Cultural Geography, Take One: In the Beginning
Our first take follows a conventional narrative plot that begins with ‘origins’ and a ‘classical period’, then unfolds in a linear narrative of ongoing progress of ‘new’, ‘newer’, and ‘newest’ cultural geography. This will give the reader a sense of comfort typical with linear, ‘progressive’ stories, and it will suggest that the boundaries of cultural geography are knowable, periodic, and fixed. This will be deliberately challenged in the takes that follow.
Classical cultural geography is conventionally traced back to origins in the 1920s, with the work of Carl Sauer and his colleagues at the University of California, Berkeley, United States of America. The ‘Berkeley School’, as it would become known, embedded an understanding of culture as both ‘cultivation’ – to grow or rear – and as ‘way of life’. Carl Sauer coined the term ‘cultural landscape’ to describe the manner in which place was ‘fashioned from a natural landscape by a cultural group’. For Sauer,
culture [as a way of life] was the agent, the natural area the medium, the cultural landscape… the result [of cultivation]. Under the influence of a given culture [as way of life], itself changing through time, the landscape undergoes development, passing through phases, and probably reaching ultimately the end of its cycle of development. With the introduction of a different – that is – alien culture [or way of life], a rejuvenation of the cultural landscape sets in, or a new landscape is superimposed on remnants of an older one. (Sauer, 1925)
Hence cultivation and way of life were intimately linked through the concepts of cultural and natural landscapes. Groups of humans with discrete population sizes, densities, mobilities, housing styles, agricultural styles, and social customs – in short, cultures with particular ways of life – would literally transform the prehuman natural landscape by cultivating a new cultural landscape. Consistent in much Sauerian cultural geography, even into the 1970s, was a ‘superorganic’ or ‘cultural-determinist’ approach. Culture was a ‘whole’, rather than an amalgam of the actions of individuals:
We are describing a culture, not the individuals who participate in it. Obviously, a culture cannot exist without bodies and minds to flesh it out; but culture is also something both of and beyond the participating members. Its totality is palpably greater than the sum of its parts. (Zelinsky, 1973: 40)
In Rowntree’s words, Sauerian cultural geographers “depicted the personality of geographical space in historical perspective.” This approach – especially followed in North America in the decades following Sauer – tended to examine the geography of the material cultural landscape, organized, patterned, and located usually in a rural context at the regional scale. Common topics included the study of the diffusion of rural farming practices, modes of agrarian life, distributions and patterns of material cultural products (from vernacular architectural styles to musical instruments), and culturally specific land-use practices.
There is further historical context also worthy of brief explanation: in the 1920s Sauer was reacting against a particularly mechanistic approach to understanding relations between humans and nature – environmental determinism – which had dominated geography until that time. Environmental determinists sought to identify causal links between ecological and terrestrial variations and cultural appearances, traits, and behaviors across the Earth’s human population distribution. Environmental determinists were prominent in Europe (e.g., Mackinder and Ratzel) and their disciples brought it back to America (e.g., William Morris Davis and Ellen C. Semple) and Australia (e.g., Griffith Taylor), under the banner of ‘anthropogeography’ or sometimes, more simply, ‘human geography’.
Environmental determinists sought not only to describe culture as way of life, but also heavily emphasized a sense of civilization or progress – cultural difference was judged through the lens of environmental determinists as moral and intellectual superiority based on a scale of perceived development. Humans were not all considered equal. While humans may have ‘risen’ from ‘nature’, according to environmental determinists, some were less human than others depending upon where they were ‘located’ along a course of ascension ‘above’ nature. Ascendance above the nonhuman world was understood by environmental determinists as a process of becoming civilized, and becoming cultured. Humans were differentiated by being classified into ‘races’. These classifications were regularly disputed, and relied upon crude techniques, such as anthropometrics (body measurement), or drew upon the now discredited scientific ideas of the 1930s, including eugenics and social Darwinism. Certain ‘races’ were regarded to have achieved ‘higher’ levels of civilization – literally, acquiring cultured traits (like reason, rationality, technology, etc.) – as they evolved away from nature. McClintock demonstrates how in the nineteenth-century Europe, these ideas of racial superiority were naturalized through depictions of the human ‘family tree’ – which placed the white races securely on the top branches. Fanciful assumptions were made that the environment somehow determined cultural differences, including morality and intellect. In other words, climate, remoteness, topography, and available ecological resources were responsible for variations in ways of life, and enabled (or limited) peoples to become cultured.
