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Third wave of autocratization

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Third wave of autocratization
Part of waves of democracy
c. 2000s – present
Third wave of democratization
Riot police firing tear gas canisters at Hong Kong protesters, 2019
LocationWorldwide
Key events

The third wave of autocratization is the ongoing 21st-century phenomenon whereby countries around the globe are drifting away from liberal democracy towards authoritarianism. The war on terror, the Great Recession, and the COVID-19 pandemic were some of the most significant events that exacerbated autocratization. Since the 2010s, more countries have been autocratizing than democratizing.[1]

Unlike previous waves of autocratization, the third wave has resulted in significant autocratization in healthy liberal democracies. Modern autocrats have relied less on military coups to consolidate power and more on being legitimately elected to positions of power and eroding separation of powers from within.

Waves of autocracy contrast with waves of democracy, with the third wave of autocratization being preceded by the third wave of democratization, which began in 1974. Although experts disagree on which year marked the beginning of the third wave of autocratization (and the corresponding end to the third wave of democratization), most agree it began during the war on terror or Great Recession.

Autocratization has ignited international pro-democracy movements such as the Arab Spring and the Gen Z protests. Autocratization has also led to developments in protest tactics against police riot control methods, as well as the popularization of new pro-democracy symbols like the three-finger salute and Straw Hats' Jolly Roger.

Timeline

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Modern democratic backsliding, rather than occurring through military coups (the norm during the Cold War era), has more frequently occurred through the election of personalist leaders or parties who subsequently dismantle democratic institutions.[2] New democracies that were weakly established during the third wave of democratization have been especially vulnerable to democratic backsliding.[3][4]

War on terror (2001–2021)

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Following the September 11 attacks and subsequent war on terror, democratic backsliding ensued.[5] The war on terror is a global military campaign initiated by the United States in response to the September 11 attacks in 2001. A global conflict spanning multiple wars, some researchers and political scientists have argued that it replaced the Cold War.[6][7]

In 2003, political scientists and theorists believed that the third wave had crested and would soon begin to ebb, just as its predecessors did in the first and second waves.[8]

Detainees in orange jumpsuits bound in a holding area at Guantanamo Bay, 2002

While support for the "war on terror" was high among the American public during its initial years, it had become deeply unpopular by the late 2000s.[9][10] Controversy over the war has focused on its morality, casualties, and continuity, with critics questioning government measures that infringed civil liberties and human rights.[11] Critics have notably described the Patriot Act as "Orwellian" due to its substantial expansion of the federal government's surveillance powers.[12][13] Controversial practices of coalition forces have been condemned, including drone warfare, surveillance, torture, extraordinary rendition, and various war crimes.[14][15][16] The participating governments have been criticized for implementing authoritarian measures, repressing minorities,[17][18] fomenting Islamophobia globally,[19] and causing negative impacts to health and environment.[20][21][22] Security analysts assert that there is no military solution to the conflict, pointing out that terrorism is not an identifiable enemy, and have emphasized the importance of negotiations and political solutions to resolve the underlying roots of the crises.[23]

Great Recession (2010s)

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V-Dem report on countries autocratizing (red) or democratizing (blue) substantially and significantly (2010–2020). Countries in grey are substantially unchanged.[24]
Since c. 2010, the number of countries autocratizing (blue) has been higher than those democratizing (yellow).[1]

Some scholars argue the third wave of autocratization began in the 2010s after the Great Recession, when the number of liberal democracies was at an all-time high.[25][26] From 2010 to 2020, the V-Dem Institute reported a global decline in liberal democracy.[27]

COVID-19 (2019–2022)

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Police wearing masks in the Wuhan Tianhe International Airport during the initial COVID-19 outbreak, January 2020
U.S. National Guard soldiers assist SWAT team members enforcing a lockdown curfew during the George Floyd protests in Atlanta, June 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic has been used as a pretext for autocratization, largely due to the heavy practical and logistical disruption the virus and subsequent lockdown restrictions have caused.[28][29][30][31] Across the world, national governments found themselves with no other choice but to suspend, cancel, or postpone numerous democratic elections at both national and subnational governmental levels.[32]

