporting, art and social justice campaigning. A range of cases are considered, including the immersive journalism of Nonny De La Peña on abortion rights, poverty and suspect interrogation; the awareness raising/fundraising efforts of The United Nations Virtual Reality (UNVR) Series, including the acclaimed “Clouds Over Sidra” VR film, and applications to art and gaming through platforms including: “The Machine to Be Another (TMTBA)”, and “A Breath-taking Journey” (...) (ABTJ). The capacity of these works to stimulate empathy is critically assessed and lessons drawn from their design for the construction of a VR ethical tool. (shrink)

As screen-based virtual worlds have gradually begun facilitating more and more of our social interactions, some researchers have argued that the virtual worlds of these interactions do not allow for embodied social understanding. The aim of this article is to examine exactly the possibility of this by looking to esports practitioners’ experiences of interacting with each other during performance. By engaging in an integration of qualitative research methodologies and phenomenology, we investigate the actual first-person experiences of interaction in the virtual (...) worlds of the popular team-based esports practices Counter Strike: Global Offensive and League of Legends. Our analysis discloses how the practitioners’ interactions essentially depend on intercorporeality – understood as a form of reciprocity of bodily intentionality between the players. This is an intercorporeality that is present throughout the players’ performance, but which especially comes to the front when they engage in feinting. Acknowledging the intercorporeality integral to at least some esports practices helps fuzzying the sharp division between virtuality and embodied social understanding. Doing so highlights the fluidity of our embodied condition, and it raises interesting questions concerning the possibility of yet other forms of embodied sociality in a wider range of virtual formats in the world. (shrink)

Are acts of violence performed in virtual environments ever morally wrong, even when no other persons are affected? While some such acts surely reflect deficient moral character, I focus on the moral rightness or wrongness of acts. Typically it’s thought that, on Kant’s moral theory, an act of virtual violence is morally wrong (i.e., violate the Categorical Imperative) only if the act mistreats another person. But I argue that, on Kant’s moral theory, some acts of virtual violence can be morally (...) wrong, even when no other persons or their avatars are affected. First, I explain why many have thought that, in general on Kant’s moral theory, virtual acts affecting no other persons or their avatars can’t violate the Categorical Imperative. For there are real world acts that clearly do, but it seems that when we consider the same sorts of acts done alone in a virtual environment, they don’t violate the Categorical Imperative, because no others persons were involved. But then, how could any virtual acts like these, that affect no other persons or their avatars, violate the Categorical Imperative? I then argue that there indeed can be such cases of morally wrong virtual acts—some due to an actor’s having erroneous beliefs about morally relevant facts, and others due not to error, but to the actor’s intention leaving out morally relevant facts while immersed in a virtual environment. I conclude by considering some implications of my arguments for both our present technological context as well as the future. (shrink)

Sing C. Chew’s latest book, Ecology, Artificial Intelligence, and Virtual Reality: Life in the Digital Dark Ages, complements his trio of monographs on the history of environmental degradation and social change. His timing could not be better, as books examining the intersection of environmental crisis and emerging technologies have quickly become a cottage industry. This burgeoning literature generally consists of two camps – techno-optimists (such as those contributing to Fei Fang et al.’s (2019) edited volume Artificial Intelligence and Conservation) and (...) techno-pessimists (exemplified by Peter Dauvergne’s (2020) AI in the Wild). Chew’s title, despite its reference to the Dark Ages, fits comfortably in the middle of these opposing perspectives. (shrink)

Based on a nuanced understanding of immersion and sense of presence as two key aesthetic effects that the application of virtual reality to cinema is believed to innovate, this paper develops the concept of synthetic vision as fundamental to understanding the visual experience of VR media, particularly VR documentaries. The concept contends that viewers’ experience in VR is based on two visions that seemingly contradict each other: first, a disembodied vision that transports them to a simulated world, and second, an (...) embodied vision guaranteed by the freedom to control kinesthetic movement and direction of gaze. This serves to advance the idea that immersion and SoP are not unified but rather multifaceted concepts premised on a nuanced understanding of the varying relationships between the technological system of VR, its media content, and its user. For the concept of synthetic vision points to the paradoxical coexistence of viewers’ presence in the virtual world and their structural absence from the world that lays the groundwork for their immersive experience. By classifying three generic categories of contemporary VR documentaries, and by examining the aesthetic and ethical underpinnings VR brings to each of them, I argue that it hinges upon what kind of cinematic conventions and genres are remediated to determine the effective synthesis of the two visions. The varying effects of synthetic vision in the three subgenres of VR documentary stress that immersion and SoP have different political and ethical consequences of media witnessing. In the conclusion, I recapitulate multiple implications that the concept of synthetic vision has in regards to both the studies on VR and the recently flourishing investigation into cinematic VR artifacts. (shrink)

The paper presents the main preliminary findings of GEITONIA research project (Growing and Enabling of Information Technologies for Online Neighborhoods: Implications and Applications). Focusing on the development of a local social network for neighborhoods of Nea Smyrni community in Attica (Greece), the main results of an exploratory mixed methods research study, are discussed. The local social network is a non-commercial social medium that operates as a mobile application. Residents of the local community will have the opportunity to use the application (...) for a pilot period, create their virtual neighborhoods, interact with other neighbors, and expand local social ties in a continuum of physical and virtual spatialities. Moreover, taking into consideration residents’ perceptions, demands and visions, regarding a local social network for their neighborhoods, the research project aims to enhance the rule that sets the focus on the users, as co-creators and co-producers of communication technologies. (shrink)

