17th/18th Century Ethics

Kant AI Textual Investigations: Critique of Practical Reason. By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Copyright©2026 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. Imprint 1.0. 2026. WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) digital. Cover art by Shawn Rodriguez. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). German philosopher. Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788). Also known as Kant’s Second Critique. All Rights are Reserved. Intended copies of this work can be used for research and teaching. No change in the content, and must include (...) my full name, Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Enjoy reading and disagreeing. Publisher: Kuhn von Verden Verlag. Language: English and German. Includes bibliographical references and an index. Pages 1-193. Warning. Warning: this is an AI Working Zone. Warning. Perhaps an impending danger of unexpected, unknown texts. These are AI investigations into Kant’s texts. Critical Analysis of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Christine Korsgaard versus Lewis White Beck: 30 Philosophical Questions and Short Answers on Kantian Practical Reason. Nietzsche’s Remarks on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason in On the Genealogy of Morality. How the Critique of Practical Reason grounds Perpetual Peace philosophically. Theological Influences on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Theological Themes within the Work. Conscience in Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger: From Moral Law to Genealogy to Ontological Call. Future Research Questions on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason with Possible Directions for Answer. Kant on Constitutional Monarchy versus Pure Democracy: A Comparative Philosophical Analysis. Kant’s entire political philosophy derives from the principle of autonomy developed in the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant and the Right to Revolution. Highest Principles in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Advanced Graduate Seminar 12 weeks. Example essay on the topic of Autonomy vs. Kant’s Notion of the Moral Worth of Actions. Heidegger’s Analysis of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason in GA 84.1 Being, Transcendental Illusion, Finitude, and the Inner Nature of Reason. Questions in Heidegger’s Kant, Dialektik und praktische Philosophie (GA 84.1 Editor Günther Neumann) Analytical Reconstruction with Concise Interpretive Answers. Also muß auf Kant zurückgegangen werden! (shrink)

In his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth, Descartes claims that knowing truths about the immortality, nobility and pleasures of the mind prevents a person from fearing death, a benefit for the practice of virtue. Employing Descartes’ commitments, Princess Elisabeth argues that said knowledge should lead a person to seek death. This paper reconstructs Princess Elisabeth’s seeking death objection, and tracks Descartes and Princess Elisabeth’s objections and replies across a series of letters in 1645. Princess Elisabeth pinpoints Descartes’ austere internalism and where (...) it goes array—despite Descartes’ insistence to the contrary. In contrast to a recent medical reading of the objection, it is argued that the primary implication is that this epistemic condition is faulty, raising problems for Descartes’ views on the relation between virtue and happiness. (shrink)

On the standard reading, Descartes maintains that there is a modal distinction between the two main faculties of the mind: intellect and will. Against the standard view, Alan Nelson has argued that a conceptual distinction holds between the intellect and will, which entails that the intellect and will are ontologically identical, but two different ways of conceiving of mental substance. While there are interpretive benefits to such a view, it is also a highly revisionary reading of Descartes’ ontology of thought. (...) It makes Descartes out to be a Spinozist, which threatens canonical features of his philosophical system. I raise three objections to Nelson’s reading that must be addressed in order for the conceptual reading to be viable. (shrink)

Spinoza and Hume employ widely different methodologies. However, both believe that moral concepts have their bases in human psychology; both are “affective” theorists who make desire central to their accounts of human motivation and value; and both are naturalists. I aim to show here that their views of desire have some perhaps unexpected commonalities as well: first, that for each, desire is in a sense fundamental to their respective theories of the passions; and second, more surprisingly, that each’s view of (...) desire is teleological, rather than thoroughly hedonistic. (shrink)

Vice, Sin, and Sociability in Early Modern Philosophy investigates ideas of human wickedness and its social and political implications. The book charts early modern discussions stemming from the Augustinian conception of original sin and earlier virtue theories, and shows the complex and innovative reception of traditional ideas. The twelve chapters investigate the nature of vice and sin and their origins in the soul, the body, and society, and elaborate on self-love, pride, honour, lying, and the desire for esteem.