The 2020 Freedom House report also highlighted a variety of responses relating to government mishandling of the pandemic against the best interests of its citizens, such as denial of the existence of COVID-19 in Turkmenistan and Nicaragua, and the promotion of unsafe or unproven treatments in Brazil and Tanzania.[31] The Freedom in the World score dropped by 45 points in 2020, marking the most significant decline in the prior fifteen years.[29] According to Ingo Keilitz, both authoritarian leaders and surveillance capitalists used the pandemic to "make massive shifts and reprogramming of our sensibilities about privacy and civil liberties that may not be reversible." Keilitz saw this as a threat to judicial independence.[33] The Pandemic Backsliding Index created by V-Dem measured authoritarian and illiberal practices between March and December 2020 for 144 countries, and found 80% of all countries engaged in authoritarian practices such as emergency measures without time limit, disproportionate limitations on the role of legislatures, and government disinformation campaigns.[34] Dr. Abouzzohour at Harvard University said that from 2020 to 2022, COVID-19 "undoubtedly contributed to the deterioration of political freedom" globally. She claimed "heightened repression, militarization, and restrictions" following from the pandemic contributed.[29]

This is due to factors that have been weakened such as "checks against abuses of power, protection of vulnerable groups, transparency and anti-corruption, free media and expression, and credible elections."[31] As governments were entrusted with unprecedented powers to protect public health, even the strongest democracies "failed to guard themselves against abuse of power," said an op-ed on Newsweek.[35] This is because emergency powers grant governments the ability to '"make regulations without an act of parliament"[36] These powers are typically intended to take "rapid action"[36] and combat instability. Emergency powers have been used by some governments to extend state power.[37] This arguably occurred in Moscow, where tens of thousands of cameras with facial-recognition features were supposedly installed to track contagion, however, these systems risk remaining in place after the pandemic.[37] According to a 2020 Brookings Institution report, "the challenges posed by the need for mass surveillance suggest that the resilience of democratic regimes cannot be taken for granted." The same study highlighted foreign disinformation surrounding COVID-19 as a threat to democracy, stating that the pandemic presented an opportunity for malign actors to "multiply the production of fake news, conspiracy theories, and manipulated information", it further stated that "Russia and China exploited the chaos induced by COVID-19 to promote their geopolitical interests and continue to destabilise western democracies."[37]

An article on the journal Democratic Theory comments that a side effect of COVID-19 will be a "long-term effect on established democracies around the world."[38] Part of this long-term effect includes the increasing prevalence of democratic backsliding; while proportional responses to a global pandemic are necessary, excessive measures under abusive enforcement have raised concerns that democracy, in nations where it is already unstable, is declining worldwide.[39]

After the National Assembly of Hungary passed legislation allowing Viktor Orbán to rule by decree, the Washington Post declared the pandemic had "killed its first democracy."[40] During the Hong Kong protests in 2020, police used newly-passed pandemic laws banning groups of more than four to disperse protesters.[41][42]

Post-COVID (2022–present)

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V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index 2026
US citizen Aliya Rahman is dragged from her car and arrested during Operation Metro Surge, 2026[43]

In the 2020s, democratic backsliding has increasingly been observed not only in newer or weakly institutionalized democracies, but also in long-established democratic systems.[44]

According to the V-Dem Institute's Democracy Report 2026, nearly a quarter of the world's countries were undergoing autocratization in 2025, including several in Europe and North America. The report also highlights growing concerns about declines in democratic quality and increasing pressures on media and journalists worldwide.[44]

Russia under Vladimir Putin has repeatedly engaged in election interference and disinformation campaigns aimed at damaging opponents of far-right populist factions, including in three US elections to support Donald Trump (2016, 2020, 2024)[45][46][47] and in German elections to support the AfD, or Alternative for Germany (2025).[48][49][50][51][52]