Such theories are dubious not only because of the inherent racism and lack of cross-cultural understanding typical of that time. They are also logically inconsistent because environmental determinists mistook material cultural evidence – the extent of cultivation (literally, in the case of the sophistication of farming practices) and assembly of material objects and edifices (like industrial technologies, buildings, cities, etc.) – as proof of ascent (or otherwise) along hierarchical scales of civility and cultural advancement. Enormous presumptions were made about what evidence constituted culture as a way of life, which was itself poorly theorized. For instance, environmental determinists were too quick to view the absence of grand buildings in some indigenous cultures as evidence of lack of advancement. At the same time, the depth and complexity of indigenous cultural practices and traditions was rarely recognized, or could rarely be imagined outside the dominant Western hierarchical worldview of the time which posited such peoples as ‘lower’ or ‘less cultured’. Ideas of culture as a way of life, when partially and selectively deployed, operated to justify a bounding of certain human worlds as cultured, as separate from others; the remainder categorized as less civilized, primitive, or as belonging to the natural world. Such a conception of culture – a ‘thing’ possessed by certain humans to various extents, in opposition to nature (as ‘without culture’) – became perhaps the most pervasive and influential example of binary thinking in geography, sustaining imagined boundaries between the civilizations of Europe and the savagery of ‘new’ worlds. Further, in this (European) human-centered moral universe, rights were allocated to only those certain people who sat above animals, plants, and minerals. Indigenous rights to land and resources in settler societies were not recognized or were traded away in treaties – acts which set in train conflicts that remained the subject of political struggle for centuries. Geographical knowledges thus enabled European colonial dispossession to be seen as the ‘survival of fittest’ cultures and states over others, while missionary evangelism and the appointment of Aboriginal ‘protectors’ could be justified as the benevolent ushering of indigenous and ‘lower’ races along the civilizing spectrum – diffusing civilization and ‘culture’ through Christianization.
Although contemporary cultural geographers might, with understandable moral outrage, recoil at the idea that such ideas were a foundation for their subdiscipline, it is important to note that environmental determinists were, in effect, writing cultural geography prior to the name ‘cultural geography’ coming into widespread use with the Berkeley School. Environmental determinists conjectured on the qualities of culture, cultural differences, and geographical distributions. The logic of environmental determinist thinking in turn had its own historical context – it did not appear from a vacuum either. It had been influenced by Western philosophy as far back as Aristotle and Plato, and later Locke, Darwin, Montesquieu, and Lamarck. It is thus possible to argue that the production of cultural geographical knowledges has been a mainstay of Western intellectual efforts throughout many hundreds of years. In regular use, however, the term ‘cultural geography’ only became prominent after Carl Sauer and the Berkeley School rejected environmental determinism, introduced the concept of cultural landscape, and injected into geographical theory the capacity of humans to transform their surroundings through a particular way of life.
For essentially half a century, the superorganic, Sauerian understanding of cultural landscape dominated cultural geography, especially in North America, until the emergence of humanistic geography in the 1970s, and the so-called ‘cultural turn’ of the late 1980s, which transformed the subdiscipline and stretched what was meant by culture. Throughout the 1960s, geography had been engaged in an excursion into mathematical modeling and positivist exploration of spatial processes – the so-called quantitative revolution. In the 1970s, geographers reacted against this, drawing on Marxist theories of uneven development, class conflict, and the structural contradictions of the capitalist system, to enliven a new radical geographical perspective. Throughout these decades, cultural geography – still very much seen as in the Sauerian tradition as the study of cultural landscape, region, ecology, and diffusion – was a persistent, albeit sidelined presence. Cultural geography did contribute to the growing, interdisciplinary fields of cultural and political ecology, but by the 1970s it had become less popular and less visible, a specialty considered by many to be arcane or inconsequential.