The Secret Codes of the Mind: From Medieval Philosophy to the Enlightenment, Volume IV, Part Three (The Age of Enlightenment) examines the Enlightenment through the transformation of ideas about reason, freedom, political authority, knowledge, conscience, and human perfectibility. The volume begins with Voltaire and his defense of reason and toleration against fanaticism and inherited authority. It then turns to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Montesquieu, examining competing approaches to freedom, law, political order, sovereignty, and the conditions under which legitimate authority can be (...) established and restrained. -/- The discussion continues with Denis Diderot and the encyclopedic project, exploring the organization and dissemination of knowledge, philosophical critique, and the challenge that independent inquiry poses to established intellectual authority. The concluding section examines Grigory Skovoroda and Freemasonry, through which questions of conscience, self-knowledge, moral formation, inner freedom, toleration, and human brotherhood acquire a different philosophical form. Across these discussions, the Enlightenment emerges as an intellectual struggle over the right of reason to judge authority and the possibility of transforming both political institutions and the individual. Each lecture includes questions and assignments designed to support philosophical analysis, together with recommended literature for further study. (shrink)

This paper examines Francis Hutcheson’s accounts of moral obligation and its relations to virtue and right in his four works on moral philosophy. I argue that Hutcheson derives the “complex moral idea” of moral obligation from one’s reflection on the moral sense’s disposition to approve of certain actions and disapprove of their omission; this reflective origin and dual sensational basis – both approbation and disapprobation – enable him to differentiate moral sense-based judgements about moral obligation from those about virtues. Hutcheson’s (...) early works are ambiguous on the correspondence between moral obligations and rights. I argue that this can be explained by two difficulties confronted by these works: the ambiguity concerning which sensation primarily determines the strength of moral obligation, and the tension between how moral obligation and right are respectively evaluated, namely, one by considering agents’ particular motives and the other by assessing actions’ universalized consequences on the public good. Hutcheson’s later works address these difficulties by acknowledging moral disapprobation as the principal basis of moral obligation and revising his accounts of rights. Moral obligation, on these new accounts, works as a bridge between Hutcheson’s theories of virtue and natural law under the guarantee provided by divine providence. (shrink)

This article introduces a new interpretation of Spinoza’s metaethics: namely, that we can understand him as a fictionalist about morality. The article is conceived primarily as a ‘proof of concept’. That is, it does not seek to prove Spinoza is best understood as a fictionalist. Rather, it only seeks to prove that such a reading is possible and that it is a possibility worth taking seriously. It is left for later papers to develop the fictionalist reading further and defend its (...) merits against rival interpretations. (shrink)

A study of Pierre Gassendi's interpretation and defence of Epicurean hedonism in the form of a commentary on, and edition and English translation of, selections from Gassendi's Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laërtii (1649).

This paper examines René Descartes's engagement with the ethical tradition of eudaimonism, which considers happiness or flourishing (eudaimonia) the highest good. On the one hand, Descartes can be read as an eudaimonist because he is in rich dialogue with certain ancient thinkers (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus and the Stoics) and shares with them an ethical concern with living a happy life. On the other hand, because Descartes is understood as rejecting perfectionism or the status of happiness as the supreme good, (...) there is reason to doubt this reading. I, however, will argue that Descartes is indeed an eudaimonist because he shares with proponents of this ancient ethical tradition a fundamental commitment to a good that is (a) partly objectively grounded in facts about human nature; (b) partly subjectively grounded in the beliefs/feelings of a subject; (c) structurally stable; and (d) only intrinsically valuable. Through these formal features we gain greater perspective on Descartes's dialogue with ancient eudaimonists (as an advocate of a prior account or an original thinker) and contemporaries such as Benedict de Spinoza, G.W. Leibniz and Thomas Hobbes concerning the nature and relationship between the will and intellect, and the mind and body, in living a good life. (shrink)

In the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Hugo Grotius expounds his theory of natural law by way of reply to a skeptical challenge from the Greek Academic Carneades. Though this dialectical context is undeniably important for understanding Grotian natural law, commentators disagree about the substance of Carneades’s challenge. This paper aims to give a definitive reading of Carneades’s skeptical argument, and, by reconstructing Grotius’s reply, to settle some longstanding debates about Grotius’s conception of natural law. I argue that (...) Grotius held a Stoic view of natural law, endorsing both the doctrine of eudaimonism and the claim that moral obligations are natural, not grounded in divine command. Consequently, Grotius’s view of natural law has more continuity with pre-modern, indeed ancient, morality than is usually supposed. However, I argue that we can still understand Grotius as a founder of modern moral philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores significant shifts in Kant’s moral thought during the years 1762-1763, focusing on the transition from an analytic to an aesthetic approach to morality. Through an examination of "Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime" and "Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality", the study highlights Kant’s evolving methodology in understanding moral principles. Departing from the analytic emphasis on cognitive and conceptual clarity, Kant embraces an aesthetic perspective that prioritizes feeling as (...) a means of accessing universal moral obligations. The paper investigates the challenges of applying analytic methods to morality, including the problem of particularised duties and the tension between justice and emotional impulses such as sympathy and complaisance. By analysing Kant’s reflections on the sublime and the beautiful, the paper elucidates how Kant’s aesthetic turn provides a resolution to the limitations of his earlier analytic framework. (shrink)