Concepts

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Autocratic legalism

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These paragraphs are an excerpt from Autocratic legalism.[edit]

Autocratic legalism is a form of weaponized legalism and politicization of the law.[53] Political scientist Javier Corrales first defined the term in the context of democratic backsliding in the 21st century. It was later expanded upon by sociologist Kim Lane Scheppele. The term describes the use of legal methods that are used by autocrats to weaken the checks and balances in liberal constitutional democracies, effectively transforming them from democratic systems into autocracies and hybrid regimes.[54]

Right-wing populism

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French politician Marine Le Pen, who has been described as a right-wing populist[55]
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Right-wing populism.[edit]

Right-wing populism, also called right populism and national populism,[56][57][58] is a political ideology that combines right-wing politics with populist rhetoric and themes. Its rhetoric employs anti-elitist sentiments, opposition to the Establishment, and speaking to or for the common people. Recurring themes of this political ideology include neo-nationalism, social conservatism, economic nationalism, and fiscal conservatism.[59] Frequently, they aim to defend a national culture, identity, and economy against perceived attacks by outsiders.[60]

Some right-wing populist parties and movements have associations with elements of authoritarianism,[61][62] while some far-right populists draw comparisons to fascism.[63] Right-wing populism in the Western world is sometimes associated with ideologies such as anti-environmentalism,[64] anti-globalisation,[65][66][67] nativism,[65][68][69] and protectionism.[70] In Europe, the term is often used to describe groups, politicians and political parties generally known for their opposition to immigration,[65][71] and for Euroscepticism.[72] Some right-wing populists may support expanding the welfare state, but only for those they deem fit to receive it;[73] this concept has been referred to as "welfare chauvinism".[74][75][76][77][78] Since the Great Recession,[79][80][81] European right-wing populist movements began to grow in popularity,[82][83] in large part due to increasing opposition to immigration from the Middle East and Africa, rising Euroscepticism and discontent with the economic policies of the European Union.[84] Some forms of right-wing populism may also go into libertarian themes, with federalism, anti-central bank, pro-sound money and the non-aggression principle being key themes in the libertarian spectre of right-wing populism, with Ron Paul and some parts of the Tea Party movement being a notable example of this.[citation needed]

Scholars use terminology inconsistently, sometimes referring to right-wing populism as "radical right"[85] or other terms such as new nationalism.[86] Pippa Norris noted that "standard reference works use alternate typologies and diverse labels categorising parties as 'far' or 'extreme' right, 'New Right', 'anti-immigrant' or 'neo-fascist', 'anti-establishment', 'national populist', 'protest', 'ethnic', 'authoritarian', 'anti-government', 'anti-party', 'ultranationalist', 'right-libertarian' and so on".[87][needs update] The term authoritarian populism can be used to describe right-wing populism,[88] although it is also used to refer to left-wing political movements.[89][90]

Policing

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Kettling

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Police kettle at the G20 Toronto summit protests, 2010
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Kettling.[edit]

Kettling (also known as containment or corralling)[91] is a police tactic for controlling large crowds during demonstrations or protests. It involves the formation of large cordons of police officers who then move to contain a crowd within a limited area. Protesters either leave through an exit controlled by the police, leave through an uncontrolled gap in the cordons, or are contained, prevented from leaving, and arrested.

The tactic has proved controversial, in part because it has resulted in the detention of ordinary bystanders as well as protesters.[92] In March 2012, kettling was ruled lawful by the European Court of Human Rights following a legal challenge.[93]

Militarization

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Law enforcement officer in an armored vehicle aiming an assault rifle during the anti-ICE Los Angeles protests, 2025
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Militarization of police.[edit]

The militarization of police (sometimes referred to as the paramilitarization of police in some media) is the use of military equipment and tactics by law enforcement officers.[94] This includes the use of armored personnel carriers (APCs), assault rifles, submachine guns, flashbang grenades,[95] sniper rifles, and SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams.[96][97] The militarization of law enforcement is also associated with intelligence agency–style information gathering aimed at the public and political activists[98][99] and with a more aggressive style of law enforcement.[100][101] Criminal justice professor Peter Kraska has defined militarization of police as "the process whereby civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model".[102]