By the late 1980s, however, Lester Rowntree, summarizing in Progress in Human Geography the advances made by ‘new’ cultural geographers such as Derek Gregory, Peter Jackson, James Duncan, and Dennis Cosgrove, was led to the following observation:
For geographers accustomed to the low, yet enduring profile shown by cultural/humanistic geography over the decades, a silhouette that sometimes engendered a certain defensiveness by its practitioners, this last year has been characterized instead by highly visible activity: a well-known, committed and productive cultural geographer as AAG president, recognition of cultural geography as a speciality group within the association, a multitude of panels and special sessions on ‘new directions’ and ‘emergent themes’ in cultural geography, even multiple-edition textbooks that attest to strong undergraduate enrolments in the area. Has a phoenix arisen? (Rowntree, 1988: 575)
Rowntree was describing the postmodern ‘cultural turn’ (as it would become known) that in the late 1980s and early 1990s networked its way through Anglophone geography, and to some extent further afield. The timing of the ‘cultural turn’ can be linked to a broader dissatisfaction across the social sciences and humanities – including geography – with existing conceptual tools and their ability to help understand the complexity and volatility of contemporary social change. The cultural turn was influenced by the writings of theorists outside geography, such as Pierre Bourdieu, Raymond Williams, and Clifford Geertz, and captured in a series of important books on meaning, power, and the symbolic landscape. According to Cook et al., the foundational narratives and initial energy for the turn in geography came mainly from geographers based in the United Kingdom. They credited the collection by Chris Philo – New Words, New Worlds – for putting the ‘new’ into ‘cultural geography’, although manifesto-like statements about the need for ‘new’ cultural geography had appeared earlier, in particular the papers organized for Cosgrove and Jackson’s session at the 1987 Institute of British Geographers (IBG) conference, on ‘new directions in cultural geography’. During the 1990s, momentum gathered for ‘new cultural geography’ under a series of conferences organized with the support of the Social and Cultural Geography Research Group of the Royal Geographical Society and the IBG.
The curiosities of ‘new’ cultural geographers in the 1980s and 1990s can be interpreted as a series of broad intentions. First, although postmodernism was the catchcry, much of cultural geography after the cultural turn was politically post-Marxian, in the sense of either seeking to advance from, or reacting to, the Marxist political economy that dominated human geography from the 1970s. Humanist geographers writing in the late 1970s and early 1980s were keen not only to reflect more theoretically on the nature of the tensions between socioeconomic structure and human agency, acknowledging Marxist insights into the macro-scale processes and conditions that create social divisions and determine life chances, but also to recognize how human agency is enacted within the bounded and structured confines of particular places and times. Influential at the time were perspectives from phenomenology and structuration theory. Even though Marxism emphasized structures of capitalism, it did enable cultural geographers to move further from superorganicism by recognizing the manner in which esthetic and moral values were contested, and “configured in such a way that they reinforce [society’s] economic and political structures” (Shurmer-Smith, 2002: 29).
Post-Marxist cultural geographers were also heavily influenced by feminist thought and philosophy, and in particular by the realization that socioeconomic class was not the only axis of oppression. Whereas Marxist historical materialism provided a useful theoretical perspective for radical geographers in the 1970s who sought explanations for the way in which capitalism was responsible for socio-economic forms of oppression, those seeking explanations for racism, sexism, and homophobia required different kinds of theoretical tools and empirical approaches. By this time, racial conflict was widespread and the Civil Rights Movement had reversed segregation in the United States, the sexual revolution had confronted conservative norms about gender roles and had empowered women, and decades of international migration and the growth of tourism had produced more heterogeneous cities. The idea of culture as a stable, superorganic ‘way of life’ held collectively by populations needed to be improved upon. Culture became understood more relativistically as identities and behaviors, held by some in a cultural geographical group (and not by others), and deployed by individual people at different times and in differing ways depending on context. This theoretical shift was necessary for researchers interested in confronting oppression, to understand human cultural difference, challenge the idea of ‘race’, uncover the gendered nature of social institutions, and unsettle conservative ideas of ‘normal’ sexuality and family.