In his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals David Hume said that a group of earlier modern philosophers, beginning with Malebranche, held that morality was founded on relations. In this paper I follow up on that suggestion by investigating pre-Humean views in moral philosophy according to which morality is founded on relations. I do that by looking at the work of Nicolas Malebranche, John Locke, and Samuel Clarke. Each of them talked prominently about relations in their accounts of basic aspects (...) of morality. Beyond that, each of them turns out to have held both metaphysical and epistemological views that might be described as founding morality on relations. Despite the definite differences between the three philosophers’ approaches, Hume does seem to have noticed a genuine connection here—even though he himself tended to ignore significant versions of this approach when criticizing it. (shrink)

This article engages closely with David Owen’s ‘Autonomy, Self-Respect, and Self-Love: Nietzsche on Ethical Agency.’ Owen argues that Kant tried, but ultimately failed, to resolve the tension between law and love that is characteristic of European modern philosophy. This is because Kant takes a ‘highly critical stance to self-love throughout his moral philosophy’ since he conflates self-love with psychological egoism and sees it as ‘opposed to morality as a threat, a challenge, a danger…’ Owen articulates Nietzsche’s main objections to the (...) Kantian opposition between self-love and the moral law and argues that Nietzsche has a rather greater claim than Kant to have resolved this tension. In this article, I explore whether some of the arguments developed in Owen’s text represent serious challenges to Kant’s position and develop a reading of Kant’s ethics which can answer most of the challenges. First, I argue that Kant is committed to a version of the ‘agency free will’ model. I show that, on the Kantian model, one constitutes oneself as self by becoming what one is through reflecting about one’s ability to live up to what one considers one’s fundamental commitments. Second, I argue that on this model, there is no universal list of maxims or commitments that can be fully specified in advance for all agents in all times. Each person’s project of moral transformation is personal and ultimately shaped by features of their own psychology and personal history as well as features of their social circumstances. Third, I argue that the Kantian project of moral transformation, which involves repenting immoral maxims, can also be understood as a form of flourishing and self-affirmation, which includes the pursuit of happiness as one of its components. On this reading, far from endorsing an ‘ascetic ideal’ of the moral agent, Kant embraces an ideal of the human life in which there is significant space, and even a duty, to pursue pleasurable endeavours. However, although morality and happiness are not intrinsically incompatible, they are likely to conflict under unstable and unjust external conditions. Thus, the extent to which we can live a completely morally good life is not independent of social and political conditions. Ultimately, in the Kantian picture, the task of moral self-improvement also has a social dimension: we must avoid being complicit with the injustices of our time and instead work towards overturning them. It is in fair (or at least fairer) social and political conditions that we can pursue both moral and personal ends and flourish. (shrink)

This paper offers a comprehensive outline of Spinoza’s account of pleasure or joy (laetitia). On the one hand, Spinoza defines pleasure as an increase in perfection qua self-affirmative power (E3defaff2). On the other hand, Spinoza describes blessedness (beatitudo), the highest happiness (summa felicitas), as both a form of pleasure (E5p36s/G II 303) and perfection qua self-affirmative power itself (E5p33s/G II 301). It is however unclear how a pleasure can be both an increase in perfection and perfection per se. This deviation (...) from his original definition of pleasure has led many scholars to conclude that Spinoza is committed to a dual account of pleasure, with some pleasures being transitional and others non-transitional in nature. But on what philosophical grounds can Spinoza expand his account of pleasure to include non-transitional pleasure qua perfection per se? What underlying essence do increases in perfection and perfection per se share that classifies them both as pleasures? Ultimately, I will argue that an increase in perfection and blessedness as a state of perfection in itself can both be considered pleasures (albeit of different kinds) insofar as Spinoza understands pleasure fundamentally as an attribute-neutral affection (affectio) which expresses the promotion of self-affirmative power. This dual account of pleasure is grounded in an important distinction between the force of existing (existendi vim) and non-transitional pleasure possessed by both God qua substance and individuals qua finite modes of substance and the striving (conatus) and affects (affectus) that are possessed by only individuals as beings with limitations and fluctuating power. (shrink)