Predictive policing

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These paragraphs are an excerpt from Predictive policing.[edit]

Predictive policing is the usage of mathematics, predictive analytics, and other analytical techniques in law enforcement to identify potential criminal activity.[103][104][105]

A report published by the RAND Corporation identified four general categories predictive policing methods fall into: methods for predicting crimes, methods for predicting offenders, methods for predicting perpetrators' identities, and methods for predicting victims of crime.[106] Predictive policing has received significant scrutiny throughout the 2010s and 2020s, especially relating to concerns of the practice disproportionately affecting communities of color due to selection bias.

Protest policing

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US Seattle Police Department officers at the George Floyd protests, 2020
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Protest policing.[edit]

Protest policing or public order policing is part of a state’s response to political dissent and social movements. Police maintenance of public order during protest is an essential component of liberal democracy, with military response to protest being more common under authoritarian regimes.[107]

Australasian, European, and North American democratic states have all experienced increased surveillance of protest movements and more militarized protest policing since 1995 and through the first decades of the 21st century.[108][109]

Criminalization of dissent is legislation or law enforcement that penalizes political dissent. It may also be accomplished through media that controls public discourse to delegitimize critics of the state. Study of protest criminalization places protest policing in a broader framework of criminology and sociology of law.[108]

Academic study of protest policing has identified several protest policing strategies.[108][110][109]

Escalating force is a legalistic and repressive approach toward protest.

Negotiated management is a communication-based approach emphasizing negotiation with protestors.

Strategic incapacitation is a policing strategy that emphasizes less lethal weapons like tasers or tear gas; kettling; no-protest zones; and surveillance or information campaigns to manage protests.

Militarized protest policing sees protest as a threat, negotiates incoherently, and uses indiscriminate surveillance and coercive strategies to suppress protest. It is associated with the “strategic incapacitation” approach to protest policing.[108][110][109]

Police response to the global justice movement in liberal democracies during the early decades of the 21st century as well as various environmental movements around the world have prompted several studies about criminalization of protest that place protest policing in a broader framework of criminology and sociology.[108]

Dissent is criminalized through a variety of processes. These include the making of new laws or increasing penalties for existing laws; control of discourse about protest to delegitimize dissent and frame it as a security problem or “terrorism”;[108] and impunity for officials that violate human rights or refuse to investigate abuses against political dissidents.[111]

Criminalization of dissent is often most severe in authoritarian countries, resulting in cruel punishments or even killings of protestors. However, both authoritarian and democratic states have restricted the right to protest; and criminalization of dissent has been “firmly entrenched” in liberal democracies since their origin.[108]

Criminalization of dissent may also take the form of intimidation, disappearances, or violence against human rights defenders or political dissidents. It may also occur as a discursive battle that frames defense of human rights or the environment as a threat to national security.[111] “Thus, a main component of criminalization is legitimizing the repression of the peaceful and democratic conduct of community members, transforming them into public enemies and accusing them of illegitimate violence, delinquency, terrorism, etc.”[111]

Riot police

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US riot police arrest a protester at the Delaney Hall protests, 2026

Riot police are police who are organized, deployed, trained or equipped to confront crowds, protests or riots.