Erick J. Ramirez, Miles Elliott and Per‑Erik Milam (2021) have recently claimed that using Virtual Reality (VR) as an educational nudge to promote empathy is unethical. These authors argue that the influence exerted on the participant through virtual simulation is based on the deception of making them believe that they are someone else when this is impossible. This makes the use of VR for empathy enhancement a manipulative strategy in itself. In this article, we show that Ramirez et al.’s ethical (...) rejection of empathy enhancement through VR is based on confusion. First, we show that this misunderstanding stems from the conception of empathy-enhancing simulations solely as failed attempts at “being someone else,” along with ignoring the crucial difference between the psychological perspective-taking processes of imagine-other and imagine-self. Then, having overcome that misconception, we argue that the ethical misgivings about the use of VR to promote empathy should disappear and that these projects have greater potential for behavioural change than purely sympathy-focused interventions. (shrink)

A virtual community is generally described as a group of people with shared interests, ideas, and goals in a particular digital group or virtual platform. Virtual communities have become ubiquitous in recent times, and almost everyone belongs to one or multiple virtual communities. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with its associated national lockdowns, has made virtual communities more essential and a necessary part of our daily lives, whether for work and business, educational purposes or keeping in touch with friends (...) and family. Given these facts, how do we ensure that virtual communities become a true community qua community? We address this question by proposing and arguing for a ‘virtual communitarianism’—an online community that integrates essential features of traditional African communitarianism in its outlook and practice. The paper’s position is that virtual communitarianism can make for a strong ethical virtual community where members can demonstrate a strong sense of group solidarity, care and compassion towards each other. The inclusion of these virtues can bring members who often are farapart and help create a stronger community bond. This will ensure that the evolution of virtual communities does not happen without the integration of progressive African communitarian values. (shrink)

The commercial VR/AR marketplace is gaining ground and is becoming an ever larger and more significant component of the global economy. While much attention has been paid to the commercial promise of VR/AR, comparatively little attention has been given to the ethical issues that VR/AR technologies introduce. We here examine existing codes of ethics proposed by the ACM and IEEE and apply them to the unique ethical facets that VR/AR introduces. We propose a VR/AR code of ethics for developers and (...) apply this code to several commercial applications. (shrink)

Olfactory Virtual Reality (OVR) for Wellbeing and Reduction of Stress, Anxiety and Pain - Journal of Medical Research and Health Sciences.

This paper analyzes in the use of virtual reality when used to induce full-body ownership in violent offenders in order to elicit empathetic feelings by allowing them to embody the virtual body of a victim of domestic abuse. The authors explore potentially harmful effects to individuals participating in this kind of therapy and question whether consent is fully informed. The paper concludes with guidelines for ethical research and rehabilitation using this innovative technology.

This paper expands Rami Ali’s dissolution of the gamer’s dilemma (Ethics Inf Technol 17:267-274, 2015). Morgan Luck’s gamer’s dilemma (Ethics Inf Technol 11(1):31-36, 2009) rests on our having diverging intuition when considering virtual murder and virtual child molestation in video games. Virtual murder is seemingly permissible, when virtual child molestation is not and there is no obvious morally relevant difference between the two. Ali argues that virtual murder and virtual child molestation are equally permissible/impermissible when considered under different modes of (...) engagement. To this end, Ali distinguishes between story-telling gameplay and simulation games, discussing both in depth. I build on the dissolution by looking into competitive gameplay in order to consider what the morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual child molestation might be when competing in a video game. I argue that when competitors consent to participate in a competition, the rules of the competition supersede everyday moral intuitions. As such, virtual competitions ought to represent such consent from virtual characters. Virtual children cannot be represented as giving consent to be molested because (1) children cannot be represented as giving sexual consent, and (2) consent to be possibly molested cannot be given. This creates a morally relevant difference between murder and molestation. By fully addressing competitive gameplay, I answer Luck’s worry that Ali’s dissolution is incomplete (Ethics Inf Technol 20:157-162, 2018). (shrink)

The Gamer's Dilemma challenges us to find a distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Without such a distinction, we are forced to conclude that either both are morally acceptable or that both should be morally illicit. This paper argues that the best way to solve the dilemma is, in one sense, to dissolve it. The Gamer's Dilemma rests on a misunderstanding in the sense that it does not distinguish between the form of a simulation and its surface content. A (...) greater appreciation of the way structural features of a simulation affect subject experience will help us see why only simulations of murder and pedophilia generating virtually real experiences are likely to be seen as wrong. I argue that a simulation’s structural elements powerfully affect how subjects experience simulated content and hence is an important, and previously neglected, variable necessary to dissolve the Gamer's Dilemma. Properly understood, virtually real simulations of murder and pedophilia are both likely to be treated by players as morally wrong. Similarly, virtually unreal murder and pedophilia will be less likely to be judged as wrong. Subject judgments are thus consistent once a simulation’s structural variables are accounted for. The Gamer's Dilemma dissolves as a dilemma once we acknowledge these structural features of simulations and how they affect experience and moral judgment. (shrink)