As a Catholic nun, to suggest Jacqueline Pascal as autonomous might at first glance seem contradictory. We show that her moral deference to the divine is not at all forfeiting her autonomy, but that aligning her own law with God's law is to align her own law with rationality itself, that is, the laws of nature. Her theoretical structure begins with a theory of virtue—viz., how and to whom we have an obligation to be moral. For her, acting in accordance (...) with cultural restrictions or following church orders against her own conscience would be living by the laws of another and so not acting autonomously. Pascal would not live by other's laws, regardless of whether her actions conform to the categories by which society expected her to act. The framework for her laws laid in Pascal's understanding of self-governance: if she wants to act virtuously then she must autonomously follow God's law by making it her own through the sentiments of her heart. Thus, she cannot live by the laws of men, but by the laws of her human nature and in alignment with a rightly ordered universe, that is, God's law, which we show parallels with a Stoic framework of autonomy. (shrink)

Descartes’ first book, 1618’s Compendium of Music, focuses on biomechanical reactions in the human body but also claims that the purpose of art is to arouse emotions. By the end of the 1630s, however, he had given up on precisely predicting how that arousal may occur. This article contends, though, that Descartes’ abandonment of that project is a result of using an inappropriate psychological model for such predictions. An appropriate model is developed in his last book, 1649’s The Passions of (...) the Soul. Especially by attending to generosity and desire, the probability of predicting aesthetic judgments is at least increased. In increasing it, Descartes’ abandonment need not be total. (shrink)

Justus Lipsius was a 16th -century renaissance humanist and literary scholar who, crucially for the history of philosophy, was involved in the publication and reinterpretation of Stoic thought, primarily focusing on the works of Seneca. Despite a fair amount of scholarship on Lipsius’s contribution to the history of philosophy, the role of Stoicism in the early to mid-17th century is still not well understood. In this thesis I show, through close examination of Lipsius’s work, that Neo-Stoic ethics in the 17th (...) century amounts to a view about the relationship between providence and human actions. After identifying ways that Stoic philosophy was used to explain this connection, I derive two key normative duties that are constitutive of a Neo-Stoic account of ethics: 1) a duty to accept the determinations of providence (whatever they may be) and 2) the duty to develop a large body of rational knowledge about the universe. In the remainder of this thesis, I map the influence of these Neo-Stoic positions on Rene Descartes, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, and Nicolas Malebranche’s moral philosophy. I contend that all these Cartesian-inspired thinkers draw upon the foundational components of Neo-Stoicism in their accounts of ethics. I first consider how the correspondence between Descartes and Elisabeth represents a debate about the viability of certain Neo-Stoic theses. And then, I argue that Malebranche’s moral philosophy should be read as the natural progression of the Neo-Stoic “seeds” planted throughout this correspondence. In developing a conceptual framework for what constitutes a Neo-Stoic position and mapping the influence of this system on prominent Cartesian thinkers, my thesis tells a conceptual story about the history of Stoicism. My thesis particularly seeks to emphasize the way that Stoicism becomes intertwined with the history of 17th century moral philosophy based on the desire of Early Modern figures to balance voluntarist and intellectualist intuitions. (shrink)

Amid the many figures who number among the Thomists writing during the early 20th century period of revival in scholastic thought in the Roman Catholic Church in the wake of the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris (1879) of Leo XIII, there is numbered the French convert, Jacques Maritain (1882–1973). Over the course of his long lifetime, Maritain authored works covering a host of philosophical and theological topics: epistemology, the philosophy of the sciences and natural philosophy, aesthetics, moral philosophy, political philosophy, metaphysics, (...) the philosophy of history, etc. The details concerning Maritain’s youth and conversion have been ably told by others and can be consulted by the interested reader. Detailed bibliographies of his works are available for those interested in engaging the full breadth of his writing. In this article, I will focus on the particular shape of Maritain’s Thomism and his place in the overall hermeneutics of the Thomistic tradition, in particular the debt that he owes to John Poinsot (1589–1644), to whom he refers as “John of St. Thomas,” in accord with the standard appellations within the Thomistic tradition in which he wrote. Following a general account of Maritain’s “style” of Thomism, I will provide a specific catalogue of some central themes in his thought that bear the clear impress of his engagement with the thought of John of St. Thomas. Without claiming to be exhaustive, this article intends to provide the reader with a sufficient appraisal of the main lines of influence exercised upon Maritain’s thought by the Baroque Commentator, without whose philosophical and theological works Maritain’s own labors would be unthinkable. (shrink)

This article offers an account of Kant's conception of the duty of self-love, a rarely researched subject, by investigating how he appropriated Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's prior conception. I argue that exploring this appropriation helps us to gain new insights into Kant's conception of duty, a leading thread in Kant's ethics. Substantiating this argument, I derive the following conclusions. First, Kant peculiarly affirms a duty to rational self-love of delight. To be more precise, human beings ought rationally to love themselves in (...) such a way that they are content with—or have a positive feeling about—themselves in acting on maxims that they are pleased to see submitted to the moral law. Further, rational self-love of delight results from declining pathological forms of self-love. Second, Kant retains, to a meaningful extent, Baumgarten's conception of the duty to self-love where feeling and rationality achieve their distinct elevation. (shrink)