Riot police may be regular police officers who act in the role of riot police in particular situations, or they may be separate units organized within or in parallel to regular police forces. Riot police are used in a variety of different situations and purposes. They may be employed to control riots as their name suggests, to disperse or control crowds, to maintain public order or discourage criminality, or to protect people or property. The militarization of modern police has brought militaristic riot gear and new technologies that allow for their duties to expand above normal police duties.[112]

Riot police often use special equipment called riot gear to help protect themselves and for offensive use in riot control. Riot gear typically includes personal armor, batons, tactical shield, riot shields, and riot helmets. Many riot police teams also deploy specialized non-lethal weapons, such as: baton rounds, sponge grenade, pepper spray, tear gas, riot guns, rubber bullets, stun grenades, water cannons, and Long Range Acoustic Devices.[113]

Other tactics

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Disinformation attack

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Framework conceptualizing the dissemination disinformation on social media
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Disinformation attack.[edit]

Disinformation attacks are strategic deception campaigns[114] involving media manipulation and internet manipulation,[115] to disseminate misleading information,[116] aiming to confuse, paralyze, and polarize an audience.[117] Disinformation can be considered an attack when it involves orchestrated and coordinated efforts[118] to build an adversarial narrative campaign that weaponizes multiple rhetorical strategies and forms of knowing—including not only falsehoods but also truths, half-truths, and value-laden judgments—to exploit and amplify identity-driven controversies.[119] Disinformation attacks use media manipulation to target broadcast media like state-sponsored TV channels and radios.[120][121] Due to the increasing use of internet manipulation on social media,[115] they can be considered a cyber threat.[122][123] Digital tools such as bots, algorithms, and AI technology, along with human agents including influencers, spread and amplify disinformation to micro-target populations on online platforms like Instagram, Twitter, Google, Facebook, and YouTube.[124][119]

According to a 2018 report by the European Commission,[125] disinformation attacks can pose threats to democratic governance, by diminishing the legitimacy of the integrity of electoral processes. Disinformation attacks are used by and against governments, corporations, scientists, journalists, activists, and other private individuals.[126][127][128][129] These attacks are commonly employed to reshape attitudes and beliefs, drive a particular agenda, or elicit certain actions from a target audience. Tactics include circulating incorrect or misleading information, creating uncertainty, and undermining the legitimacy of official information sources.[130][131][132]

Mass surveillance

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Surveillance cameras at Tiananmen Square, 2009
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Mass surveillance.[edit]

Mass surveillance is the intricate surveillance of an entire or a substantial fraction of a population in order to monitor that group of citizens.[133] The surveillance is often done via the use of technologies that collect data on a large mass of individuals.[134][135]

Mass surveillance has often been cited by intelligence agencies – for example, the American National Security Agency (NSA) – as necessary to fight terrorism,[136] and to prevent crime and social unrest.

At the same time, mass surveillance has equally often been criticized for violating privacy rights, limiting civil and political rights and freedoms, and being illegal under some legal or constitutional systems.[137] Another criticism is that increasing mass surveillance could potentially lead to the development of a surveillance state, an electronic police state, or a totalitarian state wherein civil liberties are infringed or political dissent is undermined by COINTELPRO-like programs.[138] Mass surveillance is considered a global issue,[139][140][141][142] and a 2020 Brookings Institution report warned "the challenges posed by the need for mass surveillance suggest that the resilience of democratic regimes cannot be taken for granted."[143]

Global mass surveillance

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NSA lists "Approved SIGINT countries" which are divided into two groups by their cooperation level with the NSA.
  Second Parties
  Third Parties
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Global surveillance.[edit]

Global mass surveillance can be defined as the mass surveillance of entire populations across national borders.[144]

Its existence was not widely acknowledged by governments and the mainstream media until the global surveillance disclosures by Edward Snowden triggered a debate about the right to privacy in the Digital Age.[145][146] One such debate is the balance which governments must acknowledge between the pursuit of national security and counter-terrorism over a right to privacy. Although, to quote H. Akın Ünver, "Even when conducted for national security and counterterrorism purposes, the scale and detail of mass citizen data collected, leads to rightfully pessimistic observations about individual freedoms and privacy".[147]

Pro-democracy movements

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Third-wave countries, including Portugal, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan became fully consolidated democracies rather than backsliding. As of 2020, they even had stronger democracies than many counterparts with a much longer history as democratic countries.[148]

Arab Spring (2010–2012)

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Celebration after the Egyptian revolution forced Hosni Mubarak to resign, 2011
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Arab Spring.[edit]