For example, the concept of ‘queer’ (understood both as an adjective and as a verb) became crucial to questioning and contesting normative assumptions about sexuality, gender, and space, encouraging researchers to replace assumptions considered ‘fixed’ and ‘natural’ with more fluid and unbounded perspectives. Bell et al. demonstrated how space is often taken for granted as heterosexual by discussing the hostility experienced by those who acted outside the codes and norms of heterosexuality, for example, same sex kissing in the street. More recently, the challenges posed by the gay-friendly marketing of nations, cities, and festivals has been discussed, in particular how such efforts operate to assimilate particular understandings of gayness into mainstream life. Other related debates have included the practicalities of doing and writing queer geographies, as well as potential political interventions that encapsulate the philosophical commitment to ideas of slippage, in-between-ness and liminality.
A second and related intention of the cultural turn was to uncover how ideas, knowledges, and social practices are produced, maintained, and circulated, especially in the realm of everyday life. Whereas Marxist geographers, with their intent to explain socioeconomic oppression, sought to understand the structure and politics of the world capitalist system, cultural geographers interested in sexism, racism, homophobia, and other axes of oppression needed to move beyond superorganic ideas of ‘systems’ and ‘structures’ and grasp with more subtlety the manner in which ideas and attitudes about people and places infused social life, and were responsible for the ways that repression and cruelty materialized. Influences from post-structuralist literary theory permeated geography: meanings for culture were no longer taken as fixed or stable; instead, depictions and representations of places and peoples became subject to analysis. Foucault’s idea of knowledge as power and the related concept of ‘discourse’ (understood as sets of statements that make people, plants, places and things understandable) were particularly influential. Representations and discourses could be captured as ‘data’ in formal documents, such as government policies and planning approvals, and in ‘everyday’ sources such as newspapers, films, television shows, and songs. Analysis of this could reveal the origins and contours of discursive formations – ideas, knowledges, beliefs, attitudes, depictions, and ‘common sense’ notions that permeate society and shape the contemporary world’s cultural geography. For instance, racism toward ‘Asians’ in Britain, or Muslims in the United States, could be revealed through understanding how both groups have been depicted (often in a demonizing fashion) in television and newspapers. Methodological advances included the literary technique of deconstruction, and the development of latent and manifest content analysis – a more numerical, coding-based approach to representational analysis using the language and pictorial material in everyday media as evidence.
Thus, overtly drawing on post-structuralist semiotics, geographers could ‘read’ from everyday discourses the signs and symbols that embody meaning. What these meanings were – and thus how researchers interpreted them – was argued to be open to political and ideological processes, as different groups sought to maintain or contest dominant meanings, or replace them with alternatives or pluralistic interpretations. Cultural representations in the everyday were outcomes of relations of power, from contestations between hegemonic interests (who install dominant meanings) and subordinate groups, who to various extents resist these dominant meanings and ideologies, and express their own interpretations.
Concurrent with this shift toward the representational and the everyday was the reclamation in analysis of ‘popular’ forms of culture. Inspired by the manner in which cultural studies emerged as a new interdisciplinary field seeking to challenge the stuffy orthodoxies of literary criticism, classics, and musicology, geographers embraced popular culture – once considered fanciful, escapist, or common – as a new area of research to be taken seriously. The meaning of culture ‘as art’ was exposed as elitist and deeply tied to imperial notions of European civilization as more ‘cultured’ than other societies. Instead, popular culture in all its forms, from hip hop to sit-coms, and magazines and comic books, became possible sources of representational material for cultural geographical analysis.