This is a collection of sixteen essays by a diverse group of international scholars that offers a wide-ranging and contemporary perspective on the major aspects of Christian Wolff’s ethics. The volume focuses on Wolff’s German Ethics, arguably his most important and influential text on moral philosophy, but many of the chapters also consider the development of the basic tenets of Wolff’s moral theory in his later Latin writings. The contributions cover a range of topics, including the systematic structure of the (...) text itself and the relation between Wolff’s ethics and the preceding natural law tradition. Many chapters pay special attention to the core concepts of Wolff’s moral philosophy, such as obligation, perfection, the highest good, and happiness. Other notable topics include Wolff’s conception of moral judgment and moral education, as well as the role of psychology and anthropology in his ethical thought. The volume also contains discussion of the influence of Wolff’s ethics on subsequent figures such as C.A. Crusius, G.F. Meier, and Kant. As a whole, the volume seeks to establish the importance of Wolff’s German Ethics within the history of ethics as well as inspire others to engage with his thought. (shrink)

[...] Schapiro’s new metaphor of ‘being drawn out of oneself’ is suggestive of alienation, even though it is supposed to apply at a different level. As much as in Korsgaard’s account of reflective endorsement, the problem of the agent’s dealing with their inclinations is treated as a solitary internal affair: what is staged is a psychodrama, that is, a drama that plays in the agent’s mind. The (social) world enters solely as backdrop scenery, and social roles and scripts are ultimately (...) up for choice. But this is reductive and unduly simplifies matters. In this regard, Kant’s forensic and political metaphors seem far more perspicuous in articulating the activity that leads to the agential authority of action. The ekstatic view is bound to disregard the dynamic and historical dimension of rational agency. The ekstatic view of the rational will charges the dramatic moment of choice-making with all significance, hence implicitly overshadowing the long-term history of inner conflict and the preparatory and processual stages of deliberation. This may result in a loss of explanatory power regarding the diachronic dimension of practical thinking, the long-term activities leading to decision-making, the complex processes of self-formation, the construction of practical identity and the social practices and activities that help us to sustain our commitments across time. [...]. (shrink)

This Element offers the first detailed study of Catharine Trotter Cockburn's philosophy and covers her contributions to philosophical debates in epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion. It examines not only Cockburn's view that sensation and reflection are the sources of knowledge, but also how she draws attention to the limitations of human understanding and how she approaches metaphysical debates through this lens. In the area of moral philosophy, this Element argues that it is helpful to take seriously Cockburn's (...) distinction between questions concerning the metaphysical foundation of morality and questions concerning the practice of morality. Moreover, this Element examines Cockburn's religious views and considers her understanding of the relation between morality and religion and her religious views concerning the resurrection and the afterlife. (shrink)

Esta palestra, proferida no âmbito das comemorações do sétimo centenário da canonização de São Tomás de Aquino (1323-2023), aborda a temática do cuidado em fim de vida, com especial destaque para a contribuição do filósofo e teólogo português João Poinsot (João de São Tomás, 1589-1644). O texto situa-se na intersecção entre a reflexão filosófica, a teologia católica e a prática pastoral, recorrendo à obra de Poinsot, nomeadamente ao seu tratado "Práctica, y consideración para ayudar a bien morir" (1639), para explorar (...) as dimensões espirituais, emocionais e práticas do acompanhamento de pessoas em estado terminal. (shrink)

By pushing Descartes to more clearly explain the union of body and soul beyond the functioning of a ‘strong’ passion, namely sadness, Elisabeth wants Descartes to review his idea of the passions, and his understanding of the ‘theory of the four humors’. This chapter aims at showing that Descartes turns away from Galen’s theory of the humors, which he globally adopts in the 1633 Treatise of Man. With the shift in his conceptualization of the humors between this Treatise and the (...) Treatise of the Passions (1649), Descartes analyzed more specifically the inner feelings, consciousness, and the passions, by considering that a man is not simply a body, but a psychophysical being, with a body and a soul. (shrink)

A sentimentalist theory of morality explains all moral evaluations as manifestations of certain emotions, ones that David Hume and Adam Smith, in their related but divergent accounts, call moral sentiments. The two theories have complementary successes and failures in capturing familiar features of the experience of making moral evaluations. Thinking someone courageous or dishonest need not involve having goals or feelings of desire, and Hume’s theory captures that well; but its account of how our moral evaluations are about or directed (...) toward people or actions is deficient. Smith’s theory readily explains how moral sentiments can be about things (and which things they are about), but at the cost of construing some central moral evaluations as goal-directed desires that are simply not like that. Present-day sentimentalists also face the challenge of combining these two desiderata. (shrink)