The Arab Spring (Arabic: الربيع العربي, romanized: ar-rabīʻ al-ʻarabī) was a series of pro-democracy anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across much of the Arab world in the early 2010s. It began in Tunisia in response to the death of Mohamed Bouazizi by self-immolation.[149][150][151] From Tunisia, the protests initially spread to five other countries: Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. The rulers deposed include: Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, all in 2011; and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen in 2012.[a] Major uprisings and social violence occurred, including riots, civil wars, or insurgencies. Sustained street demonstrations took place in Morocco, Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Sudan. Minor protests took place in Djibouti, Mauritania, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and the Western Sahara.[152] A major slogan of the demonstrators in the Arab world is ash-shaʻb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām! (Arabic: الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام, lit. 'the people want to bring down the regime').[153]

The wave of initial revolutions and protests faded by mid- to late 2012, as many Arab Spring demonstrations were met with violent responses from authorities,[154][155][156] pro-government militias, counterdemonstrators, and militaries. These attacks were answered with violence from protesters in some cases.[157][158][159] Multiple large-scale conflicts followed: the Syrian civil war;[160][161] the rise of ISIS,[162] insurgency in Iraq and the following civil war;[163] the Egyptian Crisis, election and removal from office of Mohamed Morsi, and subsequent unrest and insurgency;[164] the Libyan crisis;[165] and the Yemeni crisis and subsequent civil war.[166] Regimes that lacked major oil wealth and hereditary succession arrangements were more likely to undergo regime change.[167]

A power struggle continued after the immediate response to the Arab Spring. While leadership changed and regimes were held accountable, power vacuums opened across the Arab world. Ultimately, it resulted in a contentious battle between a consolidation of power by religious elites and the growing support for democracy in many Muslim-majority states.[168] The early hopes that these popular movements would end corruption, increase political participation, and bring about greater economic equity quickly collapsed in the wake of the counter-revolutionary moves by foreign state actors in Yemen,[169] the regional and international military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the destructive civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.[170] Some referred to the succeeding and still ongoing conflicts as the Arab Winter.[160][161][163][164][166]

A new wave of protests began in 2018 which led to the resignation of prime ministers Haider al-Abadi of Iraq in 2018 and Saad Hariri of Lebanon in 2020, and the overthrow of presidents Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria in 2019. Sometimes called the "Second Arab Spring", these events showed how the conditions that started the Arab Spring have not faded and political movements against authoritarianism and exploitation remain ongoing.[171] Continued protest movements in Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria have been seen as a continuation of the Arab Spring.[172][173]

As of 2025, multiple conflicts are still continuing, which some have considered as originating from the Arab Spring. A major shift in the Syrian civil war occurred in December 2024, when a rebel offensive led to the fall of the Assad regime after over a decade of warfare. In Libya, a major civil war concluded, with foreign powers intervening.[174][175] In Yemen, a civil war continues to affect the country.[176]

Gen Z protests (2019–present)

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Protesters during the Hong Kong protests, 2019
  Ongoing protests (as of September 2026)
  Successful protests; government overthrown or changed
  Successful protests; government applied the desired reform
  Partially successful protests; protests that have succeeded in some areas, failed in others
  Protests have occurred previously, with no success
  Protests have returned after previous failed protests
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Gen Z protests.[edit]

The Gen Z protests are a series of youth-led protests and riots that have occurred in some parts of the world during the 2020s. The protests in Bangladesh in 2024 are widely cited as the first successful Gen Z revolution,[177][178][179][180] inspiring other Gen Z-led protests, including Nepal, Indonesia, Philippines, Timor-Leste, Maldives, Mongolia, Madagascar, Morocco, Serbia, India, Albania, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan[181][182][183][184][185][186][187] as well as in other parts of the world. The protests began in Asia, although by 2025 the protests had spread to other continents. To date, the earliest known use of the term was in an opinion piece by French market research company Ipsos published on 8 December 2019, referring to the Fridays for Future and Hong Kong 2019 protests,[188][189] which have generally been considered the beginning of the movement.[190][191]

