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Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.

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Young v. American Mini Theatres
Argued March 24, 1976
Decided June 24, 1976
Full case nameYoung, Mayor of Detroit, et al. v. American Mini Theatres, Incorporated, et al.
Citations427 U.S. 50 (more)
96 S. Ct. 2440; 49 L. Ed. 2d 310; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 3; 1 Media L. Rep. 1151
Holding
It is constitutional for a city to enact a zoning rule that treats ordinary cinemas differently from adult cinemas.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr. · Potter Stewart
Byron White · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
MajorityStevens (Parts I, II), joined by Burger, White, Powell, Rehnquist
PluralityStevens (Part III), joined by Burger, White, Rehnquist
ConcurrencePowell
DissentStewart, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
DissentBlackmun, joined by Brennan, Stewart, Marshall
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV

Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), is a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a city ordinance of Detroit, Michigan that restricted the locations of adult movie theaters within the city.[1]

Background

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In 1972, the city of Detroit, Michigan, amended its zoning codes to regulate the location of adult movie theaters, restricting them from opening within 1,000 feet of two other establishments with "regulated uses" (such as other adult theaters, adult book stores, cabarets, bars, taxi dance halls, and hotels) or within 500 feet of any residential area. Following adoption of the ordinance, American Mini Theaters opened two adult theaters and filed a lawsuit against city officials seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. American Mini Theaters argued that the ordinances violated the First Amendment by imposing an unconstitutional prior restraint and content-based restriction and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by singling out specific businesses, while also asserting the law was void for vagueness. The federal district court upheld the ordinances and granted summary judgment to the city. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and determined the ordinances constituted a prior restraint on constitutionally protected communication and violated equal protection.[1]

Opinion of the Court

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Justice Stevens (writing for the plurality) reasoned that the speech involved here is of lower value, and the city also has a compelling interest in protecting quality of life.

Justice Powell (concurring) disagreed with Stevens' "lower value speech" argument (thus limiting Part III of the opinion to a plurality), but wrote that this is only a place restriction with a limited effect on speech.

See also

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References

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