As in classical Latin philosophical and theological texts, Spinoza did not make any semantic distinction between the concepts of conscientia and conscius, and used one interchangeably. But the concept of conscientia is used as an “inner voice” or “conscience” meaning “moral sensitivity” or “moral awareness” and expresses both rational and irrational processes in traditioanl philosophy. On the other hand, the concept of conscius is used in the sense of “consciousness” and expresses a mental or psychological reflexive activity based on rational (...) processes in the same tradition. Based on Spinoza's use of the two concepts in the same sense, this study claims that “moral sensitivity” is formed as a result of reflexive thinking, which is a mental action. Where consciousness is understood as a reflexive activity based on the relationship between ideas, it is argued that “moral awareness” occurs in the mind as an idea formed as a result of the relationship between ideas. In the study, it is determined that Spinoza developed a kind of “moral consciousness” theory based on the awareness in question, rather than a “conscience theory”. The main focus of the study is that the idea of “good” and “evil”, which are the basic concepts in Spinoza’s ethics, arise from the idea of “joy” and “sadness” that occur as emotions in the mind. Here, “joy” or “sadness” is considered as the primary ideas that occur in the mind as a result of the affection of the body, and “good” or “bad” as secondary ideas formed by the mind as a result of contemplation on these primary ideas. In the article, the theory of “moral consciousness” is based on the “ideas of ideas”, which are the secondary ideas in question. Keywords: Consciousness, Conscience, Awareness, Moral Consciousness, Good-Evil, Joy-Sadness. (shrink)

In discussing the obligation to love everyone, Mary Astell (1666–1731) recognizes and responds to what I call the theocentric challenge: if humans are required to love God entirely, then they cannot fulfill the second requirement to love their neighbor. In exploring how Astell responds to this challenge, I argue that Astell is an astute metaphysician who does not endorse the metaphysical views she praises. This viewpoint helps us to understand the complicated relationship between her views and those of Descartes, Malebranche, (...) Henry More, and John Norris, as well as her sophisticated approach to biblical interpretation and theology. Attending to theocentrism opens up new avenues of research in the study of early modern philosophy. It also helps us to see connections between Astell and other theocentric philosophers such as Spinoza and Anne Conway. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to shed light on some of the most original elements of Fichte’s conception of morality as expressed in his account of specific obligations. After some remarks on Fichte’s original classification of ethical duties, the paper focuses on the prohibition of lying, the duty to communicate our true knowledge, and the duty to set a good example. Fichte’s account of those duties not only goes beyond the mere justification of universally acknowledged demands, but also deploys (...) different arguments than his contemporaries, most notably Kant. Fichte thereby sketches a conception of morality in which the agent is crucially required to contribute to the morality of others. The chapter explores the contrast between Fichte’s view and Kant’s thought of an end in itself and suggests that Fichte’s view of morality amounts to a form of normative perfectionism that is qualified by the underlying claim of the agent-neutral character of moral demands. (shrink)

The "System of Ethics" was published at the height of Fichte's academic career and marks the culmination of his philosophical development in Jena. Much more than a treatise on ethics narrowly construed, the "System of Ethics" presents a unified synthesis of Fichte's core philosophical ideas, including the principle I-hood, self-activity and self-consciousness, and also contains his most detailed treatment of action and agency. This volume brings together an international group of leading scholars on Fichte, and is the first of its (...) kind in English to offer critical and interpretive perspectives on this work, covering topics such as normativity, belief, justification, desire, duty, and the ethical life. It will be an essential guide for scholars wanting to deepen their understanding of Fichte's ethical thought, as well as for those interested in the history of ethics more broadly. (shrink)

Dans cette contribution, nous nous penchons sur la figure du bonheur paradoxal qui, dans les "Rêveries du promeneur solitaire" de Rousseau, se définit au sein d’un jeu de tensions multiples. Si le bonheur exige la solitude, il est toujours hanté par l’altérité ; si sa source est en soi-même, il ne cesse toutefois de dépendre de circonstances contingentes ; et si, enfin, il s’éprouve tout entier dans le sentiment, il s’agit pourtant d’un sentiment augmenté d’un caractère réfléchi ou, pour mieux (...) dire, redoublé dans le souvenir que retrace l’écriture. Dans tous les cas, ces antinomies du bonheur – sur lesquelles nous reviendrons longuement plus loin – s’enracinent dans une marqueterie de références dont l’hétérogénéité est l’expression d’un dialogue tendu au sein duquel, comme nous souhaiterions d’abord le montrer, la philosophie morale des Anciens se réinvente en adoptant le langage, éminemment moderne, du sentiment. (shrink)

This is a brief introduction to the origin and development of Protestant ethical works in the tradition of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

This is a brief reference article on William Wollaston's moral theory, including some influential objections to it.