Although the causes of the protests are different in each country, they have generally been in response to inequality, declining standards of living, corruption, democratic backsliding and authoritarianism. As the first true digital-native generation, social media has been a common tool for activism and coordination and is widely believed by non-members of the generation to have caused these protests. An ML–generated study by Bloomberg Economics in late 2025, assessing 22 million data points on the dynamics surrounding Gen Z protests, found a correlation between social media penetration and a low average age, on the one hand, and increased social discontent over issues such as socio-economic inequality, unemployment, and corruption, on the other.[192]

Some protests, like Bangladesh's 2024 July Uprising and Nepal, have resulted in the overthrow of national governments. As a result, many deaths have occurred from the overthrows. In particular, it saw the emergence of the world's first Gen Z political party, National Citizen Party and Rastriya Swatantra Party,[193] whose candidates became the world's first Gen Z leaders elected as members of parliament of a government.[194][195][196]

Milk Tea Alliance (2020–present)

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These paragraphs are an excerpt from Milk Tea Alliance.[edit]

The Milk Tea Alliance is a democracy and human rights movement consisting of netizens from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, and Myanmar (Burma).[197][198][199] It originally started as an internet meme, created in response to the increased presence of Chinese nationalist commentators on social media[200][201] and has evolved into a dynamic multinational protest movement against authoritarianism and advocating democracy in different parts of Asia.

Pro-democracy symbols

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Three-finger salute

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Protesters displaying the three-finger salute in front of the Democracy Monument during Thai protests, 2020
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Three-finger salute (pro-democracy).[edit]

The three-finger salute is a hand gesture made by raising the index, middle and ring fingers, while holding the thumb to the little finger, and raising the hand with the palm facing out in a salute. The gesture was popularized in the 2010s after its use in The Hunger Games as a symbol of revolution. The gesture has been adopted by protesters, particularly for pro-democracy protest movements in Southeast Asia, mainly in Thailand and Myanmar, as well as in other countries, including Hong Kong.

Straw Hats' Jolly Roger

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Anti-ICE protester waves Straw Hats' Jolly Roger flag outside Trump Tower, 2026
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Straw Hats' Jolly Roger.[edit]

The Straw Hats' Jolly Roger (Japanese: 麦わらの一味の海賊旗, Hepburn: Mugiwara no Ichimi no Kaizokuki; lit. Straw Hat Crew's Jolly Roger), also known as the Straw Hats' Skull and Crossbones, is a pirate flag predominantly featured in the Japanese One Piece manga and its anime franchise, wherein it is used to identify the protagonist Straw Hats, a pirate crew who often fight for liberation of oppressed peoples. The fictional Jolly Roger is of a cartoonish skull with two crossbones and a straw hat similar to the one worn by Monkey D. Luffy.

The Straw Hats' Jolly Roger is a symbol for several global youth-led protest movements. In the August 2025 Indonesian protests, people began using the flag instead of the national flag as a form of protest against the government, and the practice spread to other countries. Notably, the flag saw widespread use during protests in Nepal and Madagascar which overthrew their respective governments. The flag has also seen use in protests in other countries across Africa, the Americas, and Eurasia.

Protest tactics

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Black bloc and PPE

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Black bloc demonstration in Hamburg, Germany, 2007
Black bloc Hong Kong protesters wearing personal protective equipment, 2019
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Black bloc.[edit]

A black bloc (sometimes black block) is a tactic used by protesters who wear similar clothing including ski masks, scarves, sunglasses, and personal protective equipment including goggles, gas masks, motorcycle helmets with padding, or other face-concealing and face-protecting items that are usually, but not necessarily, black.[202][203][204] The clothing is used to conceal wearers' identities from both the police and politically opposing organizations by making it difficult to distinguish between participants. It is also used to protect their faces and eyes from pepper spray, which is used by police during in some protests or civil unrest. The tactic also allows the group to appear as one large unified mass.[205] Black bloc participants are often associated with anarchism. A variant of this type of protest is the Padded bloc, where following the Tute Bianche movement protesters wear padded clothing to protect against the police.

