Témbongkeun sumber pikeun Pangaweruh

== Masalah justifikasi ==
<!--In philosophy, knowledge is held to be a belief that is true, actionable and ''justified''. But how do we justify that our beliefs are true knowledge?

Justification and evidence are both epistemic features of belief. Justification and evidence are, in other words, both qualities that indicate that the belief is true. We could try out other epistemic features in the definition of knowledge, if we wanted to. Instead of "justified true belief" or "true belief with evidence," we could say that knowledge is "rational true belief" or "warranted true belief." For our purposes, the differences between these different options don't matter. The whole point is that, to be knowledge, a belief has to have some positive epistemic feature; it can't be arbitrary or random or irrational. The [[Theory of justification]] deals with these issues in more detail.

Another problem with defining knowledge is known as the "[[Gettier problem]]". The Gettier problem arises when we give certain kinds of counterexamples to the JTB (justified true belief) definition. A counterexample is a case where the definition applies, but the word defined doesn't; or a case where the word defined applies, but the definition doesn't. Gettier counterexamples are examples where the definition, justified, true belief applies; but one nevertheless still doesn't have knowledge, so the word "knowledge" doesn't apply in that case. 
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=== Panémbal éksternalis ===
<!--Gettier's article was published in 1963. Right after that, for a good decade or more, there was an enormous number of articles trying to supply the missing fourth condition of knowledge. The big project was to try to figure out the "X" in the equation, Knowledge = belief + truth + justification + X. Whenever someone proposed an answer, someone else would come up with a new counterexample to shoot down that definition.

Some of the proposed solutions involve factors external to the agent. These responses are therefore called [[externalism]]. For example, one externalist response to the Gettier problem is to say that the justified, true belief must be caused (in the right sort of way) by the relevant facts.
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