Descartes explicitly states that virtue is sufficient for attaining happiness. In this paper I argue that, within the framework he develops, this is not exactly true: more than virtuous action is needed to secure happiness. I begin by analyzing, in Section 2, the Cartesian notion of virtue in order to show the way in which it closely connects to what, for Descartes, forms the very essence of morality – the correct use of our free will. Section 3, in turn, discusses (...) Descartes’s view of happiness and its relation to the highest good. Thereby is laid the foundation for Section 4, which offers a reconstruction of the argument that virtue leads to happiness. Section 5 concludes the discussion by suggesting how and why Descartes leaves a crucial premise – an intellectual insight that consists of three main elements – unmentioned when he claims that virtue is sufficient for happiness. (shrink)

On a standard reading of David Hume, we know two things about his analogy of morals to secondary qualities: first, it responds to the moral rationalism of Clarke and Wollaston; second, it broadcasts Hume’s realism or antirealism in ethics. I complicate that common narrative with a new intellectual contextualization of the analogy, the surprising outcome of which is that Hume’s analogy is neither realist nor antirealist in spirit, but quietist. My argument has three parts. First, I reconstruct Hume’s argument against (...) rationalist moral ontology in Treatise 3.1.1, revealing his attention to the Intellectualism/Voluntarism debate in rationalism. Second, I present evidence of Hume’s familiarity with the debate between Intellectualist moral realists and Voluntarist moral antirealists, notably Pufendorf. Third, I establish that Hume’s analogy undermines a key assumption structuring that debate, and that the analogy consequently signals his quietist abstention from his rationalist contemporaries’ realism/antirealism debate in ethics. (shrink)

Sidgwick claimed Kant as one of his moral philosophical masters. This did not prevent Sidgwick from registering pointed criticisms of most of Kant’s main claims in ethics. This paper explores the practical ethics of Sidgwick and Kant. In § I, I outline the element of Kant’s theoretical ethics that Sidgwick endorsed. In §§ II and III, I outline and adjudicate some of their sharpest disagreements in practical ethics, on the permissibility of lying and on the demands of beneficence. In § (...) IV, I argue that compared to Kant, Sidgwick has a better strategy for overcoming disagreement in practical ethics. §V sums things up. (shrink)

This chapter compares three different general accounts of personhood (Byzantine, Boethian, and Modern) and argues that if personhood is the basis on which one has equal moral status in the moral community and the disability-positive position is correct, then the Byzantine and Boethian accounts are preferable over the Modern accounts that are surveyed here. It further argues that the Byzantine account is even friendlier to a disability-positive position compared to the Boethian account.

Thanks to Michel Foucault, one might say it has become possible to conceive that the political relevance of humanity in modern thought does not have to do with its “philosophical essence” but rather with its “nonessence.” Yet this very idea surfaced earlier in Western thought, at the time of the revolutionary turn towards a politicized humanitarianism, and helped to shape some crucial political strategies making up modern liberal democracy. Its potential eluded even Foucault. I contend that tracing the contours of (...) this classical, if long unthinkable idea, can inform our response to the other of social critique. (shrink)

Planteamos el problema siguiente: Descartes contesta la acusación irracional de Voetius interpretando, excepcionalmente, los Evangelios y afirma que las _leyes de caridad _son _afines _a las _leyes de la amistad natural _que rigen las funciones del pastor y del profesor. Proponemos que Descartes excluye el examen de las virtudes teologales e incursiona en el derecho privado y civil para probar que Voetius no es un _verdadero _profesor, ni un _verdadero _pastor, y usurpa las atribuciones del juez. Frente a la irracionalidad, (...) la búsqueda de la verdad se despliega en el alegato jurídico. -/- Descartes and the laws of charity. Public and private law in the Letter to Voetius Abstract. We pose this problem: Descartes responds to Voetius’ irrational accusation by resorting once, on his own initiative, to Gospel, an interpretation that reviews the laws of charity as akin to the laws of natural friendship governing pastor and teacher roles. We propose that the Letter be a legal argument. Descartes has no interest in theological virtues: facing irrationality, he delves into private law to prove that Voetius is not a true teacher, or a true pastor, and encroaches on the function of judge. (shrink)

Scotus’s account of the two affections of the will has received extensive attention from recent scholars, in part because this is often seen as one of Scotus’s key departures from Aquinas and from the eudaimonist tradition more generally. Curiously, however, the early modern followers of Scotus seem largely to ignore the two affections doctrine. This paper surveys the reception of the doctrine in Francisco Lychetus, Francisco Macedo, Juan de Rada, Sebastian Dupasquier, and Claude Frassen.