Despite the exciting possibilities offered by working outside conventional paradigms, advances in ‘new’ cultural geography were not without their critics. The offences supposedly committed can be condensed down to at least five. Cultural geographers were charged with neglecting the immediately political – of drifting away from a concern with oppression. At best, ‘new’ cultural geography was all hype and no action. Second, cultural geography was charged with ignoring questions concerning rigor, morality, and truth. Cultural geography lacked methodological rigor and had become an ‘anything goes’ subdiscipline. Third, cultural geography was charged with speaking an exclusionary language of post-structuralist ‘jargon’ filled with its own self-importance. Fourth, driven by theory, the cultural turn had transformed the word into the world. Scant empirical data became a veneer, allowing theory-as-fashion to run rampant. Conversely, a final critique suggested that the cultural turn had discarded the possibility of integrative or holistic theory, transforming the world relativistically into a series of case studies, with a soft theoretical veneer. At best, the cultural turn resulted in a number of highly reflexive case studies. Thrift alerted us that such charges are of benefit. Crucially, he pointed to the importance of the application of analysis of everyday geographies into government policies through initiatives in both teaching and training. Others argued that cultural geographers have continued to work politically (on forms of oppression beyond capitalist exploitation), that methodological experimentation was precisely what was required to push the barriers of knowledge beyond problematic assumptions and staid conventions. Futher, cultural geography’s contemporary terminology was appropriate, and no different to the technical language of the physical sciences – having its own theoretical origins, and specific intended purposes and meanings.
Yet, throughout the 1990s, and on into the 2000s, cultural geographers themselves would voice dissatisfaction with the dominance of the now mainstream representational strand of cultural geography. The argument was that cultural geography had become too reliant on textual analysis and cultural discourse, without requisite ethnographic work required to understand how these representations impacted on people, social policy, and the material landscape. Instead, it was recommended that geographers promote efforts to ‘rematerialize’ geography, through a ‘newest’ cultural geography, intended to supersede the ‘new’ cultural geography of the 1980s and 1990s.
One response was through the importation of yet another set of outside theoretical influences, this time from history and philosophy of science and the work of authors such as Bruno Latour: the so-called ‘actor-network theory’ with its focus not on representations or discourse, but on the relations forged in an ongoing manner between people, objects, plants, and animals. The core of this theoretical perspective was recognition that humans did not have a monopoly over culture, nor over agency; instead, nonhuman objects, animals, and plants were theorized as agents with equal capacity to exist and enact agency in networked sets of relationships with humans and other beings. These sets of relationships – often described as ‘assemblages’, ‘actor-networks’, or ‘hybrid geographies’ – move cultural geography away from a purely discursive focus, and advance an understanding of the world in which dualistic ideas about humanity and nature as separate spheres are no longer assumed.
While actor-network theory provided an excellent tool for challenging nature–human dualisms, concerns were raised about how understandings of place rested within this conceptual framework. Cloke and Jones extended the concept of networks by turning to the concept of dwelling. It offered deeper insights into how (non)human actors are relationally co-constituted in landscapes and places, as well as networks. Examples would be ‘the city’, ‘the orchard’, or ‘backyard’, conceptualized not as bounded geographical entities, but as a set of continually revised relationships between people, the material objects (such as cars, roads, and ports, in the case of the city), and ecological systems containing plants, birds, insects, etc. Thrift also pointed out the failure of actor-network theory to conceptualize place, using the term ‘ecology’ to signal that thinking about relational places involves understanding interactions between a wide spectrum of entities, some human, some physical, some biological, and some human made. Further, Thrift argued that actor-network theory gave conceptual priority to the technical over the human body – that is, its perceptual mechanisms, memory, and various bodily skills. Hence, Thrift extends relational thinking about the spatial by directing attention to Judith Butler’s concept of performativity. In this view, identities are unstable, and not innate; instead, they are performed repetitively by subjects interacting (whether consciously, or in an embodied, unconscious level) with historically embedded discourses, norms, and ideals. Gender is not a given biological fact; rather it is performed by subjects in relation to social norms and ideals. This has enabled the rethinking of the relationships between scale, subjectivity, the body, and mobility. For example, Knopp rethinks the role of mobility in the lives of nonheterosexual people. Rather than explain the mobility of people with same-sex desires purely through attributes of the urban or the rural (as destinations and/or places of origin), the embodied motivations of individual people are also seen as crucial. On the one hand, particular sexual desires may be played through differences nonheterosexual people imagine between the city and the country. On the other hand, identities are created and performed through the experiences and acts of physically moving through space. A focus on embodied (dis)placement is a constant reminder that personal-identity formation is spatially co-constituted, progressive, and fluid, and never complete or fixed.