The tactic was developed in the 1980s in the European autonomist movement's protests against squatter evictions, nuclear power, and restrictions on abortion, as well as other influences.[202] Black blocs gained broader media attention outside Europe during the 1999 Seattle WTO protests, when a black bloc damaged property of Gap, Starbucks, Old Navy, and other multinational retail locations in downtown Seattle.[202][206]

Hong Kong protest innovations

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Hong Kong protesters in the Umbrella Movement make way for an ambulance, 2019
US George Floyd protesters using umbrellas to protect from pepper spray, 2020
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Umbrella Movement.[edit]

The Umbrella Movement (Chinese: 雨傘運動) was a political movement that emerged during the 2014 Hong Kong protests.[207][208][209] Its name arose from the use of umbrellas as defense against police pepper spray to disperse the crowd during the protests, sparked by the decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) of the People's Republic of China of 31 August 2014 that prescribed a selective pre-screening of candidates for the 2017 election of Hong Kong's chief executive.[210][211]

These paragraphs are an excerpt from Tactics and methods surrounding the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests.[edit]

The sophistication, novelty and diversity of tactics and methods used by protests in the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests have been noted by many scholars and news outlets around the world. They range from new principles of autonomy and decentralisation, incorporating different methods of demonstration, economic and social protest, and most notably new technological methods for organising and ensuring the security of protesters. Many of these tactics have been used or were inspired by previous protests. The sheer scale, complexity, and variety of tactics used have become a case study for mass protests around the world.

Protestors in Hong Kong using the traffic cone method to put out tear gas canisters, 2019
These paragraphs are an excerpt from Traffic cone method.[edit]

In 2019, Hong Kong protesters invented a way of using traffic cones to dispose tear gas when riot police are attempting to disperse a crowd. The method works by placing a traffic cone over the gas canister to trap the gas inside the cone and then by dousing the canister with water through an opening in the top of the cone.[212][213][214] The method has been used at protests around the world, including in Chile and the United States, after videos on social media spread of the method being used during the Hong Kong protests.

Countries

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Bangladesh

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Bangladeshi people celebrating the resignation of Sheikh Hasina as a result of the July Uprising, 2024

China

[edit]
Chinese students mourn the victims of the fire in Ürümqi, holding blank sheets of paper and singing "The Internationale" and "March of the Volunteers", 2022

Germany

[edit]

Hong Kong

[edit]
Riot police during the Hong Kong protests, 2019
Hong Kong Way campaign protesters on Lion Rock, 2019

Iran

[edit]

Italy

[edit]

Philippines

[edit]
Philippine protesters wave the Straw Hats' Jolly Roger flag, September 2025

Russia

[edit]
Russian riot police at a protest, 2021

South Korea

[edit]

Syria

[edit]

Thailand

[edit]

Turkey

[edit]

United Kingdom

[edit]

United States

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. 1 2 Boese, Vanessa A.; Lindberg, Staffan I.; Lührmann, Anna (18 August 2021). "Waves of autocratization and democratization: a rejoinder". Democratization. 28 (6): 1202–1210. doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.1923006. ISSN 1351-0347.
  2. ↑ Frantz, Erica; Kendall-Taylor, Andrea; Kendall-Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program Andrea; Wright, Joe (2024). The Origins of Elected Strongmen: How Personalist Parties Destroy Democracy from Within. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-888807-9.
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  1. ↑ Other leaders who were targeted by the initial wave of protests but were deposed after its conclusion were Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria in 2019, and Bashar al-Assad of Syria in 2024. al-Bashir was deposed in a military coup d'état during the Sudanese revolution, Bouteflika resigned during the Hirak protests against his presidential candidacy for a fifth term, and Assad was removed from office by an opposition-led offensive after 13 years of civil war.
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