Among the most animating debates in eighteenth-century British ethics was the debate over psychological egoism, the view that our most basic desires are self-interested. An important episode in that debate, less well known than it should be, was the exchange between Francis Hutcheson and John Clarke of Hull. In the early editions of his Inquiry into Virtue, Hutcheson argued ingeniously against psychological egoism; in his Foundation of Morality, Clarke argued ingeniously against Hutcheson’s arguments. Later, Hutcheson attempted new arguments against psychological (...) egoism, designed to overcome Clarke’s objections. This article examines the exchange between these philosophers. Its conclusion, influenced partly by Clarke, is that psychological egoism withstands Hutcheson’s arguments. This is not to belittle those arguments—indeed, they are among the most resourceful and plausible of their kind. The fact that egoism withstands them is thus not a mere negative result, but a stimulus to consider carefully the ways in which progress in this area may be possible. (shrink)

Andrew Youpa offers an original reading of Spinoza's moral philosophy, arguing it is fundamentally an ethics of joy. Unlike approaches to moral philosophy that center on praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, Youpa maintains that Spinoza's moral philosophy is about how to live lovingly and joyously. His reading expands to examinations of the centrality of education and friendship to Spinoza's moral framework, his theory of emotions, and the metaphysical foundation of his moral philosophy.

Overview of "Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics" to kick off online colloquium on book, with responses by Sandra Field, Michael LeBuffe, and Daniel Eggers, ending with reply from Arash Abizadeh.

Reading Hobbes in light of both the history of ethics and the conceptual apparatus developed in recent work on normativity, this book challenges received interpretations of Hobbes and his historical significance. Arash Abizadeh uncovers the fundamental distinction underwriting Hobbes's ethics: between prudential reasons of the good, articulated via natural laws prescribing the means of self-preservation, and reasons of the right or justice, comprising contractual obligations for which we are accountable to others. He shows how Hobbes's distinction marks a watershed in (...) the transition from the ancient Greek to the modern conception of ethics, and demonstrates the relevance of Hobbes's thought to current debates about normativity, reasons, and responsibility. His book will interest Hobbes scholars, historians of ethics, moral philosophers, and political theorists. (shrink)

After qualifying in which sense ‘realism’ can be applied to eighteenth-century views about morality, I argue that while Kant shares with traditional moral realists several fundamental claims about morality, he holds that those claims must be argued for in a radically different way. Drawing on his diagnosis of the serious weaknesses of traditional moral realism, Kant proposes a novel approach that revolves around a hybrid view about moral obligation. Since his solution to that central issue combines elements of realism with (...) elements of voluntarist ascent, Kant’s position can be characterized as an idealist version of moral realism or, more specifically, as the combination of a strong realism about the moral law with an idealist account of moral obligation. (shrink)

This paper sheds light on Kant’s notion of autonomy in his moral philosophy by considering Kant’s critique of the rationalist theories of morality that Kant discussed in his lectures on practical philosophy from the 1760s to the time of the Groundwork. The paper first explains Kant’s taxonomy of moral theories and his perspective on the history of ethics. Second, it considers Kant's arguments against the two main variants of ‘rationalism’ as he construes it, that is, perfectionism and theological voluntarism, pointing (...) out the similarities to previous criticisms. Third, the paper argues that Kant’s discussion of the 'rationalist' views does not amount to an unqualified dismissal, but to an attempt at working out a novel rationalist position. Kant’s criticisms of rationalist views suggest that his project emerges from the failures of previous rationalism, with the aim to work out a rationalist view that can account for moral obligation by integrating insights from the theological conception. The combination of perfectionism and theological views yields the basic outline of the idea of autonomy, consisting in the lawgiving function of a rational will as a key to the legislation of a necessary law. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham is often interpreted as defending a satisficing, rather than maximizing, version of utilitarianism, where an act is right as long as it produces more pleasure than pain. This lack of maximization is surprising given Bentham’s maximizing slogan ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Against the satisficing interpretation, I argue that Bentham consistently defends a maximizing version of utilitarianism, where an act’s consequences are compared to those of not performing the act. I show that following this version of (...) utilitarianism requires that one realizes the greatest happiness for all affected individuals. (shrink)